Dorris v. State
| Decision Date | 17 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | SC 91713,SC 91767.,Nos. SC 91652,s. SC 91652 |
| Citation | 360 S.W.3d 260 |
| Parties | Jesse V. DORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.Jose Luis Lopez–McCurdy, Jr., Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent.Louis Hill, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gwenda R. Robinson, Public Defender's Office, St. Louis, for Dorris.
James B. Farnsworth, Evan J. Buchheim, Attorney General's Office, Robert J. (Jeff) Bartholomew Jr., Jefferson City, for the state.
Mark A. Grothoff, Public Defender's Office, Columbia, for Lopez–McCurdy.Rosalynn Koch, Public Defender's Office, Columbia, for Hill.WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge.
Jesse V. Dorris, Jose Luis Lopez–McCurdy, Jr., and Louis Hill (collectively “Movants”) were denied the right to appeal their post-conviction relief motions on the merits because they were filed out of time. The State did not raise the issue of timeliness below. Because Rules 29.15 and 24.035 (“the Rules”) state that failure to file a motion within the time provided by the Rules “shall constitute a complete waiver of any right to proceed under [these] Rule[s] and a complete waiver of any claim that could be raised in a motion filed under [these] Rule[s],” the motion court had no authority to hear the motions, regardless of the State's failure to raise the issue. We affirm the dismissal of Dorris' and Lopez–McCurdy's cases because they were filed outside the time limits provided in the Rules. Hill's case is remanded for a hearing on the timeliness of his motion.
The cases of Jesse V. Dorris, Jose Luis Lopez–McCurdy, Jr., and Louis Hill have been consolidated following oral argument because each case presents the same issue. The facts of each case are recited briefly.
On April 11, 2008, Jesse V. Dorris was convicted of possessing anhydrous ammonia in a non-approved container. Following trial in the circuit court, the judge told Dorris, Rule 29.15 was read to Dorris in open court, including the language stating that Dorris had either 90 or 180 days to file, depending on whether he appealed his judgment, and that the failure to file a motion within the time limits would “constitute a complete waiver of any right to proceed under this Rule.” Rule 29.15(a).
Dorris appealed his conviction. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction in State v. Dorris, 277 S.W.3d 831 (Mo.App. S.D.2009). The court issued the mandate in this direct appeal on March 18, 2009. Because Dorris appealed his conviction, he had 90 days after the mandate on appeal issued to file a motion for post-conviction relief. Rule 29.15(b). On July 1, 2009, 105 days after the mandate issued and 15 days late, Dorris filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15. The State did not raise the issue of timeliness of the motion. The motion court held an evidentiary hearing and ruled on the merits of the motion, denying relief. Dorris appealed the motion court's judgment. On appeal, the southern district held Dorris waived his right to Rule 29.15 relief because his filing was not within the time limits of Rule 29.15.
Jose Luis Lopez–McCurdy, Jr., was convicted of one count of forcible rape following a jury trial. After his trial and sentencing, Lopez–McCurdy filed a motion for new trial and/or resentencing. In a hearing on this motion, the judge told Lopez–McCurdy,
Lopez–McCurdy appealed his conviction. The court of appeals affirmed in State v. Lopez–McCurdy, 266 S.W.3d 874 (Mo.App. S.D.2008), and the mandate issued on November 13, 2008. Because he appealed his conviction, Lopez–McCurdy had 90 days after the mandate issued to file a motion for post-conviction relief. Rule 29.15(b). On February 17, 2009, 96 days after the mandate issued and six days out of time, Lopez–McCurdy filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15. The State did not raise the issue of timeliness in the motion court. The motion court denied post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing, and Lopez–McCurdy appealed. The southern district vacated the judgment and remanded, directing the motion court to dismiss the Rule 29.15 motion as untimely. As it did with Dorris, the southern district found Lopez–McCurdy waived his right to proceed with his post-conviction motion when he did not timely file his pro se motion.
In 2004 Louis Hill pleaded guilty to first-degree statutory rape. The State recommended the court suspend imposition of the sentence and place Hill on five years' probation. On March 20, 2006, Hill's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. He was delivered to the department of corrections on March 24, 2006. Hill did not appeal his judgment or sentence, so he had 180 days from the date he was delivered to the custody of the department of corrections to file a motion for postconviction relief.1 Rule 24.035(b).
Hill prepared a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035. He claims his girlfriend delivered the motion to the court so it would be filed on time, but the court lost the motion and filed it at a much later date. The court's time stamp on the motion is May 5, 2008, more than two years after Hill's arrival at the department of corrections and outside the 180–day time limit provided in Rule 24.035(b). The State raised the issue of the timeliness of the motion and a hearing was set.
Before the hearing, the State dropped its objection to the timeliness of the motion. The motion court held an evidentiary hearing on the merits and denied relief. Hill appealed to the southern district. On appeal, the State again raised the issue of timeliness of Hill's Rule 24.035 motion. Hill argued the State waived its timeliness objection after dropping the issue in the motion court. He argued that he planned to present evidence to the motion court showing the motion was timely filed, but he did not present this evidence because the State dropped its timeliness objection before the hearing. 2 The southern district held that Hill's motion was filed out of time and that he waived the right to proceed on his post-conviction relief claims.
This Court is obliged to determine whether it has jurisdiction to review this matter. Smith v. State, 63 S.W.3d 218, 219 (Mo. banc 2001). Subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court is governed by the Missouri Constitution. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Mo. banc 2009). The Missouri Constitution provides circuit courts “original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.” Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 14. When a statute, or court rule, speaks in jurisdictional terms, or can be read in such terms, it is proper to read it “as merely setting ... limits on remedies or elements of claims for relief that courts may grant.” Webb, 275 S.W.3d at 255.
The motion court had subject matter jurisdiction over Movants' post-conviction relief motions because they were filed in a circuit court. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the motion court correctly or incorrectly exercised its authority. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.
Under Rule 29.15(a),3 a person convicted of a felony following trial may claim that the conviction violates the constitution or laws of Missouri by seeking post-conviction relief in the sentencing court. Rule 24.035(a) 4 provides a person convicted of a felony by guilty plea the same right. To request relief, the defendant “shall file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence” within specified time limits. Rule 29.15(b); Rule 24.035(b).
If the defendant appealed the judgment, “the motion shall be filed within 90 days after the mandate of the appellate court is issued affirming such judgment or sentence.” Rule 29.15(b); Rule 24.035(b). If the defendant did not appeal, “the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the person is delivered to the custody of the department of corrections.” 5 Rule 29.15(b); Rule 24.035(b). The Rules state that the “[f]ailure to file a motion within the time provided by this Rule ... shall constitute a complete waiver of any right to proceed under this Rule ... and a complete waiver of any claim that could be raised in a motion filed pursuant to this Rule.” Rule 29.15(b); Rule 24.035(b) (emphasis added).
The court of appeals has split on whether the state can waive the time limits for filing a Rule 29.15 or 24.035 motion. The eastern district recently held that a court must raise and enforce the time limits for filing in Rules 29.15 and 24.035 even if the State did not raise the issue of timeliness. Swofford v. State, 323 S.W.3d 60, 63–64 (Mo.App. E.D.2010). The court found authority within an appellate court's “power and duty to enforce Missouri Supreme Court rules” to raise the timeliness issue sua sponte. Id. at 63. It was of “no consequence” that the State did not previously...
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