Douglas v. Douglas

• Decision Date: 15 July 1912
• Parties: THOMAS J. DOUGLAS, Appellant, v. MARY E. DOUGLAS et al., Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

125 P. 796

22 Idaho 336

THOMAS J. DOUGLAS, Appellant, v. MARY E. DOUGLAS et al., Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

July 15, 1912

SEPARATE PROPERTY OF HUSBAND UNDER LAWS OF FOREIGN STATE-COMMUNITY PROPERTY UNDER LAWS OF IDAHO-INVESTMENT OF SEPARATE PROPERTY-ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE-PROBATE PROCEEDINGS AS ESTOPPEL.

(Syllabus by the court.)

1. Under the statute of this state, sec. 2679, Rev. Codes "all property owned by the husband before marriage, and that acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent is his separate property," and under sec. 3060, Rev. Codes "Community property is property acquired by husband and wife, or either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either."

2. Under the community property laws of this state, whenever after marriage, the husband purchases real estate within this state, a prima facie presumption arises that such property is community property, and such presumption may be overcome by the husband assuming the affirmative and burden of proof and showing as a matter of fact that such property was purchased with his separate property or estate.

3. Personal property acquired during coverture is governed and controlled by the law of the matrimonial domicile, and if the title thereto and property therein was vested in the husband under the law of the domicile, it will be presumed everywhere to be his property, and the same is true of any property that was the separate and individual property of the wife under the law of the matrimonial domicile.

4. Where husband and wife during coverture accumulated property in a state where the community law did not exist and where property accumulated and acquired during coverture vests absolutely in the husband, and such property or the proceeds thereof is brought into the state of Idaho and here invested in real property, the property so acquired will be the separate property of the husband.

5. Where no proof is shown to the contrary, the presumption arises in the courts of this state that the community property law prevails in a sister state, the same as it prevails in this state.

6. In inquiring into and ascertaining the law of a sister state with reference to the title and ownership of property acquired by husband and wife in that state during coverture the courts of this state do not make such inquiry and investigation for the purpose of executing a foreign law within this state, but rather to ascertain the status of the foreign law as a probative fact in ascertaining and establishing the title and ownership of such property at the time it is brought into this state.

7. A probate court has no jurisdiction or authority in the administration of an estate of a decedent to order or confirm the sale of real estate which belongs to someone else, and the title to which is vested in another and which property did not in fact or law belong to the estate being administered.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Twin Falls County. Hon. C. O. Stockslager, Judge.

An action to quiet title. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. Reversed.

Reversed and remanded with direction. Costs awarded in favor of appellant.

James H. Wise, for Appellant.

There being no dispute as to the marriage taking place in Colorado at the time alleged, or as to the property being earned during the life of the marriage contract, or that the wife, during the marriage contract, performed her usual household duties during the acquiring of said property in Colorado, it would naturally appear that the status of the property was permanently fixed in Colorado and was separate property of the plaintiff in Colorado. (Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 P. 360, 14 L. R. A., N. S., 1009; Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Young, 30 Colo. 349, 70 P. 688.)

The husband's ownership of real, personal and mixed property in Colorado will not be divested by his removal to Idaho, where the community property law exists. (Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302; George v. Ramson, 15 Cal. 322, 76 Am. Dec. 499; Ramsdell v. Fuller, 28 Cal. 37, 87 Am. Dec. 103; In re Burrows' Estate, 136 Cal. 113, 68 P. 488; Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 123 Am. St. 944, 90 P. 914, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 921, 13 Ann. Cas. 839; Bond v. Cummings, 70 Me. 125; Lichtenberger v. Graham, 50 Ind. 288; Mason v. Fuller, 36 Conn. 160; Jaffrey v. McGough, 83 Ala. 202, 3 So. 594; Thorn v. Weatherly, 50 Ark. 237, 7 S.W. 33; Dye v. Dye, 11 Cal. 163; Tinkler v. Cox, 68 Ill. 119; Smith v. Peterson, 63 Ind. 243; Hayden v. Nutt, 4 La. Ann. 65; Henderson v. Trousdale, 10 La. Ann. 548; Stokes v. Macken, 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 145; Lyon v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548; Cade v. Davis, 96 N.C. 139, 2 S.E. 225; Cressey v. Tatom, 9 Ore. 451; Vardeman v. Lawson, 17 Tex. 10.)

