Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co.

Decision Date07 June 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-2222,93-2222
Citation23 F.3d 1354
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P. 13,875 John Frederick DORMAN, Appellant, v. EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Daniel J. McMichael, Chesterfield, MO, argued, for appellant.

Bruce D. Ryder, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

John Frederick Dorman, a Canadian citizen, brought this diversity action against Emerson Electric Company (Emerson), a Missouri corporation, to recover for personal injuries he sustained while operating a saw designed by Emerson. Dorman's cause of action proceeded upon theories of strict products liability, breach of warranty, negligence, and res ipsa loquitur. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), Emerson moved to strike the claims based on strict liability, breach of warranty, and res ipsa loquitur. The District Court, applying Missouri choice-of-law rules, held that Canadian law applies to the claims, granted Emerson's motion to strike, and dismissed the entire complaint. Dorman appeals the District Court's choice-of-law conclusions and the granting of the motion to strike. He also argues that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing his negligence claim. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. 1

I.

Dorman is a resident of Lantzville, British Columbia, Canada. In 1989 he purchased a ten-inch Sears/Craftsman Professional miter saw from a Sears Canada, Inc., retail outlet in Nanaimo, British Columbia, to use on various projects he had been hired to perform. Shortly after purchasing the saw, Dorman removed the upper and lower guards on the saw and reattached the blade so that he could make a deeper cut with the saw. When Dorman then turned the saw on, the rotating blade disengaged at a very high speed and struck and almost completely severed his arm below the shoulder. The arm was surgically reattached, but Dorman has only limited use of it.

In July 1991 Dorman brought this action against Emerson in the Eastern District of Missouri. Emerson admits it designed and design-tested in St. Louis the kind of saw that injured Dorman. The particular saw that injured Dorman was manufactured in Taiwan by P & F, Inc., a Taiwanese corporation, and was quality-control tested in Taiwan by both P & F, Inc., and Emerson. The saw then was purchased by Emerson Electric Canada, Ltd. (EECL), a Canadian corporation, and was shipped directly from Taiwan to Vancouver, Canada, where EECL sold the saw to Sears Canada, from which Dorman purchased the saw.

After the District Court denied Emerson's motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens, 789 F.Supp. 296, Emerson filed its motion to strike pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) 2. Emerson argued that the District Court should apply Missouri's choice-of-law rules and that for both tort and contract actions Missouri courts apply the most-significant-relationship test found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Sec. 145 (1971) (the Restatement). Under this analysis, Emerson argued that Canadian law governs the disposition of the case and that Dorman's claims based upon strict products liability, breach of warranty, and res ipsa loquitur were materially deficient as a matter of Canadian law and should be stricken. Emerson recognized that Dorman's negligence claim is cognizable under Canadian law and did not move to strike it.

The District Court granted Emerson's motion to strike, concluding that, under Missouri's choice-of-law rules, Canadian law is the appropriate law to apply to this case and that the challenged claims are materially deficient under Canadian law. Without discussing Dorman's negligence claim, the court dismissed Dorman's entire complaint, 815 F.Supp. 1287.

On appeal, Dorman argues that the District Court erred in determining that Canadian law, rather than Missouri law, governs the case. Alternatively, he contends that if Canadian law does apply, the court erroneously concluded that his claims are materially deficient under Canadian law. Finally, Dorman argues that the court abused its discretion when it dismissed his negligence claim. We affirm the District Court's conclusions that Canadian law is the appropriate law to apply to this case and that under Canadian law Dorman's claims of strict products liability, breach of warranty, and res ipsa loquitur are materially deficient. We reverse the District Court's dismissal of Dorman's negligence claim, however, and remand for further proceedings on that claim.

II.
A.

Dorman argues that the District Court erred when it concluded that Canadian law rather than Missouri law governs his cause of action. A district court, sitting in diversity, must follow the choice-of-law approach prevailing in the state in which it sits. Birnstill v. Home Sav. of Am., 907 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir.1990). The District Court correctly recognized that Missouri choice-of-law rules must be used to decide whether Canadian or Missouri substantive law governs Dorman's action. For both tort and contract claims, Missouri courts apply the most-significant-relationship test as defined in the Restatement. Galvin v. McGilley Memorial Chapels, 746 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). Under this test, the identity of the state having the most significant relationship will depend upon the nature of the cause of action and upon the particular legal issue in dispute. Whether the District Court's analysis under the forum state's choice-of-law rules was proper is a legal issue subject to de novo review. Birnstill, 907 F.2d at 797.

Section 145 of the Restatement establishes the general rule applicable to all torts: the rights and liabilities of the parties will be determined by the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the accident and the parties. Section 146 of the Restatement establishes the precise rule with respect to conflicts issues arising out of personal injury actions:

In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in Sec. 6 3 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.

This formulation essentially establishes a presumption that the state with the most significant relationship is the state where the injury occurred, absent an overriding interest of another state based on the factors articulated in section 6. In ascertaining whether such an overriding interest exists, the section 6 factors must be evaluated taking into account the contacts listed in section 145 according to their relative importance to the particular issue:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Mo.1969) (en banc) (quoting Restatement Sec. 145(2)).

In cases in which the injury and the conduct causing the injury occur in the same state, the Restatement principles are easy to apply. See Restatement Sec. 146 cmt. d (noting that, subject only to rare exceptions, the local law of the state where the conduct and the injury occurred will be applied). The choice of law becomes more complex, however, where the injury and the conduct causing the injury take place in separate states. Missouri law establishes that where it is difficult to see clearly that a particular state has the most significant relationship to an issue, the trial court should apply the lex loci delicti rule; that is, it should apply the substantive law of the place where the injury occurred. Kennedy, 439 S.W.2d at 185. This rule, however, should not be used by the courts as a means of abdicating their responsibility to determine which state has the most significant contacts. Id. With these Missouri choice-of-law rules in mind, we turn to our consideration of whether the substantive law of Canada or Missouri governs Dorman's case.

B.

Consistent with Missouri's adoption of the Restatement principles, we begin our analysis with the presumption created by section 146 in favor of applying the law of the jurisdiction in which the injury occurred. In this case, the section 146 formulation translates into a presumption in favor of applying the law of Canada, the place where Dorman's injury occurred. Section 146 specifies that the presumption may be rebutted, however, if, as demonstrated by the principles enunciated in section 6 in light of the contacts listed in section 145, another state has a more significant relationship to the accident and the parties with respect to the particular issue in dispute. Under Missouri law, it is not the number of contacts with a particular state that is crucial to the analysis but the quality of these contacts. Nelson v. Hall, 684 S.W.2d 350, 359 (Mo.Ct.App.1984).

A detailed analysis of all of the section 6 factors is unwarranted. The Restatement commentary explains that paragraphs (d) and (f), which deal with protection of justified expectations and certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, are implicated only minimally where personal injury claims arising from accidents are involved. This is true because persons who unintentionally cause injury usually act without contemplating the law that may be applied to determine the legal consequences of their conduct. Restatement Sec. 145 cmt b. Similarly, paragraph (a), which lists for consideration the needs of the interstate and international systems, is not ordinarily implicated by actions to recover for personal injuries, see Kenna v....

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