Doss v. Howell-Oregon Elec. Co-Op., Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 26270.,26270. |
| Parties | Mark DOSS and Kathy Doss, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. HOWELL-OREGON ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Defendant, and Missouri Employers Mutual Insurance Co., Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
David A. Childers, Whiteaker & Wilson, P.C., Springfield, Mo., for appellant.
Mathew W. Placzek and Angela Desanctis Myers, Placzek & Francis, Springfield, Mo., for respondents.
Missouri Employers Mutual Insurance Company ("Insurance Company") appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining a Motion to Determine Workers' Compensation Lien filed by Mark Doss and Kathy Doss. Insurance Company raises two points of error; first, that the trial court erred in ruling on the motion because the court lacked both personal and subject matter jurisdiction in the matter, and second, that the trial court erred in ruling that the workers' compensation lien held by Insurance Company should be reduced by fifty percent, due to Mark's alleged comparative fault.1
On October 4, 1999, while responding to a fire as a volunteer member of the Howell County Fire Department ("Employer"), Mark Doss suffered a severe electric shock and burns. Mark filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer; Insurance Company was Employer's insurer. A stipulation for compromise settlement resulted in a workers' compensation lien in the amount of $40,233.35.
On July 19, 2001, the Dosses filed a petition alleging a cause of action against Howell-Oregon Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("Electric Co-op"), which, according to the Dosses, had sole control and management of a fallen power line that allegedly led to Mark's electric shock. A Second Amended Petition was filed on April 15, 2002, and contained four counts alleging damages due to Electric Co-op's negligence, including a loss-of-consortium claim brought by Kathy. In its answer, Electric Co-op alleged that any damages the Dosses "sustained were directly caused or contributed to be caused by the negligence and fault of plaintiff, Mark Doss[.]"
In a letter to the court dated May 1, 2003, counsel for the Dosses informed the court that the case had been settled. On May 9, 2003, the Dosses filed a Motion to Determine Workers' Compensation Lien, which indicated that the case had been settled for $180,000.00. Within the motion, the Dosses stated that they and Insurance Company had "attempted to negotiate a settlement with respect to the satisfaction of the [workers' compensation] lien, but have been unable to do so because there is a dispute between the parties as to what sum, if any, should be deducted for plaintiff Mark Doss' alleged contributory negligence." The Dosses asked that the court determine the amount owed to Insurance Company on the workers' compensation lien.
On May 29, 2003, the Dosses filed a Dismissal with Prejudice indicating their intention to "dismiss all pending claims against [Electric Co-op]." On June 13, 2003, the trial court entered an order holding the dismissal of the case in abeyance pending the court's decision on the Dosses' Motion to Determine Workers' Compensation Lien.
A hearing was held on the Dosses' motion on September 16, 2003. Counsel for Insurance Company indicated that Insurance Company was "not technically a party to this action ... [and that] no personal jurisdiction's really ever been asserted over [it]." He agreed that the hearing held that day was on the Dosses' motion "to have the subrogation proceeds from the settlement between [the Dosses and Electric Co-op] divided." All parties, including Insurance Company, agreed at the hearing that if the workers' compensation payment was fully subrogated, i.e., no comparative fault on Mark's part, the amount subrogated to Insurance Company would be $23,574.70.
The Dosses' position was that the settlement between them and Electric Co-op for $180,000.00 "presupposed a contributory negligence of fifty percent." Therefore, according to the Dosses, the total damages reflected in the settlement were actually $360,000.00, which would result in a reduction in the subrogation amount due to Insurance Company on the workers' compensation lien.
Counsel for Insurance Company argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make a determination regarding any adjustment to the subrogation amount for the workers' compensation lien. Counsel did, however, acknowledge that it was correct for the court to state that neither Kathy's share for her loss-of-consortium claim nor the issue of comparative fault had been addressed in the negotiation and settlement between the Dosses and Electric Co-op or by a trier-of-fact in the determination of that case. Therefore, according to the court, "there is no ... preclusion" with regard to those issues. Although counsel for Insurance Company agreed with the court's statements, he noted that neither Insurance Company nor Employer "were a party to those negotiations or to that settlement."
