Douglas v. Dephillips
| Decision Date | 13 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 17-2305 SECTION I |
| Parties | RICHARD DOUGLAS ET AL. v. MATTHEW DEPHILLIPS ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
In March 2016, Joshua Douglas led law enforcement officers on a car chase through the streets of St. Tammany Parish. By the end of it, he was dead as a result of an officer's use of force. This case is about whether such use of force, and other actions taken by officers at the time, violated the U.S. Constitution and Louisiana law.
Defendants have filed a joint motion1 to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims in the amended complaint ("complaint").2 Because plaintiffs untimely filed their opposition, the Court could have treated the motion as unopposed.3 The Court nevertheless readplaintiffs' untimely filings and considered the arguments presented therein. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants' joint motion to dismiss.
At approximately 5:00 pm on March 19, 2016, a National Crime Information Center camera detected a license plate that had been reported stolen.4 The license plate was attached to a silver, four-door Infiniti sedan.5
The camera relayed the detection to the St. Tammany Parish sheriff's office ("Sheriff's Office"), whose dispatch alerted officers to the sighting.6 Deputy James Kelly responded.7 At the time, Deputy Kelly was in a "fully-marked" cruiser.8
Deputy Kelly spotted the Infiniti near the intersection of Interstate 12 and Highway 59 "[a]lmost immediately."9 Deputy Kelly noticed a male driver, later identified as Joshua Douglas ("Douglas").10 Jessica Sheppard ("Sheppard") was also in the Infiniti, sitting in the front passenger seat.11 Deputy Kelly turned on hiscruiser's emergency lights and began to pursue the Infiniti on the basis of the stolen license plate.12 Douglas refused to stop.13
Deputy Kelly pursued Douglas north on Highway 59.14 Douglas then took a series of turns, eventually ending up on 3rd Avenue.15 From 3rd Avenue, Douglas entered "the dead-end square of Judy Avenue to the north, Barbara Avenue to the south, Bode Avenue to the east, and Janice Avenue to the west."16
Deputy Kelly stopped on 3rd Avenue, and was joined by Deputies Matthew DePhillips and Jacob Jenkins, who drove their own "fully-marked" vehicles.17 Deputies Kelly, DePhillips, and Jenkins then drove into the square to pursue Douglas.18 Deputies Kelly and Jenkins went south on Janice Avenue; Deputy DePhillips went east on Judy Avenue.19 After Deputy DePhillips turned from Judy Avenue onto Bode Avenue, he encountered Douglas, who was driving the Infiniti in reverse down Bode Avenue at a "high rate of speed."20 The complaint suggests that Douglas may have struck one or more of the deputies' vehicles in the process, although in no "appreciable manner."21
Douglas then backed the Infiniti into a ditch on Bode Lane, which "juts out like a scorpion's tail" from the corner of Bode and Barbara Avenues.22 The Infiniti's driver's side was leaning against the embankment, which allegedly prevented Douglas from being able to exit the Infiniti through the driver's door.23
Deputies DePhillips, Kelly, and Jenkins pulled up to Bode Lane.24 The three officers left their vehicles and "rushed" the Infiniti with firearms drawn.25 Deputy DePhillips "positioned himself at the rear passenger door," Deputy Kelly at the front passenger door, and Deputy Jenkins at the passenger side front fender.26 The time was on or about 5:12 pm, and the weather was clear with "sufficient natural daylight."27
As the officers positioned themselves, Sheppard's hands were "in the air," and Sheppard was screaming that she was pregnant.28 Douglas "put his hand(s) near the top" of Sheppard's arms.29 Douglas's face was "within inches" of Sheppard's face.30
Deputy DePhillips opened the Infiniti's rear passenger door and "immediately fired one shot" with his firearm, hitting Douglas near his right eye.31 According to the complaint, "Deputy DePhillips claimed with certainty that he assessed andconcluded . . . that he believed" Douglas had a firearm in his hand, which was hidden underneath Sheppard's hair.32 No firearm was recovered from the scene.33
After Deputy DePhillips discharged his firearm at Douglas, Deputy Jenkins removed Sheppard from the Infiniti as Sargent34 Alex Dantaghan and Deputy Cristen Graham arrived on the scene.35 Deputy Jenkins allegedly "threw" Sheppard face-down on the ground, and then either he or Deputy Graham handcuffed her and placed her in the back seat of his vehicle.36
Paramedics arrived twelve to fourteen minutes later.37 Deputy Graham recalled that the paramedics "'came out after' the scene was 'declared safe.'"38 One of the paramedics "checked [Douglas's] pulse with an EKG patch on his right arm, consulted with a physician, and declared death."39 According to the complaint, an examination of Douglas's body after these events suggests that Douglas lived for some time after he had been shot.40
In addition to checking Douglas, the paramedics attended to Sheppard, who was transported to Lakeview Regional Medical Center ("Lakeview") at approximately5:46 pm.41 Deputy Grey Thurman accompanied her.42 Both before and until she arrived at Lakeview, Sheppard "repeatedly asked for her purse," which no officer provided to her.43
Sheppard arrived at Lakeview around 5:56 pm, where she remained "against her will."44 Upon arrival, Sheppard was isolated from the general population.45 She chose to end her medical treatment at approximately 8:35 pm.
After ending her treatment, Sheppard gave a statement at the St. Tammany Parish Law Enforcement Center, beginning at 9:48 pm and ending at 10:22 pm.46 Sheppard alleges that the statement was "effectively forced."47 She was then taken home.48
At some point either during or after this incident, law enforcement discovered that the Infiniti driven by Douglas had been stolen.49 The St. Tammany Parish sheriff's office returned the Infiniti to its lawful owner before plaintiffs' counsel had an opportunity to inspect it.50
In response to these events, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, alleging over a dozen theories of liability against a dozen defendants. Defendants now jointly move51 todismiss all claims against them for failure to state a claim. Defendants also assert qualified immunity as a defense to certain claims.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, where a plaintiff has not set forth well-pleaded factual allegations that would entitle him to relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff's factual allegations must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
A facially plausible claim is one where "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If the well-pleaded factual allegations "do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," then "the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court limits its review "to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint." Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010); see alsoSpivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). In assessing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and liberally construe all such allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Spivey, 197 F.3d at 774; Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997).
Where "the complaint 'on its face show[s] a bar to relief,'" then dismissal is the appropriate course. Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 Fed. App'x. 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986)). Where applicable, qualified immunity can operate as such a bar.
The doctrine of qualified immunity "balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). In striking this balance, qualified immunity shields "government officials performing discretionary functions" from civil liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) ().
Where a public official invokes qualified immunity as a defense to a civil action against him, the plaintiff then has the burden "to demonstrate the inapplicability ofthe defense." Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct." Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). "Courts have discretion to decide which prong of the qualified-immunity analysis...
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