As it now stands, the property described in plaintiff's complaint is not inventoried in the probate court, nor has the probate court any jurisdiction over the property described in the plaintiff's complaint. (Ross on Probate Law, p. 420.)

The adjudication of the probate court or the recitals of the inventory are not conclusive in another forum of the decedent's ownership either as against a third person or against the executor or administrator. (Estate of Rathgab, 125 Cal. 302, 57 P. 1010; Lammex v. Dodson, 4 Mont. 560, 2 P. 298; Estate of Bolander, 38 Ore. 493, 63 P. 689; Estate of Belt, 29 Wash. 535, 92 Am. St. 916, 70 P. 74.)

The laws of the sister state must be proved as facts or the court will not take judicial notice of them. (Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1, 6 S.Ct. 242, 29 L.Ed. 535; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 15 P. 821; Washburn Crosby Co. v. Boston & A. R. R. Co., 180 Mass. 252, 62 N.E. 590; Crandall v. Great Northern R. Co., 83 Minn. 190, 85 Am. St. 458, 86 N.W. 10; Musser v. Stauffer, 178 Pa. 99, 35 A. 709; Coghlin v. S. C. R. Co., 142 U.S. 101, 12 S.Ct. 150, 35 L.Ed. 951; Shannon v. Wolf, 173 Ill. 253, 50 N.E. 682; 5 Ency. Ev. 808; Jones on Evidence, p. 129, sec. 118; Eastern Building & Loan Assn. v. Williamson, 189 U.S. 122, 23 S.Ct. 527, 47 L.Ed. 735.)

Longley & Hazel, for Respondents.

The community property laws of this state step into the place of the law of devolution of Colorado, and more particularly sec. 3011 of the Colorado statutes, which makes express provision for the wife, and says that the husband may not cut off the wife by the execution of the will, as she has the option to take under any will which may be executed, or, in lieu thereof, one-half of the entire estate, both real and personal. (Hanna v. Palmer, 6 Colo. 160, 45 Am. Rep. 524.)

Distributions of the estates of decedents are governed by the laws of the state where the estate is situated. (Wharton's Conflict of Laws, secs. 560, 561; Story on Conflict of Laws, secs. 480-484; Brock's Administrator, 51 Ala. 85; Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart., N. S. (La.) 569, 16 Am. Dec. 212.)

The law of every civilized state aims to preserve essential rights vested under foreign laws, but the owner cannot bring with him to the new situs the laws of the place of acquisition. (McKay, Com. Prop., sec. 526.)

The probate court, having made an order final and conclusive in its nature, and having vested some third person with the title to the property here involved, it is not within the province of this court to consider or disturb such order except upon appeal as by the statutes of the state provided. (Clark v. Rossier, 10 Idaho 348, 78 P. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 231.)

AILSHIE, J. Stewart, C. J., and Sullivan, J., concur.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

On about the 12th day of May, 1897, the appellant, Thomas J. Douglas, was a resident of Otero county, Colo., and there intermarried with Margaret v. Douglas, and thereafter the two continued to live together as husband and wife in the state of Colorado until the 25th day of February, 1908, on which date they removed from Colorado to Idaho. Between the date of their marriage and their removal to Idaho, and while they were husband and wife, they acquired and accumulated real, personal and mixed property which amounted to the sum of $ 13,050 at the time of their departure for Idaho. During this time they were engaged in the farming business, the wife discharging the usual and ordinary household duties and the husband conducting the farming business. The wife had no separate property of any kind or character recognized as such under the laws of Colorado Upon arriving at Twin Falls, Idaho, the husband invested this money in real estate. They continued to live in Idaho until the time of the death of Margaret V. Douglas, the wife of the appellant, which occurred on the 25th day of October, 1909. She left surviving her husband and her minor children, Mary E. Douglas, Robert M. Douglas and Kenneth Douglas, Administration was had on the estate of Margaret V. Douglas, and among other things, the inventory returned one-half of this real estate as community property and subject to administration under the laws of Idaho. The administration proceeded on the theory that this was community property and an order was subsequently made for the sale of this property and a sale was made. Thereafter the husband, Thomas J. Douglas, concluded that this was not community property but his separate property, and he was thereupon suspended as administrator of the estate and a special administrator was appointed, and appellant thereupon made a motion to have this property stricken from the inventory on the ground that it was not community property but his separate property. This motion was sustained by the probate court. Thereafter the appellant instituted this action for the purpose of quieting his title to the whole of the property on the ground that it was his separate estate.

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