Dorman v. State, 42156
| Decision Date | 06 June 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 42156,42156 |
| Parties | William J. DORMAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Virgil Q. Mayo, Public Defender, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
This original proceeding in habeas corpus was referred to Circuit Judge Ernest E. Mason of the First Judicial Circuit of Florida as Commissioner to conduct an evidentiary hearing in the salient issues in the proceedings. See Dorman v. State, 263 So.2d 207 (Fla.1972).
The Commissioner has filed his report of the evidentiary hearing and has answered the first question raised by this Court affirmatively, and the second question negatively. Those questions were: (1) Whether Petitioner's plea of guilty was voluntary and (2) whether the trial court should have inquired into the question of Petitioner's sanity, as provided in F.S., Chapter 917, F.S.A.
The Commissioner's report indicates that the Petitioner was charged with five counts of crime against nature and three counts of lewd, lascivious and indecent assault. On November 1, 1963 the Petitioner plead not guilty to all eight charges. At Petitioner's request the trial judge ordered a psychiatric examination of Petitioner at his own expense. Two experts conducted the examination--
Morris L. Eaddy, Ph.D., a certified clinical psychologist, and
William M. C. Wilhoit, M.D., a psychiatrist and neurologist--and their reports were submitted to the judge.
On February 10, 1964 all charges except three counts of crime against nature were placed upon the 'inactive docket.' Petitioner then plead guilty to the remaining counts and was sentenced to three sentences of ten years, to run consecutively. The Commissioner found that Petitioner's plea was not made because of a promise that if he were to plead guilty he would be sent to a state mental institution for hospitalization and not to prison.
In response to the second question posed by this Court, the Commissioner found that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in failing to order a hearing as provided by F.S., Chapter 917, F.S.A. His reasons for holding Sections 917.01 and 917.02 inapplicable are reflected in the following passage:
As to the applicability of F.S., Section 917.12, F.S.A., the Commissioner found that the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to adjourn the proceedings or suspend the sentence for the following reasons:
'(1) that the report of the experts reflected only that the petitioner was a sexual deviate, not a criminal sexual psychopath, and (2) because his prognosis was so poor that Dr. Wilhoit felt that his chance for release to society was remote.' Dorman v. State, supra, at 209.
We are not satisfied with the Commissioner's findings and recommendations in one important particular: It is our view of the matter, derived from a careful reading of the evidence, that there was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge under the circumstances of this case in not affording the Petitioner the benefit of a mental examination pursuant to the provisions of F.S., Chapter 917, F.S.A. (1963). We agree with the Public Defender appointed by the Commissioner to represent the Petitioner at the evidentiary hearing that a mental examination of Petitioner pursuant to Chapter 917 was a condition precedent to a determination of whether the Petitioner should have been criminally tried or his plea of guilty accepted by the trial judge.
F.S., Section 917.12(1), F.S.A., defines criminal sexual psychopaths as:
'all persons suffering from a Mental disorder and Not insane or feeble-minded which mental disorder Has existed for a period of not less than four months immediately prior to the appointment of the psychiatrists provided for in subsection (2)(c) Coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses and who may be considered dangerous to others. . . .' (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsection (2) provides:
'When a person has been charged by information with any crime . . . the Trial judge on his own motion or on motion of the prosecuting attorney of said court or on application by affidavit by or on behalf of the defendant, if, it appears to the satisfaction of the court that there is probable cause for believing such person is a sexual psychopath within the meaning of this act, may adjourn the proceeding or suspend the sentence, as the case may be, and may certify the person for hearing the examination by the circuit court of the circuit in which the trial court is situate to determine whether the person is a criminal sexual psychopath within the meaning of this act.' (Emphasis supplied.)
Returning to the reasons for the Commissioner's finding, we find that the first reason--that the Petitioner is only a sexual deviate and not a sexual psychopath--is incorrect. That the placing of such a label as 'sexual deviate' on Petitioner is not conclusive in a determination of whether the Petitioner is a sexual psychopath is made clear by our holding in Hobbs v. Cochran, 143 So.2d 481 (Fla.1962). In Hobbs, the defendant was charged with assault with intent to rape, sodomy per os, false imprisonment, and kidnapping. His plea of 'guilty by reason of insanity' was taken as a plea of guilty and he was sentenced to 60 years in the state prison. The prison hospital declared him insane. Upon petition for writ of habeas corpus this Court appointed a commissioner to take testimony upon the question of whether the defendant should have been given a hearing under F.S., Section 917.12, F.S.A. Upon submission of the Commissioner's findings, we agreed with the Commissioner that there was Plain notice to the trial judge that the sanity or insanity of the Petitioner was an issue and that there existed adequate probable cause that he was a sexual psychopath. Of significance to this cause is our statement in Hobbs that
'. . . That he had a pronounced tendency toward sex crimes . . . and that he was dangerous to others was demonstrated by what he did . . . there was a plain notice to the trial judge that the sanity or insanity of the Petitioner was an issue and we concur in the commissioner's view there should have been resort to the procedure outlined in Sec. 909.17 and Chapter 917, Florida Statutes 1959, F.S.A., or Sec. 917.12, supra, or all of them.'
The fact that the Petitioner has been labeled a sexual deviate does not, therefore, mean that he is...
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