Dorsey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 82-1662

Decision Date11 January 1984
Docket NumberNo. 82-1662,82-1662
Parties, 9 O.B.R. 119 DORSEY, Gdn., Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

The doctrine of parental immunity does not bar an action in negligence brought against the estate of a deceased parent and her liability insurance company by the unemancipated minor children. (Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 227, 436 N.E.2d 1014 , overruled.)

On August 21, 1978, a vehicle operated by Mildred Dorsey was involved in a collision with another vehicle when the Dorsey vehicle, spinning out of control, travelled left of center. Passengers in the Dorsey vehicle were Mrs. Dorsey's four minor children. Mrs. Dorsey died as a result of the injuries she received from the accident; her children survived but sustained injuries.

Joseph R. Dorsey, surviving spouse and father of the children involved in the accident, brought an action, as next friend, against the estate of Mildred Dorsey, the deceased, alleging that she negligently caused the children's injuries. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, appellee herein, was asked to defend the action based on an automobile liability insurance policy on the Dorsey vehicle, in which Mildred Dorsey was a named insured. Appellee refused to defend and denied that the children were entitled to any recovery under the terms of the policy. Appellee further denied coverage under the uninsured motorist provision partially on the basis of the doctrine of parental immunity.

Appellant herein, Joseph R. Dorsey, as father and legal guardian of the injured children, subsequently instituted a declaratory judgment action against appellee to determine whether the minor children would recover from appellee under the terms of the policy. The trial court determined the doctrine of parental immunity "to be without sufficient justification to warrant its retention and therefore is not followed," and granted appellant's motion for summary judgment.

While appellee's appeal was pending in the court of appeals, this court rendered its decision in Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 227, 436 N.E.2d 1014 . On the basis of Karam, supra, the court of appeals below reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the doctrine of parental immunity prevented appellant from recovering against appellee or the estate of the deceased parent.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Richard H. Siegel Co., L.P.A., and Richard H. Siegel, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Meyers, Hentemann, Schneider & Rea Co., L.P.A., and Henry A. Hentemann, Cleveland, for appellee.

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, Chief Justice.

The question before the court today is whether an unemancipated minor child may maintain a cause of action in negligence against the estate of the child's deceased parent and her liability insurance company. For the reasons to follow, we answer that question in the affirmative.

In Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 227, 436 N.E.2d 1014 , this court identified the reasons for retention of the doctrine of parental immunity to be: preservation of family tranquility, possible interference with parental discipline and control, risks of fraud and collusion due to the predominance of liability insurance, and potential depletion of family funds. Id. at 228-229, 436 N.E.2d 1014. The court in Karam also surveyed the law on parental immunity and found that while a significant number of jurisdictions had abrogated parental immunity, a significant number of jurisdictions had opted to retain it. Id. at fn. 4. Thus, the court concluded in its syllabus:

"An unemancipated child may not recover in a tort action instituted against the administrator of the estate of the child's mother and her liability insurance company for personal injuries received by the child in an automobile accident alleged to be proximately caused by the negligent operation of an automobile, and which results in the mother's death. The immunity arising from the parent-child relationship shall be recognized even though the alleged negligent parent has deceased. (Teramano v. Teramano [1966] 6 Ohio St.2d 117 , followed.)"

We are now in a position to reconsider our decision in Karam.

In Prem v. Cox (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 149, 443 N.E.2d 511 we recently faced a similar issue in the context of interspousal immunity where the estate of the deceased spouse brings an action against the surviving spouse. In Prem, supra, we held that:

"The doctrine of interspousal immunity does not bar an action for wrongful death brought by the estate of a deceased spouse against the surviving spouse."

The rationale for our decision in Prem was that, when the spouse who is seeking recovery is deceased, the reasons for imposition of the doctrine of interspousal immunity no longer exist. This court stated in Prem, at 151, 443 N.E.2d 511:

" * * * [T]he public policy reasons underlying the doctrine of interspousal immunity lose whatever force they might otherwise have had after the marriage has terminated by the death of one of its partners. Fraud and collusion are unlikely to occur when one spouse is dead and the action is brought by the legal representative of that person's estate. Furthermore, there is no marital peace and harmony to be preserved. It is not realistic to maintain that insurance companies are tactically disadvantaged in this situation. Thus, the reasons for the immunity are irrelevant to a wrongful death action. The doctrine should be confined to cases supported by the traditional justifications."

In the case at bar, the traditional justifications supporting the doctrine of parental immunity are not present where the parent who would normally be able to invoke the immunity is deceased. When the parent-tortfeasor dies, the parent-child relationship terminates insofar as parental immunity is concerned. That is, there is no longer the compelling need to preserve harmony and tranquility between a child and a deceased parent or to insure the ability of the parent to discipline the child. Moreover, the risks of fraud and collusion are considerably lessened where the parent against whom the action is brought is deceased and is no longer capable of fabricating evidence or structuring a lawsuit so as to allow recovery by the child against the parent's insurer.

We hereby overrule Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co. and hold that the doctrine of parental immunity does not bar an action in negligence brought against the estate of a deceased parent and her liability insurance company by the unemancipated minor children. 1

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 2

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, SWEENEY, CLIFFORD F. BROWN and JAMES P. CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.

WILLIAM B. BROWN and CLIFFORD F. BROWN, JJ., concur separately.

LOCHER and HOLMES, JJ., dissent.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, Justice, concurring.

Because I believe the doctrine of parental immunity should be abolished without the reservation retained by the majority I concur in the judgment only. As I previously stated in my concurrence in Prem v. Cox (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 149, 152, 443 N.E.2d 511, I strongly believed interspousal immunity to be an outmoded, ineffective, anachronistic and unconstitutional doctrine. The reasons for my belief were amply set forth in my dissenting opinions in Varholla v. Varholla (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 269, 271, 383 N.E.2d 888 ; and Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 152, 155, 431 N.E.2d 998 . I see no difference in the justifications, logic and analysis now put forward with regard to parental immunity. Thus, those same reasons lead me to conclude that the doctrine of parental immunity is also outmoded, ineffective, anachronistic...

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