Dorroh v. State, 40256
| Decision Date | 26 November 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 40256,40256 |
| Citation | 229 Miss. 315,90 So.2d 653 |
| Parties | Fred DORROH v. STATE. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Holloman & Threadgill, Sims & Sims, Columbus, for appellant.
Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by J. R. Griffin, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Dorroh, the appellant, was convicted of second degree arson and sentenced to the state penitentiary for seven and a half years. Section 2007, Mississippi Code of 1942. The property involved was a barn and a separate, but nearby, tool shed. The property belonged to A. G. Godwin.
Dorroh, on this appeal, contends the verdict of the jury was against the great weight of the evidence--so much so that we should reverse and remand the case for another trial.
The testimony on behalf of the state showed, in substance, that Godwin and Dorroh lived in the same neighborhood; that they had known each other some ten years; that intense enmity and personal dislike existed between them; that Dorroh had several times trespassed upon the lands of Godwin; that Godwin had caused Dorroh to be arrested and fined for such trespasses, and that Dorroh had made threats against Godwin and his property, describing Godwin by use of the vilest kind of language.
A witness, shown to have been a servant and friend of Dorroh's, frankly testified that he was with Dorroh about midnight of November 14, 1954, when the fire took place, and that he saw Dorroh set the barn on fire and then drag from the barn to the tool shed a bale of straw, which he had lighted at the barn fire, and which he placed in the shed in an effort to burn the shed and the machinery and tools therein. The barn was entirely consumed by the fire and the shed and tools therein partly so. The evidence of the State discloses dire threats by Dorroh about, and to, this witness if he testified against appellant. The state had other evidence we deem unnecessary to detail.
Dorroh testified himself and introduced two other witnesses. He denied any participation in the crime and denied he made threats against Godwin, owner of the property, and the main witness of the State. He said that on the night of the fire he was fishing in Tombigbee River and did not leave the fishing camp until around seven o'clock Sunday morning after the fire had occurred shortly after twelve o'clock Saturday night. He admitted the three trespasses on the lands of Godwin and that he had paid fines therefor, and, in effect, admitted his strong enmity towards Godwin. He also admitted he had been convicted of numerous other crimes, one of which being the impersonation of a federal officer.
One of his other witnesses testified that he was with Dorroh at the fishing camp all night the night the property burned and that Dorroh could not have burned the property. He admitted, however, that on the morning of the trial, when he was being examined for jury service in this case against Dorroh, that he told the presiding judge he knew nothing of the facts of the case.
The other witness was a half brother of the one just mentioned. He also said he was with Dorroh at the fishing camp the night of the fire and that Dorroh could not have burned the property. However, he was asked if he did not tell the sheriff, the district attorney and a representative of the State Fire Marshal's office, in a conference on the morning of the trial, that he didn't know whether the fishing venture was the night of the fire or some other night, and he replied, 'I probably made that statement then.'
We have detailed sufficient of the evidence to demonstrate, we think, that the guilt or innocence of Dorroh was a matter for the jury. All of the witnesses, except the Fire Marshal, resided and lived in Lowndes County, where the case was being tried and from which the trial jurors were drawn. Doubtless personal acquaintance existed between all or some of the witnesses and the jurors. The jurors saw the actions and heard the witnesses testify. The circumstances here disclose a typical case vesting in the trial jurors, under our judicial system, the function and duty to pass upon the veracity of the witnesses and weigh the testimony given by them.
The indictment did not specifically say that at the time Dorroh set fire to the buildings that he intended to burn them. Dorroh says that, for that reason, the indictment charged no crime.
Section 2007, said Code, defining second degree arson, under which this prosecution took place, provides that 'Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any building or structure of whatsoever class or character * * *' not included within the next preceding section, which defines first degree arson, 'shall be guilty of Arson in the second degree, and upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than ten years.'
The indictment herein charged that Dorroh, within the jurisdiction of the court, on a named date, 'did then and there unlawfully, maliciously, and feloniously set fire to and burn in the night time * * *' the two buildings here involved, describing them, and giving their locations, said buildings being then owned by A. G. Godwin, and then charged that '* * * the said unlawful, wilful, malicious, and felonious setting fire to and burning of said buildings by him, the said Fred Dorroh, being then and there with the unlawful, wilful, malicious, and felonious...
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Berry v. State
...be held to a higher standard of proof, citing Carter v. State, 650 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex.Ct.App.1982). Berry cites Dorroh v. State, 229 Miss. 315, 90 So.2d 653, 655 (1956) for the proposition that willfull is virtually the same as intentional. Procedurally, Berry neither raised this issue in......
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