Dotson v. Shelby Cnty.
| Decision Date | 15 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-2766-JDT-tmp,13-2766-JDT-tmp |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
| Parties | ANDRE LOVELL DOTSON, Plaintiff, v. SHELBY COUNTY, ET AL., Defendants. |
DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS AND PARTIES, AND
DIRECTING REMAINING DEFENDANTS TO RESPOND
On May 17, 2013, Plaintiff Andre Lovell Dotson, booking number 12146457, a pretrial detainee at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Complex ("Jail") in Memphis, Tennessee, forwarded a pro se complaint, titled "Injunctive Relief," to the Circuit Court for Shelby County, Tennessee. The case was filed on September 9, 2013, as case number CT-003910-13, Division VII. (ECF No. 1-1.) The complaint seeks relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq., the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Two of the Defendants, Shelby County Sheriff William Oldham and Chief Jailer Robert Moore, removed the case to this Court on October 2, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) TheClerk shall record the Defendants as Shelby County, Oldham, Moore, and Aramark Correctional Services, LLC ("Aramark"), which was sued as "Aramark, Inc."1 The individual Defendants are sued in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.)
There is no mystery about why Plaintiff filed this case initially in state court. Dotson has filed more than three cases in this district that have been dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. See Dotson v. Gilless, No. 00-2229-BBD-ja (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2000) (). In addition to recognizing Dotson as a three-strike filer under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the order in case number 00-2229 barred Plaintiff from filing any lawsuit in this district without leave of court (id. at 15-17) and advised him that "[a]ny complaint submitted by plaintiff without this motion [for leave to file] and [ supporting] affidavit will not be filed but will be immediately returned to the plaintiff for failure to comply with this order" (id. at 16).
Dotson subsequently filed several suits in state court that were removed to this Court. On January 9, 2002, a suit filed by Dotson in the Shelby County Circuit Court was removed. In an order issued on January 17, 2002, then-United States District Judge Bernice B. Donald dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction and as frivolous. Dotson v. Gilless, No. 02-2013-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 17, 2002) (). In that order, Judge Donald reaffirmed the sanctions that had previously been imposed and sanctioned Dotson $150 on the ground that he had "flagrantly avoidedcomplying with the Court's order in [case number 00-2229] despite the warning that failure to comply would result in the imposition of sanctions, including a monetary fine . . . ." Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A second case filed by Dotson was removed to this Court on February 12, 2002. In an order issued on April 23, 2002, then-United States District Judge Julia Smith Gibbons dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Dotson v. Gilless, No. 02-2086-JSG-ja (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 23, 2002) (). That order also reaffirmed the sanctions imposed in case number 00-2229 and imposed the following, additional restriction:
Plaintiff shall abide by those orders [in case number 00-2229] in connection with any case filed in, or removed to, this court. The court reiterates the above prohibition on the clerk's filing of any new case from this prisoner without leave of court. Moreover, any case submitted by this plaintiff to another court that is thereafter transferred to this district, or removed from state court, will result in the same sanctions.
(Id. at 14.) Dotson was also fined $150. (Id.)
A third case filed in state court by Dotson was removed to this Court on August 1, 2003. In an order issued on January 29, 2004, United States District Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr. dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Dotson v. Shelby Cnty., No. 03-2566-SHM-tmp (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF No. 4). Judge Mays declined to sanction Dotson because the complaint arguably alleged that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury. (Id. at 12-13 n.5.)
Since the commencement of this action, the parties have filed many documents and motions. On October 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a "Notice of Motion to Objection to theDefendants [sic] Notice of Removal," which appears to argue that the Notice of Removal violates the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. (ECF No. 3.) Defendants Oldham and Moore filed a response to Plaintiff's filing on October 30, 2013 (ECF No. 10), and Aramark filed its response on November 4, 2013 (ECF No. 11).
On November 7, 2013, the Clerk docketed Plaintiff's Motion to Remand the Case to State Court. (ECF No. 13.) On November 18, 2013, responses to the Motion to Remand were received from Aramark and from Defendants Oldham and Moore, respectively. (ECF Nos. 16 & 17.)
On November 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion, titled "Motion for Leave to File an Amended Remand the Case to State Court" (ECF No. 14), which appears to be a motion to amend the Motion to Remand. On November 25, 2013, Aramark filed a response to the motion to amend. (ECF No. 21.) The "Motion for Leave to File an Amended Remand the Case to State Court" is GRANTED. The Court will consider the argument presented in that filing in evaluating Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Plaintiff's complaint asserts claims under three federal statutes and the First Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution and, therefore, this Court has original jurisdiction. Oldham and Moore were, therefore, entitled to remove the case to federal court.
The Court has considered whether Plaintiff's status as a three-strike filer precludes him from litigating the claims in this removed action in federal court. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) does not alter the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction, a district court cannot remand a properly removed action to state court on the ground that the prisoner is a three-strike filer. See Lloyd v. Benton, 686 F.3d 1225, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2012); Lisenby v. Lear, 674 F.3d 259, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2012); Hartley v. Comerford, No. 3:13cv488/MCR/EMT, 2014 WL 241759, at *5-6 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2014) (); Lanier v. Holiday, No. 05-2203-Ml/P, 2005 WL 1513106, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. June 16, 2005) ().2 The action was properly removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and, therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, as amended, is DENIED.3
On November 13, 2013, Defendants Oldham and Moore filed a Motion to Refer ProSe Prisoner's Complaint for Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and Stay Response Dates or in the Alternative for an Extension of Time to Respond. (ECF No. 15.) On November 22, 2013, Aramark joined in this motion. (ECF No. 20.) On December 4, 2013, Aramark filed a Motion to Stay Discovery Pending the Court's Ruling on Aramark's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 23.)4 In an order issued on December 5, 2013, the Court granted the motions for screening and to stay discovery pending screening and the disposition of Aramark's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 24.)5
On November 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (ECF No. 18.) On December 4, 2013, Defendants Oldham and Moore filed a response in opposition to the Motion that also objected to certain exhibits to Plaintiff's Motion. (ECFNo. 22.) On December 5, 2013, Aramark joined the response filed by Oldham and Moore. (ECF No. 25.) The Court declines to strike the exhibits to Plaintiff's Motion and has considered them to the extent they are relevant to the request for the appointment of counsel.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), "[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel." However, "[t]he appointment of counsel in a civil proceeding is not a constitutional right." Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605-06 (6th Cir. 1993) (); Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 1993) (). Appointment of counsel is "a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances." Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Id. at 606 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Appointment of counsel is not appropriate when a pro se litigant's claims are...
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