Dougherty v. Woodward

• Decision Date: 13 December 1917
• Docket Number: 9015.
• Citation: 94 S.E. 636,21 Ga.App. 427
• Parties: DOUGHERTY v. WOODWARD.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

94 S.E. 636

21 Ga.App. 427

DOUGHERTY v. WOODWARD.

No. 9015.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

December 13, 1917

Syllabus by the Court.

The owner of an automobile is not liable for injuries inflicted by his son, 20 years of age, in negligently operating it where it appears that at the time of the injuries the son was using the car for his own purposes, and not as the agent, or servant, of the father.

The trial judge, under the facts appearing in the record, did not err in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Where a minor son while negligently operating defendant's automobile for his own purposes fatally injured plaintiff's son, defendant's expressions of sympathy and his promise to do the right thing did not amount to a ratification of the tort, or an acknowledgment of liability.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Geo. L. Bell, Judge.

Suit by Leola Dougherty against J. C. Woodward. Judgment for defendant upon a directed verdict, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Nalley & Scott, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Moore & Branch, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

HARWELL J.

It is not necessary to consider the allegations or the proof as to the acts of negligence charged to the defendant's son the value of the life of plaintiff's deceased son, or any other circumstances save that of the agency of the son in driving the defendant's car, which feature we deem controlling upon the case. The evidence was in sharp conflict as to whether the car, driven by the defendant's son at the time of the injury, was the property of the defendant or his wife and would have authorized either conclusion. However, conceding that the car was the property of the defendant and was being negligently driven by his son, the father would still not be liable, unless the son, in driving the car, was in the performance of his father's business.

"It may be taken as settled law in this state that a father is not liable for the tort of a minor child, with which he was in no way connected, which he did not ratify, and from which he did not derive any benefit, merely because of the relation of parent and child. * * * A child, however, may occupy the position of a servant or agent of his parent, and for his acts as such the parent may be liable under the general principles governing the relation of master and servant, or principal and agent." Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 278, 87 S.E. 10, 11 (L.R.A. 1916F, 216, Ann.Cas. 1917D, 994).

And as said by the New York court:

"The liability of an owner of a motor car for the negligence of one driving it in his absence depends upon whether the relation of master and

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