Dorsey v. Dorsey

• Decision Date: 03 April 2019
• Docket Number: No. 1D17-5375,1D17-5375
• Citation: 266 So.3d 1282
• Parties: Glenn Charles DORSEY, II, Former Husband, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Paula Rae DORSEY, Former Wife, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

266 So.3d 1282

Glenn Charles DORSEY, II, Former Husband, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.Paula Rae DORSEY, Former Wife, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 1D17-5375

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 3, 2019

Laura E. Keene of Beroset & Keene, Pensacola, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Ross A. Keene, Pensacola, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Bilbrey, J.

Former Husband appeals the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and Former Wife cross-appeals. Both parties challenge various aspects of the equitable distribution, alimony, child support, and attorneys' fees ordered by the trial court. Upon review of the judgment as a whole to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, as required by Hamlet v. Hamlet , 583 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1991), and Canakaris v. Canakaris , 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), and given the partial concessions of error by each party, the final judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part as set forth below.

Background. During their long-term marriage of 23 years, the parties had two children. They acquired substantial assets which, at the time of the final hearing, included seven residential properties, several vehicles, three businesses (one of which owned an airplane), and numerous cash accounts. The children attended private school, and Former Wife worked only sporadically and temporarily during the marriage, expending most of her efforts on unpaid work such as child-rearing and household management. Former Wife's most recent employment consisted of part-time clerical and administrative work for one of the marital businesses managed by Former Husband.

After the two-day final hearing and two post-hearing conferences to discuss the court's anticipated rulings, the court issued the final judgment now on appeal. The court distributed to Former Husband the three businesses and associated debt, three of the residential properties, six vehicles, and a trailer. The distribution to Former Wife included two residences, the proceeds from the sale of two other properties, a vehicle, her jewelry, and several cash accounts. The court also ordered an equalization payment from Former Husband to Former Wife which is not challenged on appeal.

In addition to distributing the parties' assets and liabilities, the trial court awarded $ 2,000.00 per month permanent periodic alimony to Former Wife and child support based on a child support guidelines worksheet attached as an exhibit to the final judgment. The court directed Former Husband to continue to pay for the older child's private school unless the parties agreed to discontinue such attendance. The court left the decision on schooling for the younger child to the parents, acknowledging Former Husband's concerns about his ongoing financial abilities. Finally, the court directed Former Husband to pay half of Former Wife's requested attorney's fees and costs, reserving jurisdiction on the method of payment.

Both parties filed a motion for rehearing which was denied by the trial court. The issues addressed below are therefore preserved for our review. See Owens v. Owens , 973 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Equitable Distribution . The equality of the overall equitable distribution scheme was not challenged on appeal or cross-appeal. See § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. (2017) ("court must begin with premise that distribution should be equal"). Instead, each party challenges certain individual distributions of assets and debts within the whole.

Former Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding one of the residential properties, a condominium, to be a marital asset. Former Husband also argues that even if the condominium was marital property the trial court reversibly erred in its valuation. Former Husband also challenges the court's allocation of debts to two of the businesses distributed to him. Former Wife cross-appeals the equal distribution of the parties' income tax liabilities up to 2015 and division of the proceeds from the sale of the business airplane.

Without asserting that these challenged aspects of the equitable distribution scheme make the overall apportionment unequal, both parties invite piecemeal review of the trial court's distribution scheme. This court is prohibited from engaging in a piecemeal approach and may reverse only upon a showing that "the judgment entered by the trial court, when taken as a whole, constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion." Hamlet , 583 So.2d at 657. The trial court's application of the various remedies to "do equity between the parties" must be "reviewed by appellate courts as a whole, rather than independently." Canakaris , 382 So.2d at 1202. Using this standard, no error has been shown in the trial court's overall equitable distribution scheme.

Even if we were to consider the parties' piecemeal complaints, they do not have merit. Former Husband admitted at trial that he purchased the subject condominium five days before Former Wife filed her petition for dissolution. Section 61.075(7), Florida Statutes (2017), sets the filing date as a valid cut-off date for determining an asset's marital character. The trial court's valuation of the condo as of this cut-off date was within the court's discretion. Id. As for the trial court's allocation of the $ 92,708 debt "associated with the condo" to one of the businesses distributed to Former Husband, Glenn Dorsey, Inc. (GDI), rather than reducing the value of the condo by that amount, the court explained in the final judgment that the debt was incurred by Former Husband through "cross collateralization with the business accounts" which the court considered "with the value of the business."

Similarly, former Husband failed to establish an abuse of the trial court's discretion in the distribution of $ 87,500 as business debt "associated with" the second business distributed to Former Husband, Collins Mill Creek, LLC. Even if this distribution of debt rendered the equitable distribution scheme unequal — which Former Husband did not assert, and we do not find apparent from this record — such unequal distribution is authorized by section 61.075(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Where one spouse incurred a business debt, and the other spouse was not actively involved in the business, distribution of that debt to the managing spouse is within the trial court's discretion. See Cardella-Navarro v. Navarro , 992 So.2d 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Former Wife's cross-appeal of two parts of the equitable distribution scheme also lacks merit. The trial court's equal distribution of the parties' income tax liabilities through the year 2015 comports with the presumption of equal distribution of liabilities as provided in section 61.075(1). While the trial court could have unequally distributed this liability if it found any of the factors that justify such unequal distribution under the statute, Former Wife fails to establish any unreasonableness in the court's equal distribution. Likewise, Former Wife fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by directing the equal division of the proceeds from the sale of the business airplane — after subtraction of the hangar fees paid by Former Husband as a cost of the sale. Former Wife's disagreement with the court's subtraction of the costs of sale from the proceeds of the sale, which results in reimbursement to Former Husband for an expense he paid, does not render the court's direction unreasonable.

Alimony . Both parties appeal the trial court's alimony award in the final judgment, but we find no error. Former Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing only minimum wage income of $ 1,395 per month to Former Wife. He bases his position on Former Wife's income of $ 2,334 per month when she worked for him at GDI at some point during the marriage. Considering that this business was distributed to Former Husband in the final judgment and considering the uncontroverted evidence at trial that Former Wife's employment in this family business was temporary and sporadic, no abuse of the trial court's discretion by imputing only minimum-wage income is established. See § 61.08(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2017) (providing that relevant factors to consider in setting alimony include "earning capacities, education levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties").

Former Wife challenges the trial court's award of $ 2,000.00 per month in permanent periodic alimony as inadequate to meet her needs as established during the marriage and far below Former Husband's ability to pay. She argues that this award "shortchanges" her, such that the court abused its discretion. See Marcoux v. Marcoux , 464 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla. 1985) (claim that former spouse "shortchanged" in dissolution action is "another way of saying that a trial court has acted unreasonably and thereby abused its discretion"). However, Former Wife's general assertion that the alimony award is inadequate fails to establish unreasonableness amounting to an abuse of discretion in the overall financial settlement of the marital assets, alimony, and child support. Cf. Juchnowicz v. Juchnowicz , 157 So.3d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (reversing where alimony award resulted in nearly $ 17,000 disparity between parties' monthly incomes); Sussman v. Sussman , 915 So.2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 200...