Maag v. Wessler
Decision Date | 13 May 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-36657,92-36657 |
Citation | 993 F.2d 718 |
Parties | Garth MAAG, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard WESSLER; Valley County, Montana, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Joseph M. Sullivan, Emmons & Sullivan, Great Falls, MT, for defendants-appellants.
Don M. Hayes, Herndon, Hartman, Sweeney & Halverson, Billings, MT, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana.
Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, O'SCANNLAIN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
In our previous amended opinion, Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773 (9th Cir.1992), we remanded to the district court for consideration of the appellants' request for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Upon remand, the district court issued an order that required the defendants to submit a motion and a brief in support of their request for attorney's fees. On July 16, 1992, the district court entered an order denying the motion for attorneys' fees. The order stated simply "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion, requesting the Court for an award of a reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, be, and the same hereby, is denied." The final judgment was entered on July 24, 1992, against the plaintiff, Garth Maag, and for the defendants. In accordance with the order of July 16, 1992, no attorney's fees were awarded to the defendants. Two of the defendants, Deputy Richard Wessler and his employer, Valley County, Montana, timely appeal from the final judgment. 1 Deputy Wessler and Valley County argue that the district court abused its discretion by: (1) failing to articulate any reason for its denial of fees, and (2) denying their request for attorney fees under the law of this case as we previously determined it in Maag, 960 F.2d 773.
The Law Regarding a Defendant's Entitlement to Attorney's
We have explained the circumstances under which a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorney's fees:
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a district court may award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant only in limited circumstances. A prevailing defendant in a civil rights action is entitled to an attorney's fees award where plaintiff's action, even though not brought in subjective bad faith, is " 'frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.' " Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 664 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)); see Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-16, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178-79, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980).
Jensen v. Stangel, 762 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir.1985).
We review attorney's fees awards for an abuse of discretion. Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, we may not reverse unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors. United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724, 725 (9th Cir.1992) ( ); Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1546 (9th Cir.1988) (per curiam) ( ). We cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the lower court. United States v. Egbuniwe, 969 F.2d 757, 761 (9th Cir.1992).
Citing Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.1987), the appellants contend the district court was required to state the reasons for its denial of an award of attorney's fees. However, findings are unnecessary to sustain a denial of attorney's fees under section 1988. A court may grant attorney's fees to a defendant under section 1988 only under the limited circumstances where the action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Stangel, 762 F.2d at 817. Therefore, it is implicit in a denial of attorney's fees to a defendant that a court has found that the action was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Jordan v. Multnomah County is distinguishable. In that case, the issue was the reasonableness of a district court's grant of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. Because the "district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award," Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1263 n. 11, courts were required to apply the twelve factors listed in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1726, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976), as a guide to determining the proper amount of the fee award. Therefore, in Jordan, we held that the failure to apply the Kerr factors was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1263-64 & n. 11. It is an entirely different matter when a court denies the request of a prevailing defendant for an award of fees under section 1988: simply put, there are no factors to consider other than whether the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Such a denial is within the distinct province of a district court because it has superior knowledge of the facts:
Not infrequently, the question [of whether attorney's fees should be awarded] will turn upon not merely what was the law, but what was the evidence regarding the facts. By reason of settlement conferences and other pretrial activities, the district court may have insights not conveyed by the record, into such matters as whether particular evidence was worthy of being relied upon, or whether critical facts could easily have been verified....
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2547, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) ( ).
an Award of Attorney's Fees
The appellants argue that when we remanded for the district court to consider the request for attorney's fees, the court was bound by the law of the case, 2 including our conclusion that Maag, 960 F.2d at 776 (emphasis added). Because of our statement, the appellants contend that
The appellants misapprehend the basis of our previous decision. We disposed of the case on the doctrine of immunity rather than on the merits of Maag's claim. See Maag, 960 F.2d at 774 (). We have said:
Under Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 [87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288] (1967), police officers have a qualified immunity under section 1983 such that they are shielded from liability if they reasonably believe in good faith that their actions are constitutional. Id. at 557 . Thus, to recover the plaintiff must clear two hurdles: probable cause must be shown not to have existed [and] the officers must be shown not to have reasonably believed in good faith that probable cause did exist. It is necessary that police officers be immune when they reasonably believe that probable cause existed, even though it is subsequently concluded that it did not, because they "cannot be expected to predict what federal judges frequently have considerable difficulty in deciding and about which they frequently differ among themselves."
Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir.1981) (citations omitted) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1349 (2d Cir.1972) (Lumbard, J., concurring)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829, 103 S.Ct. 65, 74 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982).
Thus, we determined whether the officers had probable cause and acted in good faith in detaining Maag. 3 Because a "policeman's on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for [detaining] a person ... and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to [detention]," Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14, 95 S.Ct. 854, 863, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (emphasis added), we did not consider Maag's version of the facts in deciding whether there was immunity. Our discussion of the facts from the officers' viewpoint for purposes of immunity was not intended to express any views on the merits of Maag's claim. For all we know, from Maag's...
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