Double v. Iowa-Nebraska Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 11 December 1924 |
| Docket Number | 36302 |
| Citation | 201 N.W. 97,198 Iowa 1351 |
| Parties | CLARA DOUBLE, Appellant, v. IOWA-NEBRASKA COAL COMPANY et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Lucas District Court.--D. M. ANDERSON, Judge.
ACTION under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Iowa, to recover compensation for a fatal injury to Harold Lager, the minor son of the appellant, Clara Double. It is appellees' contention that the award could not extend beyond the period of decedent's minority. It is the appellant's contention that she is entitled to recover compensation at the prescribed statutory rate for a period of 300 weeks, less 22 weeks' compensation paid decedent during his lifetime. The arbitration committee, the industrial commissioner, and the district court, from which this appeal is taken, ruled the contention in favor of the employer and its insurance carrier, appellees herein. From the judgment entered by the trial court, claimant appeals.
Reversed.
Clarkson & Huebner, for appellant.
Miller Kelly, Shuttleworth & McManus, for appellees.
DE GRAFF, J.
This appeal presents a question of statutory construction. The specific problem requiring solution may be stated as follows Is the appellant (the mother of a minor son) entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Iowa for a period of 300 weeks, less 22 weeks paid decedent before his death, irrespective of whether or not the minor son would have attained his majority before the expiration of 300 weeks from the time of the injury that caused his death?
Before making answer to this proposition, we deem it necessary to recite the primary facts. The claimant, Clara Double, is the mother of Harold Lager, a minor born December 21, 1903. He sustained a personal injury on January 12, 1923, arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Iowa- Nebraska Coal Company, which resulted in his death, June 23, 1923. The Integrity Mutual Casualty Company, as workmen's compensation carrier for the Coal Company, paid to the injured employee the full amount of workmen's compensation to which he was entitled at the time of his death. On September 20, 1923, Clara Double, as claimant, filed with the industrial commissioner her petition for arbitration, in which she alleged that she was the sole survivor and only dependent of said deceased employee, and that any interest of her husband, Curtis J. Double, stepfather of the deceased minor, had been assigned to her. The arbitration committee found as a fact that Clara Double was not in any degree actually dependent for support upon her minor son at the time of his injury, but that, under the statutory conclusive presumption of dependency, she was entitled, as a parent, to workmen's compensation at $ 10 per week (2/3 of full weekly rate) from the date of death of her son until December 21, 1924, at which time, had he survived, he would have attained his majority. Upon review, the industrial commissioner confirmed the finding and affirmed the award made. The claimant appealed to the district court, and a judgment was entered affirming the decision of the industrial commissioner. It is from this entry that this appeal is taken.
It become necessary for this court to construe the Iowa statute making a parent a dependent of a minor employee, and to determine under the statute whether a parent who is not actually dependent upon the earnings of her minor son is entitled to receive compensation only until the time when he would have reached his majority, or for the statutory 300 weeks.
The Workmen's Compensation Act, within the scope of its operation, is exclusive. No rights are conferred and no benefits are derived therefrom, except as therein provided. No compensation is provided except for the injured employee or for his dependents. Dependency is a prerequisite to receiving compensation, and the compensation paid is either for earnings lost, earning capacity lost, or physical loss by severance or of function. Section 2477-m9 (h), (i), and (j), (1 to 19, inc.), Code Supplement, 1913. The statutory provisions having a direct bearing upon the instant case are as follows:
"Where injury causes death to an employee, a minor, whose earnings were received by the parent, the compensation to be paid the parent shall be two thirds of the amount provided for payment in Subdivision (d) Section 10." Section 2477-m9 (f).
Subdivision (d) of m9, as amended by Chapter 220, Acts of the Thirty-eighth General Assembly, reads:
"If death results from the injury, the employer shall pay the dependents of the employee wholly dependent upon his earnings for support at the time of the injury, a weekly payment equal to 60 per cent of his average weekly wages, but not more than $ 15 nor less than $ 6.00 per week for a period of 300 weeks."
The Compensation Law of Iowa further provides:
"The following shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon a deceased employee; * * * (3) A parent of a minor entitled to the earnings of the employee at the time when the injury occurred, subject to provisions of Subdivision (f), Section 10, hereof." Section 2477-m16 (c) (3), Code Supplement, 1913.
Under this record, the decedent is within the terms of m9 (f). He was an employee, a minor, and his earnings were received by his mother. Therefore, the compensation to be paid the mother is two thirds of the amount provided for payment in Subdivision (d), which, under the statute and this record, is two thirds of $ 15 for a period of 300 weeks. It is conceded that 22 weeks had been paid, and this period of time must be deducted in any event. The question is squarely presented: Is the claimant, as mother of the decedent, entitled to compensation beyond the period of minority of the decedent? The statute does not expressly provide for the termination of such payment. What is the legal justification for abating or terminating the parent's compensation short of 300 weeks from the date of the occurrence of the fatal injury? Does the presumptive dependency of the mother control? The statute recognizes two kinds of dependency, actual and presumptive. We are not dealing with actual dependency, which is a question of fact. Serrano v. Cudahy Pkg. Co., 194 Iowa 689, 190 N.W. 132. The dependency in the instant case is conclusively presumed, and arises by virtue of the statute. Without inquiry as to the wisdom of the legislative policy, the statute conclusively presumes the parent to be wholly dependent upon the minor son, under the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Did the legislature intend that the amount to be paid, when the employee is a minor and the parent entitled to the earnings of the minor at the time when the injury occurred, should be for 300 weeks, regardless of the time when said minor reached his majority?
In Wancler B. & S. Metal Works Co. v. Industrial Com., 287 Ill. 118 (122 N.E. 366), it is said:
"The legislature has the power to place limitations upon the rights of beneficiaries, but courts have no power to put a limitation upon a right legally given by the legislature, unless by a fair construction of the act it can be said that such limitation was in furtherance of legislative intent."
Our legislature had the power to terminate the parent's compensation when a deceased minor son attained the age of 21. It did not so provide. Does a judicial limitation on the period during which the parent shall receive compensation read into the act that which is not found therein, either in its language or its spirit?
In Newton v. Rhode Island Co., 42 R.I. 58 (105 A. 363), the court said:
This court said, in Davey v. Norwood-White Coal Co., 195 Iowa 459, 192 N.W. 304:
"Necessarily, the statutory liability continues until discharged by statutory exceptions."
Under the Compensation Act of the state of Washington, it is provided that the parent's compensation terminates when the deceased son "would have arrived at the age of 21 years." See Boyd v. Pratt, 72 Wash. 306 (130 P. 371). Since our Compensation Law is silent on this proposition, the Washington case is in no sense controlling. Nor is the case of Giggndelle v. Piedmont & G. C. Coal Co., 137 Md. 25 (111 A. 135), in point, since the ambiguity noted in that case does not exist, under the terms of our statute.
Is our Compensation Law a substitute for the rights and remedies given a parent under Section 3471, Code of 1897? This section reads:
"A father, or, in case of his death or imprisonment or desertion of his family, the mother, may as plaintiff maintain an action for the expenses and actual loss of service resulting from...
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