Doty v. County of Lassen, s. 91-16755
| Decision Date | 06 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 91-16755,93-16163,s. 91-16755 |
| Citation | 37 F.3d 540 |
| Parties | Barbara DOTY, and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COUNTY OF LASSEN, and Ronald D. Jarrell as Sheriff, and Individually, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Lawrence T. Woodlock, Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Sacramento, CA, for defendants-appellants.
Richard A. Derevan, Snell & Wilmer, Irvine, CA, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
Before: ALARCON and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges, and WILSON, * District Judge.
On July 25, 1989, certain inmates at the old Lassen County Jail ("Old Jail") brought suit against the County of Lassen ("County") and the Sheriff of the County of Lassen under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 alleging that conditions in the Old Jail violated the First, Fourth and Eighth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Among other things, the prisoners alleged overcrowding, inadequate clothing, inadequate medical, dental and mental health care, inadequate privacy for conversations with attorneys, and unequal access to programs for women prisoners. Plaintiffs sought a broad set of injunctive remedies.
When the suit was filed, Lassen County was developing and implementing plans for construction of a new, much larger jail ("New Jail").
On October 17, 1989, the District Court approved a stipulated order preliminarily enjoining certain Old Jail conditions, primarily overcrowding.
On April 25, 1990, defendants made an offer of judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 68. Plaintiffs rejected this offer. On July 6, 1990, defendants made a second offer of judgment limited to the medical care issues. Plaintiffs did not accept this offer, nor did they formally reject it.
Beginning on July 16, 1990, the case was tried before Magistrate Judge John Moulds. The trial concluded in September 1990.
On July 1, 1991, the New Jail opened and the County ceased using the Old Jail.
On August 1, 1991, Magistrate Judge Moulds entered his 129-page Findings and Recommendations. On September 17, 1991, District Judge Lawrence Karlton entered an Order adopting (with one minor modification) the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations. This Order granted only a small fraction of the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. On October 9, 1991, Judge Karlton entered a judgment. On November 7, 1991, the defendants filed their notice of appeal from the judgment. This commenced Appeal No. 91-16755.
The attorney's fees litigation then commenced, with both sides seeking attorney's fees. On March 30, 1993, Magistrate Judge Moulds filed a 29-page Findings and Recommendations on the attorney's fees issue. On April 20, 1993, Judge Karlton filed an order adopting in full the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations. This order granted the plaintiffs some of the attorney's fees they had sought and denied the defendants' request for fees. On April 27, 1993, Judge Karlton entered his Judgment pursuant to the attorney's fees order. On April 28, 1993, the appellants filed their notice of appeal from the attorney's fees order. This commenced Appeal No. 93-16163.
The inmates brought their action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343. We have jurisdiction on appeal from the judgments of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The standards of review for our examination of the District Court's decision to grant injunctive relief regarding prison conditions are set forth in Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1245-46 (9th Cir.1982). The District Court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. The District Court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id.
When a constitutional violation has been properly identified, the District Court's fashioning of a remedy is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, we may not reverse unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the District Court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors. Maag v. Wessler, 993 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir.1993). Under this standard, we must "scrutinize the injunction closely to make sure that the remedy protects the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and does not require more of state officials than is necessary to assure their compliance with the constitution." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987). "Within these parameters, we will defer to the district court." Id.
Awards of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership v. State Water Resources Control Board, 972 F.2d 274, 277 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2439, 124 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993). However, any elements of legal analysis and statutory interpretation which figure in the District Court's opinion are subject to de novo review. Id. The District Court's factual determinations underlying its finding that plaintiffs are the "prevailing party" for purposes of collecting attorney's fees under Section 1988 will not be set aside absent clear error. Sablan v. Department of Finance, 856 F.2d 1317, 1324 (9th Cir.1988).
In examining prison conditions, federal courts must remember that "[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a basis for broad prison reform." Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246. "The function of a court is limited to determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred." Id. When a violation is found, the court must fashion "a remedy that does no more and no less than correct that particular constitutional violation." Id. Beyond this responsibility, federal courts have no role in the formulation of prison policy. "Any needed prison reform is an executive and legislative responsibility." Id.
In issuing its final injunctive order, the District Court made factual findings regarding the conditions at the Old Jail prior to the litigation. These findings are not appealed, and we therefore accept them as true. In 1970 the County built the Old Jail. The Board of Corrections established a capacity of forty-one inmates for the Old Jail. The actual population exceeded the rated capacity from 1987 until the time the lawsuit was filed. From January to August 1989, the prison housed between fifty-two and eighty-two inmates at any one time, with an average of sixty-three. This overcrowding resulted in numerous problems at the jail, including prisoners sleeping on bedding on the prison floor and prisoners sleeping in unsanitary conditions within inches of toilets and/or showers.
The stipulated order entered on October 17, 1989, provided the prisoners with the following relief pending the outcome of the lawsuit:
(1) The County agreed to limit inmate population at the Old Jail to forty-one inmates;
(2) The County agreed to limit the temporary holding cell's population to the rated capacity;
(3) The County agreed to limit time spent in the temporary holding cell to eight hours;
(4) The County agreed that use of the detoxification facility would comply with California law;
(5) The County agreed that all inmates would be provided with a permanent bed appropriate to his/her classification; and
(6) The County agreed that all inmates would have daily access to the "program room" and outdoor recreation.
The Final Injunction
The District Judge's 1991 Order granted the following relief:
(1) For a period of one year, the County was prohibited from exceeding the established inmate capacities at the Old Jail or the New Jail;
(2) The County was required to "modify" and follow written policies regarding access to the jail law library;
(3) The County was required to clarify the procedures for staff handling of prisoners demonstrating a mental disorder;
(4) The County was required to develop a procedure for ensuring a timely response to an inmate's request for mental health care.
All further requests for relief were denied. Some of these requests were denied because the disputes had been resolved by the County's implementation of new policies during the litigation. Others were denied on the merits with findings that the plaintiffs had not established several of the alleged constitutional violations.
The County contends that the injunction was improper. We agree.
Pursuant to the terms of the injunction, the court-ordered population caps on the jails expired on September 13, 1992. Accordingly, the dispute over the imposition of the cap is moot, and this Court's opinion has no impact on the now-expired portion of the injunction.
However, this Court must still examine the merits of the population cap because the propriety of that order is central to the resolution of the attorney's fees disputes which we confront below. For organizational clarity, we will address the merits of the population cap order here, rather than in the portion of the opinion addressing the attorney's fees issue.
The portion of the injunction requiring a population cap on the Old Jail was improper. When the District Court entered its injunction, it is undisputed that the County had transferred all its inmates to the New Jail and was no longer using the Old Jail. As a result, the question of the need for a population cap at the Old Jail was moot.
The portion of the injunction requiring a population cap on the New Jail was also improper. Even assuming arguendo that the Old Jail's overcrowding resulted in...
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