Dorsch v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 17 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. C--476,C--476 |
| Citation | 185 Colo. 219,523 P.2d 458 |
| Parties | Robert R. DORSCH, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of Colorado et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. F. Brauer, Arvada, for petitioner.
John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent Industrial Commission.
Richard G. Fisher, Jr., Fred B. Dudley, Denver, for respondents Lake Eldora Corp. and State Compensation Insurance Fund.
We granted certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals which held that petitioner Dorsch was not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits. That court affirmed an Industrial Commission decision that Dorsch was not acting in the course of his employment when injured. Dorsch v. Industrial Commission, 33 Colo.App. ---, 518 P.2d 954 (1973). We reverse.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. The referee found that Dorsch, the petitioner, was employed as a full time bartender by respondent Lake Eldora Corporation. His remuneration consisted of an hourly wage of $2.25, free meals while working and a ski pass. The ski pass, which Dorsch was using, and its value as remuneration is the basis for petitioner's claim that he was acting in the course of his employment when injured. It sold to the public for $110 a ski season. As an inducement it was offered to him at the reduced rate of $5. While skiing before going on the afternoon shift, petitioner Dorsch was injured. He then brought the claim for workmen's compensation.
The referee made the following relevant findings regarding the ski pass and the injury: (1) That petitioner was using the ski pass on the employer's premises when injured; (2) that the employer used the season ski pass as an incentive to attract employees to its ski area; (3) that the ski pass was part of the remuneration received by petitioner; (4) that the use of the ski pass was contemplated by the parties. Notwithstanding these findings, however, the referee concluded that '(claimant's skiing) did nothing in furtherance of the employer's business,' and that its value as remuneration was insignificant. (The evidence was, however, that it was valued at about five per cent of his wages for the season.) The Commission adopted the referee's conclusion, denied compensation, and petitioner appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that '' In our view, the Commission's conclusion was in error and not in accord with applicable law, and the affirmance by the Court of Appeals, though reluctant, likewise was erroneous.
Initially, we note that all parties are in agreement that the question of whether Dorsch was acting in the course of his employment when skiing is a matter of law. Thus, this is not a case where the facts are disputed and the Commission's findings are binding on the appellate court. The correctness of a legal conclusion drawn from undisputed facts are properly a matter for the appellate court. Industrial Commission v. Day, 107 Colo. 332, 111 P.2d 1061 (1941).
The question of whether an employee who is injured while engaging in a job-related recreational activity is within the course of his employment has been before this court previously, but not in the posture of this case. This court held that an employee who was not required to participate in the mining company's baseball team was not acting in the course of his employment when injured. Industrial Commission v. Murphy, 102 Colo. 59, 76 P.2d 741 (1938). Since Murphy, additional factors have developed in our law. These factors include: (1) whether the activity occurred during working hours; (2) whether it was on the employer's premises; (3) whether participation was required; (4) whether the employer took the initiative in sponsoring the recreational activity. Denver v. Lee, 168 Colo. 208, 450 P.2d 352 (1969); Lindsay v. Public Service Co., 146 Colo. 579, 362 P.2d 407 (1961); Industrial Commission v. Day, Supra.
As a reading of those cases will show, however, this case differs from them in two material respects. First, the principal business of the employer here is recreational entertainment; in the prior cases the recreational activity was an incidental event to the employer's business. Second, and more importantly, none of the prior cases involved, as here, a recreational activity which was contemplated in the original contract of employment. These factors place the case in a different posture.
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Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co.
...course of his employment when he was injured while skiing during his time off, using his employee ski pass. (Dorsch v. Industrial Commission (1974) 185 Colo. 219, 523 P.2d 458, 460; see Northstar at Tahoe v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1485, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 475.) T......
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...of the Panel is based upon an improper application of the law, a reviewing court may set aside the award. Dorsch v. Industrial Comm'n, 185 Colo. 219, 523 P.2d 458 (1974); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Swort, 134 Colo. 421, 306 P.2d 661 (1957); Gruntmeir v. Tempel & Esgar, Inc., 730 P.2d 893 He......
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