Dornes v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias

• Citation: 23 So. 191,75 Miss. 466
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Decision Date: 21 February 1898
• Parties: JACOBINA DORNES v. SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS

23 So. 191

75 Miss. 466

JACOBINA DORNES v. SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 21, 1898

December 1897

FROM the circuit court of the first district of Hinds county HON ROBERT POWELL, Judge.

This was an action for $ 2, 000, brought by the appellant on a benefit certificate for that sum, issued to her son, Philip Schanzenbacker, in April, 1894, by the board of control Knights of Pythias, on the surrender of one for $ 1, 000 issued to him in February, 1894. The certificate was, by its terms, subject to the conditions expressed in the member's application, and the application contained a condition of forfeiture in the event of his suicide. The certificate also recited, as part of the consideration thereof, the compliance by Schanzenbacker with all the laws then or thereafter in force governing the endowment rank, and provided that a violation of the same should render the certificate void. The anti-suicide law, that gave rise to the condition, was adopted by the board of control on January 12-13, 1893, and this action was reported to the supreme lodge at its next session, and concurred in and approved on September 7, 1894, the supreme lodge adopting the report of the committee on endowment rank, showing its concurrence and approval, designated "Document 159." The power to legislate for the government of the endowment rank is limited to the supreme lodge by its charter.

Schanzenbacker ceased to live on October 27, 1896. The defendant, the supreme lodge, pleaded the fact of suicide, in connection with the conditions against it expressed in the application the enactment of the suicide amendment by the board of control, and its ratification by the supreme lodge, together with the recital in the certificate sued on that it was based on the declarations, representations and agreements made in the application, and the condition in the certificate that the same should be void in case of any violation of the requirements of the laws then or thereafter in force governing the endowment rank. The plaintiff demurred to defendant's several pleas, and, her demurrer having been overruled, she declined to reply, and appealed from the judgment in favor of defendant. It was agreed between counsel that the various documents referred to in the opinion of the court and briefs should be considered on the hearing of the demurrer in the lower court, and treated as part of the record in the Supreme court.

Affirmed.

Calhoon & Green, for appellant.

It was decided in Supreme Lodge v. Stein, ante, p. 107, that "no anti-suicide provision was in the constitution adopted by the supreme lodge, even up to Stein's death, in August, 1893, " and that the suicide clause was the unauthorized act of the board of control, and, though inserted in the application, it did not form a part of the contract, unless it was adopted by the supreme lodge. There was no claim made in the court below that there had been any change in the charter power of the board of control. The sole reliance to show an adoption by the supreme lodge of these clauses against suicide and change of occupation, was that contained in the minutes of the supreme lodge of September 7, 1894, adopting the report of the committee to whom was referred the report of the board of control. These minutes show that the board of control reported to the supreme lodge that it had adopted, January 12 and 13, 1893, the amendment as to suicide. This report of the board of control was presented August 28, 1894, and, on motion of the supreme keeper of records and seals, it was referred to the committee on endowment rank. Min., p. 6738. That committee, by its report presented September 6, 1894, designated "Document 159, " reported to the supreme lodge that they fully concurred in and approved of the legislation in all details enacted by said board for the government of the endowment rank. On September 7, 1894, as recited in said minutes, page 6904, report of committee on endowment rank was taken from the table and "adopted by the supreme lodge, as under document 159, " etc. It was insisted by counsel for appellee that this adoption of document 159, this committee's report, was such an enactment, under the charter and constitution, as made these acts of the board of control the acts of the supreme lodge, and hence, they then became engrafted in each contract of insurance theretofore made.