The court proceeded, pursuant to discussions in chambers, to receive "a proffer in lieu of live testimony[.]" Counsel for the Dosses then offered that the attorney for Electric Co-op would testify that he was present at the mediation between the Dosses and Electric Co-op, that the mediation led to a negotiated settlement, and that Electric-Co-op "discounted the settlement value of the case fifty percent because of plaintiff Mark Doss's contributory negligence." The Dosses' counsel also noted that he "would take the stand and testify to the same effect."
In addition, counsel for the Dosses stated that if the fire chief was called to testify, he would state that prior to Mark arriving at the scene, there were radio communications available for Mark to hear indicating that "a live power line [was] down and that people should be careful." Further, counsel stated that a neighboring homeowner, if called to testify, would state that he spoke with Mark and two other firefighters at the scene and told them "that there was a hot line."
Counsel for the Dosses also stated that there would be testimony either from Mark and Kathy, or counsel himself, "that there was no apportionment of the settlement proceeds between Mark and Kathy Doss because [the Dosses and their counsel] have always taken the position that this is a matter exclusively for the trier of fact." When asked by the court to provide further explanation of the facts related to the consortium claim, counsel for the Dosses indicated that he would describe Mark's injuries, the lengthy hospital stay, necessary grafts, and substantial time off work. There would also be testimony regarding the effects on Mark, Kathy, and their children due to Mark's injuries. Counsel for the Dosses stated that they would "ask the court to allocate the settlement seventy-five percent to [Mark] and twenty-five percent to [Kathy]."
At the end of the hearing, Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 were received into evidence by the court. These documents included the Stipulation for Compromise Settlement in the workers' compensation case; a letter from the Dosses' counsel to the Dosses outlining attorney fees and expenses and the total calculated sum remaining on the workers' compensation lien ($23,640.12); and a letter from the Dosses' counsel to counsel for Insurance Company noting that if fifty percent was deducted for Mark's contributory negligence, $11,820.06 would be owed to Insurance Company.
The letter to counsel for Insurance Company included an offer to settle the case of the workers' compensation lien amount for $12,319.95. The letter also included a note that the computations did "not account for Kathy Doss' consortium claim which will also diminish the amount the comp carrier is entitled to receive." The note further stated that the Dosses would "ask for that offset at the hearing."
On March 30, 2004, the court entered its judgment on the Dosses' Motion to Determine Workers' Compensation Lien. The court found that of the $180,000.00 settlement amount, seventy-five percent was attributable to Mark's claims, and thus subject to the workers' compensation lien, and that twenty-five percent was attributable to Kathy's loss-of-consortium claim. The court also apportioned fifty percent fault to Mark and fifty percent fault to Electric Co-op. Therefore, according to the findings of the court, the total of damages sustained by Mark was $270,000.00 and the total of damages sustained by Kathy was $70,000.00.2
Regarding the workers' compensation lien, the court noted that the parties stipulated that the amount of the lien, after deducting for attorney fees and expenses, was $23,574.70. Therefore, according to the court, since Mark only recovered fifty percent of the total damages sustained, the workers' compensation lien should also be reduced by fifty percent, resulting in a lien of $11,787.35. The Dosses were ordered to pay the $11,787.35 to Insurance Company to satisfy the workers' compensation lien. This appeal followed.
Insurance Company raises two points on appeal. We find the first point dispositive.
Point I — Trial court lacked both personal and subject matter jurisdiction to rule on motion
In its first point, Insurance Company contends that the trial court erred in ruling on the Dosses' Motion to Determine Workers' Compensation Lien because the court was without either personal or subject matter jurisdiction in the matter. According to Insurance Company, the court lacked such jurisdiction because the Dosses had voluntarily dismissed their claim with prejudice.
The term jurisdiction is often somewhat loosely employed but generally refers to three kinds of authority of a court: over the person; over the subject matter; and to render the judgment or order given. Scott County Reorganized R-6 School Dist. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 872 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Mo.App.1994). In the strict sense,...
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