Doty v. ADT, LLC
| Decision Date | 28 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 20-60972-CIV-SINGHAL/VALLE, CASE NO. 21-80645-CIV-SINGHAL/VALLE |
| Citation | 594 F.Supp.3d 1319 |
| Parties | Shana DOTY, Plaintiff, v. ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT Security Services, and Telesforo Aviles, Defendants. Randy Doty, v. ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT Security Services and Telesforo Aviles, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Amy K. Carter, Pro Hac Vice, Heather V. Davis, Pro Hac Vice, Carter Law Group PC, Matthew Ryan McCarley, Pro Hac Vice, Christopher Michael Brown, John Warren Raggio, Fears Nachawati Law Firm, Dallas, TX, Benjamin H. Richman, Pro Hac Vice, J. Eli Wade-Scott, Pro Hac Vice, Jay Edelson, Pro Hac Vice, Nicholas H. Rosinia, Pro Hac Vice, Edelson PC, Chicago, IL, Natalia Maria Salas, The Ferraro Law Firm, P.A., Miami, FL, Karina de Oliveira Rodrigues, Kelley/Uustal, PLC, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff in 20-60972-CIV.
Alfred John Saikali, Jennifer Ann McLoone, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Miami, FL, Charles C. Eblen, Pro Hac Vice, Jason R. Scott, Pro Hac Vice, Kerensa E.B. Cassis, Pro Hac Vice, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant ADT, LLC in 20-60972-CIV.
Amy K. Carter, Pro Hac Vice, Heather V. Davis, Pro Hac Vice, Carter Law Group PC, Matthew Ryan McCarley, Pro Hac Vice, Christopher Michael Brown, Fears Nachawati Law Firm, John Warren Raggio, Dallas, TX, J. Eli Wade-Scott, Pro Hac Vice, Jay Edelson, Pro Hac Vice, Nicholas H. Rosinia, Pro Hac Vice, Edelson PC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff in 21-80645.
Jennifer Ann McLoone, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Miami, FL, for Defendant ADT, LLC in 21-80645.
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant ADT LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE [151]). The parties have fully briefed the Motion. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff, Shana Doty ("Doty") contracted with Defendant ADT, LLC ("ADT") for a Pulse home alarm service which provided an internet-connected smart home system including camera surveillance inside and outside her home. The system was installed in March 2015. On December 7, 2019, an ADT technician, Telesforo Aviles ("Aviles") visited Doty's home and added himself to her account as an authorized user. That addition enabled Aviles to access the Pulse system, remotely arm or disarm the system, unlock doors, and access security cameras. (DE [176] ¶ 57). Between December 7 and 18, 2019, Aviles accessed Doty's Pulse system at least 45 times. (Id. ¶ 52). ADT's logs for Doty's account do not show any live camera events by Aviles during this time. (DE [152 ¶ 29). It is unknown, however, whether Aviles accessed stored video on Doty's Pulse account. (Id. ¶ 30).
In addition to Doty's account, Aviles accessed at least 215 other ADT customers’ systems more than 9,600 times over a period of seven years. (DE [176] ¶ 53). ADT learned of Aviles’ conduct in March 2020, when a customer reported an intrusion into his system. (DE [176] ¶ 82). ADT reported the intrusion to Doty in April 2020.
Doty filed suit1 alleging breach of contract, negligence, violation of Texas’ consumer protection statute (DTPA), negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Aviles, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 Doty seeks damages and injunctive relief in the form of continued privacy monitoring, as well as exemplary and punitive damages, where applicable, attorney's fees and costs to the extent allowable, and pre- and post-judgment interest.
The parties have conducted extensive discovery and trial is scheduled to commence in March 2022. ADT moves for summary judgment (DE [151]) and asks for judgment in its favor on every claim.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment "is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 656–57, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) );3 see also Alabama v. North Carolina , 560 U.S. 330, 344, 130 S.Ct. 2295, 176 L.Ed.2d 1070 (2010). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the nonmoving party in light of his burden of proof. Harrison v. Culliver , 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). And a fact is "material" if, "under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case." Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co. , 357 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004). "[W]here the material facts are undisputed and do not support a reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment may properly be granted as a matter of law." DA Realty Holdings, LLC v. Tenn. Land Consultants , 631 Fed. Appx. 817, 820 (11th Cir. 2015).
The Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. SEC v. Monterosso , 756 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2014). However, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party must offer more than a mere scintilla of evidence for its position; indeed, the nonmoving party must make a showing sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably find on its behalf." Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ. , 780 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2015). "[T]his, however, does not mean that we are constrained to accept all the nonmovant's factual characterizations and legal arguments." Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp. , 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994).
To establish a breach of contract action under Texas law, a plaintiff must show "(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4) damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the breach." Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 419 (5th Cir. 2009). ADT argues that Doty cannot recover damages for breach of contract because she only claims emotional damages. Alternatively, ADT argues that the parties’ contract limits contractual damages to $500. ADT also argues that Doty is not entitled to attorney's fees under Texas law.
According to ADT, Texas law does not support a claim for mental anguish damages arising from a breach of a contract. See City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 498 (Tex. 1997) (); Hallmark v. Hand , 885 S.W.2d 471, 481 (Tex. App. 1994) (). Doty, however, correctly notes that the exception to "the general rule that mental anguish damages may not be recovered in an action for breach of contract ... has been recognized in a limited number of situations...." Dean v. Dean, 821 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Texas law).
One Texas court described the exception this way:
Where the contract is personal in nature and the contractual duty or obligation is so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, with the sensibilities of the party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering, and it should be known to the parties from the nature of the contract that such suffering will result from its breach, compensatory damages therefor may be recovered.
Pat H. Foley & Co. v. Wyatt , 442 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (quoting Lamm v. Shingleton , 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949) ). Such recovery is only available "in certain types of contracts" where mental anguish can be reasonably contemplated to be caused by a breach. Dean, 821 F.2d at 282. These include contracts for services relating to the handling of dead bodies, failure to deliver an important telegram, a promise to marry, and "a common carrier's refusal to honor a passenger's ticket for travel." Id. (collecting cases). Damages for mental distress can, therefore, be recovered for breach of contract if it is shown that the mental anguish is "more than ordinary regret or annoyance" and that "the mental anguish was such a necessary and natural result of the breach of contract as to have been made within the contemplation of the defendant at the time the contract was made." Delgado v. Methodist Hosp., 936 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Tex. App. 1996). Doty argues that her claim meets both conditions.
Doty has raised a genuine dispute of fact as to whether her mental damages were within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. She contracted with ADT for ADT to provide a security system that included a bookshelf camera in her home. (DE [55]). The Amended Complaint (DE [47]) alleges a breach of an implied covenant "to provide a security system that was suitable for its advertised purpose and not to contain design flaws that render it and/or access to it vulnerable to unauthorized intrusion resulting in the compromise of user safety and security." (DE [47], ¶ 61). This Court previously held that the parties’ contract implied a secure monitoring system that would be secure from intrusion by ADT's employees. (DE [85], p. 6).
Doty has presented evidence that ADT marketed itself as a leader in the home security industry who used professional installers and that its system...
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