Dorman v. Chaplains Office BSO
| Decision Date | 10 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-10770 |
| Parties | BRADLEY DORMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHAPLAINS OFFICE BSO, Richard Aronofsky, CHAPLAINS OFFICE BSO, Capri Jordan, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-61392-RKA
Before Jordan, Jill Pryor, and Marcus, Circuit Judges.
Bradley Dorman, a Jewish inmate at the Broward County Main Jail in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, did not participate in Passover in 2018 because he failed to register 45 days prior to its celebration as required by the Jail's policy. Proceeding pro se, he sued Broward Sheriff's Office Chaplains Richard Aronofsky and Capri Jordan under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging violations of his rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), and Mr. Dorman appealed. We appointed counsel for Mr. Dorman and set the case for oral argument.[1]
We now affirm. First, the 45-day registration requirement did not constitute a substantial burden on Mr. Dorman's exercise of his Jewish faith under the RLUIPA, and therefore it also did not violate the First Amendment's more lenient reasonableness standard. Second, the electronic posting of the 45-day registration requirement on the Jail's computer kiosk, which he and other inmates used to communicate with Jail staff, provided adequate notice of the registration requirement to satisfy due process.
Because we are reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we accept Mr Dorman's factual allegations as true. See Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Here's what the complaint alleged.
In 2017, Mr. Dorman successfully signed up for and participated in the Passover celebration, which began on April 10. See D.E. 1 at ¶ 11. He initially "attempted to sign up" for Passover on March 6, 2017, using the Jail's kiosk messaging system, but Chaplain Jordan replied that "Passover isn't until April." Id. at ¶ 10. On April 3, 2017, Mr. Dorman again messaged the Chaplain's Office his request to "sign . . . up for the [P]assover services and diet[.]" That same day, just a week shy of Passover, an employee of the BSO Chaplain's Office replied that "[they] will add [his] name" to the list of Passover participants. See id. at ¶ 11; D.E. 3 at 7.
The following year, 2018, Passover began on March 30 and ended on April 7. On April 1, after Passover had started, Mr. Dorman again utilized the kiosk to request that the Chaplain's Office add him to list of participating inmates in the Passover celebration. See D.E. 1 at ¶ 6. This time, however, his request was denied, with Chaplain Jordan explaining on April 2 that "[t]he deadline to sign up [for Passover] was" on February 14. Id. at ¶ 7. On April 4, Mr. Dorman replied, asking: Id. at ¶ 8. That same day, Chaplain Jordan sent Mr. Dorman the following message: "It was posted on the kiosk that the deadline to sign up to participate in Passover was February 14." Id. at ¶ 9.[2]
On April 6, 2018, Mr. Dorman filed a grievance with the Chaplain's Office, claiming that "a notification regarding Passover was not posted" in 2018 and that "no notice was posted" in 2017. Id. at ¶ 12. Chaplain Aronofsky rejected the grievance as "unfo[u]nded," explaining that "the notice [was] posted in the kiosk for all inmates" and that "[a]t this time [P]assover is over." See id. at ¶ 13; D.E. 3 at 5. Mr. Dorman appealed this determination, but Chaplain Aronofksy denied the appeal on the same grounds and closed the matter. See id. at ¶ 16.
Mr. Dorman filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Chaplains Aronofsky and Jordan had denied him the ability to partake in the "proper [Passover] diet and associated religious ceremonie[s]" in violation of the First Amendment and the RLUIPA. See id. at ¶¶ 18-19. He also claimed that, when instituting the new 45-day registration policy, Chaplains Aronofsky and Jordan failed to provide proper notice in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at ¶ 20. He expressly alleged that "no . . . notice was posted in the kosher holiday menu section." See id. at ¶ 15. He requested a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at ¶¶ 22-24.
Chaplains Aronofsky and Jordan filed a motion to dismiss. See D.E. 53. They attached to their motion a notice-which appeared to be a printout of the Jail's kiosk homepage-announcing the Passover registration deadline as February 14, 2018. See id. at 11.[3]
Mr. Dorman responded to the motion. See D.E. 55. In his response, he conceded that a notice had been placed in the Jail's kiosk essentially withdrawing his allegation that there had been no notice. Instead, he asserted that he was "unaware of such posting" on the kiosk homepage because "all notifications that are important are printed and placed around the kiosk." See id. at ¶ 3. A magistrate issued a report recommending that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. See D.E. 67. Mr. Dorman filed his objections to the report but did so late and offered no explanations for the untimeliness of his objections. See D.E. 70.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and dismissed the complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). Given the untimeliness of Mr. Dorman's objections, the district court determined that it only needed to review the report for clear error, but nevertheless conducted a de novo review "in the interest of justice." D.E. 71 at 3-5. Exercising plenary review, the district court concluded that the 45-day registration requirement did not impose a substantial burden on Mr. Dorman's religion in violation of the RLUIPA or the First Amendment. See id. at 5-11. The court also determined that Chaplains Aronofsky and Jordan did not violate Mr. Dorman's due process rights because (1) "[Mr.] Dorman [did] not deny that the Jail posted the notice in the Jail kiosk computer that he and the other inmates routinely used," and (2) the court owed the Jail "due deference" in the manner in which the notice was posted. See id. at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the court noted that Mr. Dorman submitted his request to participate in Passover on April 1, 2018-two days after the holiday had begun. See id. at 10 ().[4]
Our review of the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is plenary. See, e.g., Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to allege facts that are "plausible on [their] face," and "raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Mr. Dorman, therefore, must plead "factual content that allows [us] to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [were] liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Mr. Dorman filed his complaint pro se, we read it liberally. See, e.g., Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011).[5]
Mr Dorman contends that he has presented a valid § 1983 claim for violation of his rights under the First Amendment and the RLUIPA. We disagree and explain why below.
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting any law "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. See U.S. Const. amend. I. It applies to the states (and their political subdivisions) through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 n.1 (1996) (citing cases).
Though the government may not dictate what an individual can believe, it may enact neutral and generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious conduct and exercise. See Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). So long as the restriction or prohibition of religious conduct or exercise is not "the object" of the regulation "but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." Id. In the prison setting, a rule, regulation, or policy restricting the exercise of religion is valid "if it is reasonably related to legitimate penolog-ical interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). See also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (); Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000) (same).
The RLUIPA was enacted, in part, to address the "'frivolous or arbitrary' barriers imped[ing] institutionalized persons' religious exercise." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 (2005) (citing 146 Cong. Rec. 16698, 16699 (2000)). As relevant here, Section 3 of the RLUIPA states:
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