Doucet v. Middleton
Citation | 328 F.2d 97 |
Decision Date | 07 February 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 20143.,20143. |
Parties | Dewey DOUCET et al., Appellants, v. Stanley H. MIDDLETON, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Kilborn, Darby & Kilborn, Mobile, Ala., Benjamin H. Kilborn, Mobile, Ala., of counsel, for appellants.
Alex T. Howard, Jr., Mobile, Ala., McCorvey, Turner, Johnstone, Adams & May, Mobile, Ala., of counsel, for appellee.
Before RIVES, WISDOM and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.
In Alabama must an action for willful or wanton injury to the person, or to personal property, be brought within one year,1 or within six years?2
Four complaints based on diversity jurisdiction, all arising out of an automobile collision, were filed against the defendant, Stanley H. Middleton. One of the plaintiffs was Dewey Doucet, the owner and driver of the other automobile who sought to recover both for injuries to his person and for damages to his automobile. The other three plaintiffs were passengers in Doucet's car, who sued for personal injuries. The collision occurred on a highway in Baldwin County, Alabama, on July 29, 1960, and the complaints were filed on February 14, 1962, well within six years but more than one year after the collision.
Each complaint was in two counts, the first charging simple negligence, and the second a willful or wanton injury.3
The plaintiffs concede that the first or simple negligence count of each complaint is barred by the one year statute of limitations (n. 1, supra). The district court held that the second or willful or wanton count was also barred by the one year statute of limitations.4
There is, and can be, no contention but that under Alabama law a complaint alleging that a defendant willfully or wantonly injured a plaintiff's person or property is in trespass rather than trespass on the case.5 For many years it was impossible to join the master and servant as defendants in an action seeking to recover for a willful or wanton injury committed by the servant, because the count would be trespass against the servant and trespass on the case against the master.6 To permit the master and servant to be joined in such actions, the Alabama Legislature in 1947 enacted what now appears as section 138(1) of Title 7 of the Code of Alabama.7 In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Johns, 1958, 267 Ala. 261, 101 So.2d 265, 74 A.L.R.2d 499, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that statute invalid, and quoted at length from a previously unpublished opinion8 in part as follows:
To meet the unpublished opinions in Sibley v. Odum and in the Birmingham Transit Company case, supra n. 8, the Alabama Legislature had in 1957 enacted what is now section 176 of Title 7 of the Code of Alabama.9 Thus, the Alabama Legislature found it necessary "to create a form of action known as the statutory suit against principal and agent or master and servant, etc.," and to prescribe the limitations applicable to such an action. Further, the Act provided that, "In all such cases, but in no other, the ancient distinctions between trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case are abolished." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Supreme Court of Alabama in the Johns case, supra, and the Legislature of Alabama in enacting what is now section 176 of Title 7 of the Code of Alabama clearly recognized that an action against a defendant for a willful or wanton injury committed by the defendant himself was in trespass and was covered by the six year statute of limitations, now section 21 of Title 7 of the Alabama Code, the pertinent part of which is quoted in footnote 2, supra.
The defendant, appellee, argues that the six year statute of limitations in Alabama is not applicable to all actions for trespass to the person, but only to such actions as are intentional. He bases that argument on the last clause in the description of the actions in section 21, footnote 2, supra:
We cannot accept that argument, especially in the light of the legislative recognition of that part of the Sibley v. Odum and Birmingham Transit Company opinion adopted by the Johns decision.
Further, the reference to the statute of limitations in Johns was not mere obiter dictum, as defendant claims, but was an important part of the ratio decidendi of the case. However, even if the defendant was correct in referring to that part of the Johns opinion as dictum, it is nonetheless binding on this Court under the Erie10 doctrine.
"The obligation to accept local law extends not merely to definitive decisions, but to considered dicta as well, and if explicit pronouncements are wanting, the federal court should endeavor to discover the law of the state on the point at issue by considering related decisions, analogies, and any reliable data tending convincingly to show what the state rule is."
1A Moore's Federal Practice, p. 3312. Even in the era of Swift v. Tyson, 1842, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865, federal courts were bound to follow state court decisions on construction of state statutes.11 Speaking of such a statutory construction, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Cardozo, said:
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