Dority v. State, CR
| Decision Date | 25 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
| Citation | 951 S.W.2d 559,329 Ark. 631 |
| Parties | Stephanie DORITY, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 97-66. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
John H. Bradley, Blyetheville, for Appellant.
Winston Bryant, Attorney General, Gil Dudley, Assistant Attorney General, Little Rock, for Appellee.
This appeal raises the question whether Ark. R.Crim. P. 28.1, which requires that a defendant be tried within twelve months from the time she is charged with an offense in circuit court, applies to a revocation of probation. The trial court found that the rule does not apply because, in a probation revocation hearing, the defendant is not charged with an offense, but is alleged to have violated the terms of a previously imposed sentence on an offense. This is a question of first impression for this court. The reasoning of the trial court is sound, and we affirm.
A felony information was filed against Stephanie Dority, appellant, on May 9, 1993, charging her with second-degree battery, disorderly conduct, and refusal to submit to arrest. She pleaded guilty to the battery charge, and the other charges were dismissed. On November 9, 1993, the trial court entered an order of probation, which required her, among other things, to report as directed to her parole officer, promptly notify the sheriff and probation officer of any change of address, pay $15.00 per month probation fee, and pay installments of $25.00 per month on a $155.00 fine.
Two petitions for revocation were filed; one on March 14, 1994, and one on February 15, 1995. The first petition stated that appellant had failed to pay $155.95 on her fine, costs, and restitution. The second one stated that she had failed to notify her probation officer and sheriff of any change of address or employment, failed to cooperate with the probation officer "and/or" report as directed, failed to pay probation fees, and failed to pay fines and court costs.
A revocation hearing was held on June 24, 1996. Appellant argued that her right to a speedy trial had been violated because the hearing was held more than one year after the petition to revoke probation had been filed. The court agreed that more than one year had passed and that the extra time periods were not excludable. However, it ruled that appellant had no right to a hearing within a year under the provisions of Ark. R.Crim. P. 28.1 because the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not apply to revocation hearings, and proceeded to hear testimony.
Appellant's probation officer testified that appellant's records indicated that she had only reported once in fifteen months. She did not meet with an officer in person, but slid a note under his door. He stated that he had attempted to locate her, but she had moved. Appellant did not report any changes of address, and the officer filed a report on February 14, 1995, listing her as a absconder because he could not locate her.
Appellant testified that she hadn't paid her fees because she only receives $162.00 per month through Aid for Families with Dependent Children. She said that she had not reported to the probation officer because she had "caught" a drug charge and had assumed that she was not supposed to report after that. She said that she had moved three times since she had been put on probation. She admitted that she had not notified the officer of any changes of address. She said that she had been "hiding out" from police since she "caught" the drug charge.
The court found that appellant had inexcusably violated her probation and sentenced her to four years' imprisonment. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in determining that the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not apply to a revocation proceeding, and she contends that its finding that she inexcusably violated her probation is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence.
As we consider appellant's speedy-trial argument, we recognize that the constitutional right to a speedy trial, as embodied in Ark. R.Crim. P. 28.1,...
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