Nelson v. Hall
| Decision Date | 26 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 684 S.W.2d 350 |
| Parties | Ewell NELSON and Thelma Nelson, Appellants, v. David Grant HALL, Respondent. 34469. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Shirkey, James M. Slone, Kansas City, for appellants.
Paul V. Herbers, James F. Stanley, Happy, Cooling & Herbers, Kansas City, for respondent.
Before PRITCHARD, P.J., TURNAGE, C.J., and SHANGLER, J.
The parents Nelson sued for the wrongful death in Colorado of a minor daughter. The petition alleged that on May 27, 1977, the defendant Hall so negligently operated his motor vehicle on U.S. Interstate 70 near Burlington, Colorado, as to overtake and run into the vehicle occupied by the child, and caused her death. The petition alleged also that at the time of the tortious conduct and consequent casualty, the decedent was a resident of Missouri. The answer of the defendant admitted physical, but transitory, presence in Missouri for five months of 1977, but without the intent to establish local residence or domicile. The petition alleged that Missouri was the sovereignty with the most significant relationships with the occurrence and actors, and on that rationale, asserted recovery under the Missouri Wrongful Death Act [§ 537.080, et seq., RSMo 1978].
The defendant Hall pleaded the effect of the Colorado statute of limitations in bar to the action and the contributory negligence and assumption of the risk by the decedent in defense to the action. The defendant Hall then moved to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction by the court to adjudicate the petition: on the ground that a cause of action for wrongful death was enabled to the plaintiff parents, if at all, by the statutes of the situs of the tortious death--Colorado--and not by the statutes of Missouri as the petition asserted. The trial court sustained the motion and dismissed the petition without prejudice.
The appeal poses: whether a cause of action for wrongful death accrues under the statute of the forum state to the exclusion of the state where the defendant acted to cause death merely because the forum state enjoys the more significant relationships with the occurrence and the litigants. 1
The traditional doctrine that the lex loci delicti applies to determine questions of conflicts of law in tort cases was discarded from our jurisprudence in Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. banc 1969). The strict principle that all substantive questions were determinable by the law of the state where the tort occurred was supplanted by the more pliant and fair most significant contacts standard as promulgated by Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971). That standard gives effect to the general principle of choice of law that [§ 145]:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. 2
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. [emphasis added]
The general principle § 145 enunciates: that the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and parties is iterated in those terms, and applied to the range of defined torts in separate sections [§§ 146 through 155], and also to the statutory action for wrongful death:
§ 175 Right of Action for Death
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied. [emphasis added]
These general principles of significant relationship, by the very terms, are formulated to determine which law governs the rights and liabilities of the parties as to a particular issue of a tort, and not usually the essential cause of action, itself: that is, whether a tort was committed at all. The general principle § 145 promulgates is recognition that a state other than the locus delicti may have a superior interest as to a particular aspect of the cause of action, and as to that issue the lex loci delicti yields to the tort rule of the state with the more significant relationship to the occurrence and parties. Thus, the state where the tort was committed may not be the state with the superior interest in such an issue as the amount of damages a jury may return on the cause of action [Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 171 (1971); Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo.App.1983) ], or whether the guest statute shall be given effect in favor of a nonresident host driver and against a nonresident guest passenger [Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. banc 1969) ], or whether a claim for damages for a tort survives the death of the tort-feasor or of the injured person [Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 167 (1971) ], or who could sue upon a claim for wrongful death [Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 179 (1971); Rotella v. Joseph, 615 S.W.2d 616 (Mo.App.1981) ]. The general principles of significant relationship, therefore, allow a choice of law on these and other such particular issues of a tort cause of action.
That the choice of law principle § 145 promulgates for general application to actions in tort, and § 146 then addresses to tort actions for personal injury, and § 175 then addresses to actions for wrongful death, usually appertains to a particular issue of the cause of action--and only with exception to determine whether the conduct was tortious--is evident from the comments and notes of the reporter:
§ 145 The General Principle
Comment d. The issue involved
Experience and analysis have shown that certain issues that recur in tort cases are most significantly related to states with which they have particular connections or contacts. So, for example, a state has an obvious interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing redress for injuries that occurred there. Thus, subject only to rare exceptions, 3 the local law of the state where conduct and injury occurred will be applied to determine whether the actor satisfied minimum standards of acceptable conduct and whether the interest affected by the actor's conduct was entitled to legal protection.
§ 146 Personal Injuries
Comment d: With respect to issues relating to standards of conduct, the local law of the state of conduct and injury has been invariably applied.
The local law of the state of conduct and injury has invariably been applied to determine issues relating to standards of conduct.
[emphases added]
The precept of § 145 that as a general principle the law of the locus delicti governs [to the exclusion of other sovereignty] to define the minimum standard of acceptable conduct of persons within the territory--and hence whether the act which produced the harm was tortious--finds acceptance in court decisions, treatises, and commentaries. See Reporter's Note to Comment d § 146 Personal Injuries and Reporter's Note to § 175 Right of Action for Death, Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws (1971); E. Scoles and P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 17.1 (Hornbook Series, 1982); 4 W. Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future, 16 Colum.J.Trans.L. 1, 1.c. 13-14 (1977); 1 S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death 2d § 13.4, p. 351 (Second Edition 1975).
Our choice of law jurisprudence accepts that rationale as an assumption, albeit not as a question presented for determination and adjudicated under the most significant contacts principle. In Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. banc 1969), a driver and passenger--both Missouri residents--were enroute to New York and return--when a collision occurred in Indiana. The passenger sued the personal representative of the driver in a Missouri court. The question presented was whether Missouri would give effect to the guest statute of Indiana--the locus delicti--to defeat recovery by the plaintiff passenger. The defendant argued the efficacy of the lex loci delicti rule, the law then extant. Our Supreme Court en banc, as we note, discarded the traditional doctrine in favor of the Restatement (Second) choice of law principle. In the course of opinion the court gave emphasis that only a particular issue was there for decision:
[1.c. 181]:
"The issue here presented relates only to which law should govern the host-guest relationship and consequently whether the Indiana Guest Statute is applicable."
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[1.c. 182]:
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