Doshier v. Twitter, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 September 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:18-cv-00700-KGB
• Citation: 417 F.Supp.3d 1171
• Parties: William F. DOSHIER and dotStrategy, Co., Plaintiffs v. TWITTER, INC., Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

417 F.Supp.3d 1171

William F. DOSHIER and dotStrategy, Co., Plaintiffs

v.TWITTER, INC., Defendant

Case No. 4:18-cv-00700-KGB

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Western Division.

Signed September 27, 2019

David A. Hodges, David Hodges Law Office, Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey R. Roeser, Jennifer Haltom Doan, Haltom & Doan, LLP, Texarkana, TX, for Defendant.

ORDER

Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), or, alternatively, to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) filed by defendant Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter") (Dkt. No. 3). Plaintiffs William F. Doshier and dotStrategy, Co. ("dotStrategy") responded in opposition to the motion (Dkt. No. 5). Twitter filed a reply in further support of its motion (Dkt. No. 11). Plaintiffs filed a surreply (Dkt. No. 18). For the following reasons, in the interest of justice, the Court grants the motion to transfer venue (Dkt. No. 3).

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed their complaint initially in the Circuit Court of Faulkner County, Arkansas (Dkt. No. 2). Twitter removed this action to this Court on September 21, 2018 (Dkt. No. 1). Twitter then filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or, alternatively, to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Dkt. No. 3). Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Twitter asserts that venue is improper in this Court and that the Court should either dismiss this case or transfer it to the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiffs requested limited jurisdictional discovery regarding venue, but this Court by separate Order denied that request (Dkt. Nos. 15, 26). For the following reasons, the Court determines that this case should be transferred to the Northern District of California.

II. Analyzing Venue

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) permits a party to raise the defense of improper venue by motion. In considering a motion to dismiss, the pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true. Ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc. , 946 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1991). The moving party has the burden of establishing that venue is improper. United States v. Orshek , 164 F.2d 741, 742 (8th Cir. 1947).

A. Venue Generally

"[V]enue of all civil actions brought in district courts of the United States" is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which states:

A civil action may be brought in—

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Venue is proper in any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action only if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in § 1391. This means that the Court must determine whether venue is appropriate under subsections (1) and (2) of § 1391(b) before looking to subsection (3) to determine if venue is proper. Further, where there are multiple claims involved, unless the doctrine of "pendent venue" applies, venue must be proper as to each claim. See Bredberg v. Long , 778 F.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1985) ; Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd. , 473 F.2d 515, 528 (8th Cir. 1973).

With respect to § 1391(b)(1), the venue statute provides that a "natural person ... [is] deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled," and "an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued ... [is] deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). The court looks to the time the claim arose to determine the propriety of venue when an entity is involved. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Louis Lesser Enters., Inc. , 353 F.2d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 1965).

With respect to § 1391(b)(2), "[t]he statute does not posit a single appropriate district for venue; venue may be proper in any of a number of districts, provided only that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred there," Woodke v. Dahm , 70 F.3d 983, 985 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Setco Enters. Corp. v. Robbins , 19 F.3d 1278, 1281 (8th Cir. 1994) ), or that "a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated" there, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The question is not which is the "best" venue, but "whether the district the plaintiff chose had a substantial connection to the claim, whether or not other forums had greater contacts." Pecoraro v. Sky Ranch for Boys, Inc. , 340 F.3d 558, 563 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Setco , 19 F.3d at 1281 ).

B. Where Twitter Resides And Where The Claims Occurred

Twitter contends that it is not a resident of Arkansas within the meaning of § 1391(c) (Dkt. No. 4, at 14). Further, Twitter asserts that the acts forming the basis of plaintiffs' claims did not occur in the Eastern District of Arkansas (Id. , at 16-21).

A defendant is deemed a resident under § 1391 in any district in which "such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction...." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Arkansas's long arm statute is consistent with federal constitutional law and permits personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yanmar Co., Ltd. v. Slater , 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439, 443 (2012) ; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101(B). Therefore, the only question is whether Twitter can be subjected to personal jurisdiction in Arkansas without offending the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

Due process requires that the defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotations omitted). Courts must consider the "quality and nature" of the defendant's activities. Id. at 319, 66 S.Ct. 154. Personal jurisdiction does not exist when the forum state "has no contacts, ties, or relations" to the defendant. Id. The Supreme Court has held that "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , the Supreme Court concluded that "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State" were such that he could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). "This ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated,’ contacts." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citations omitted).

When deciding a personal jurisdiction issue, this Court considers five factors to determine the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts, with "the first three factors being of primary importance." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc. , 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996). The five factors as identified by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals are: "(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of the contacts with the forum; (3) the relation of the cause of action to these contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience of the parties." Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecomms. (PTE), Ltd. , 89 F.3d 519, 522-23 (8th Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted). The first three factors are closely related and can be considered together. Id. at 523.

Courts have elaborated on the third factor—the relationship of the cause of action to the contacts—to distinguish between general and specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). "General jurisdiction ... refers to the power of a state to adjudicate any cause of action involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the cause of action arose." Sondergard v. Miles, Inc. , 985 F.2d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir. 1993). General jurisdiction is appropriate for a non-resident corporate defendant whenever a corporate defendant's "affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State." Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138-39, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). Typically, a corporate defendant is "essentially at home" in the state of its incorporation or in the state in which it has its principal place of business. Id. at 137, 134 S.Ct. 746. On the other hand, specific jurisdiction is proper "only if the injury giving rise to the lawsuit occurred within or had some connection to the forum state, meaning that the defendant purposely directed its activities at the forum state and the claim arose out of or relates to those activities." Steinbuch v. Cutler , 518 F.3d 580, 586 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Burger King , 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 ).

1. General Jurisdiction Is Lacking

Twitter is a...