In considering these matters, it must be borne in mind that we are dealing with conditions subsequent, whereby, as claimed, one party to the contract had the power, by his acts, to change the terms, and impose more onerous stipulations, and, hence, they must be strictly construed. Gadberry v. Sheppard, 27 Miss. 203. Where there is a reserved power in one of the parties to the contract to create new conditions, the rule of strict construction, a fortiori, should prevail. The policy provides that it is "in consideration of the payment, etc., and full compliance with all the conditions therein contained and with the laws governing this rank, now in force or that may hereafter be enacted by the Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias of the World, " etc. What would constitute "the laws . . . hereafter to be enacted" by the supreme lodge? Would the adoption of a report of a committee [document 159] by the supreme lodge be the enactment of a law, so as to bind the policy holder by new conditions? The action of the board of control in passing these stipulations was inoperative, and if the supreme lodge had intended these as law, it would have done so in such proper form as would have notified its policy holders of the change in the contract.

The constitution promulgated as that of the endowment rank at the meeting of 1894 is substantially the same as that of 1892, and this without reference to these stipulations of the board of control. The first time these "laws" of the board of control were adopted by the supreme lodge, as far as appears from the promulgated constitution and laws, was on September 1, 1896 [see const. 1896, p. 12], and then they did not become operative until October 31, 1896 [see certificate to const. 1896, p. 3], Even then the provision of forfeiture for suicide adopted by the board of control was not adopted by the supreme lodge, but only a reduction in the amount of the policy was to be incurred in case of suicide. Const. 1896, p. 41. That this adoption of the report of September 7, 1894, was not the enactment of a law within the meaning of the policy, is shown by the fact that at the September meeting, 1894, a new supreme constitution was ordained and put in force on and after September 1, 1894 [Minutes, 6955], seven days before the report was adopted. By this constitution all legislative power was vested in the supreme lodge [art. 7]; and the power reserved to supreme lodge [art. 7, sec. 10, par. 2] was that of enacting laws [par. 17]--to prescribe "by law the rights, benefits, privileges and duties pertaining to all rank and honors of the order."

Section 12 provides: "All laws enacted by the supreme lodge shall be of general application, shall be formulated as statutes, and shall be styled 'supreme statutes, ' and when introduced, and while under consideration, shall be styled 'propositions.'"

Section 18: "The enacting clause of every proposition shall be as follows: 'Be it enacted by the Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, ' etc."

It is clear that under the stringent constitution rules for the enactment of supreme statutes, in force on September 1, 1894, the adoption of the report of a committee, or document 159, could not be interpreted as the passage of a statute law.

Article 12, section 2, of supreme constitution 1894, provides that the insurance branch of the order shall be governed by such laws as the supreme lodge may enact or authorize. Counsel laid stress on "or authorize, " as sustaining the view that the adoption of the report was sufficient. But the words "or authorize" are themselves violative of the charter [Min., 6830] of 1894; for the charter incorporated Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, and by section four it is provided that said corporation "shall have a constitution, and shall have power to amend the same at pleasure." tinder Stein's case the supreme lodge, under this charter, could not delegate the power to enact laws, and hence, "or authorize" would be unconstitutional.

Again, counsel insisted that section 6, article 15, supreme constitution 1894 [Min. Bk., 6968] ratified and approved these laws of board of control. That section provides: "The laws hereafter enacted for the government of the endowment rank, and in force at the date of the adoption of, and so far as they do not conflict with, this constitution, shall continue in force as the laws for the government of the insurance branch until superseded by statute duly enacted."

"The laws hereafter enacted" could not mean the unauthorized stipulations of the board of control, but the laws of supreme lodge set forth in the constitution of the endowment rank. It was the supreme lodge speaking, and, of course, it spoke of its own laws, and not those void acts of the board of control. Again, it is not pretended that the supreme lodge ever, in any way, acted on the acts of the board of control, except by the adoption of the report of September 7, 1894. Now, this constitution was in force on September 1, 1894, and hence, "laws hereafter enacted" could not refer to this adoption of the report of September 7, 1894.

Again the constitution of endowment rank, 1896, shows that these laws of the board of control were for the first time adopted September 1, 1896, and then, under section 19, article 7, supreme constitution [Min. Book, 6961], they went into effect sixty days after passage, and for this reason...