Douglas v. Jane Doe, CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-5574
| Decision Date | 12 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-5574 |
| Parties | MONTRELLE DANIEL DOUGLAS v. JANE DOE, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Defendant Joseph Korszniak's1 Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30), and Defendants Pennsylvania State Department of Corrections, John Wetzel, and William Lewis's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
On October 24, 2010, Plaintiff acting pro se filed a Complaint. (ECF No. 3.) That same day, we ordered that Plaintiff be appointed counsel. (ECF No. 5.) On February 14, 2012, counsel was appointed. (ECF No. 21.) On April 30, 2012, counsel for Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 29.) The Amended Complaint asserts five claims: violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I & II), violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (Count III), and violations of Pennsylvania law for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count V). On June 15, 2012, Defendant Joseph Korszniak filed a Motion to Dismissthe Amended Complaint. (Korszniak Mot., ECF No. 30.) Also on June 15, 2012, Defendants the Pennsylvania State Department of Corrections ("DOC"), John Wetzel, and Sergeant William Lewis (collectively the "Commonwealth Defendants") filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Comm. Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 31.) On August 1, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to the Motions. (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 35.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that on December 7, 2008, Plaintiff was committed to the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Graterford ("Graterford") while he was awaiting a hearing on state criminal charges. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) Prior to being committed, Plaintiff had undergone ankle and leg surgery. The surgery resulted in a six-inch metal plate and a number of surgical screws being inserted into Plaintiff's leg. (Id. at ¶ 19.) As a result of the surgery, Plaintiff was unable to bear weight on or fully utilize his left foot, ankle, and leg. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff could not climb or use stairs. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Korszniak and Lewis of his limited ability to use his left foot, ankle, and leg. (Id. at ¶ 20.) In addition, Plaintiff's injuries were immediately obvious and apparent. (Id.) Because of his leg injury, Plaintiff requested assignment to a sleeping facility that would not require him to use any ladder or other device that was beyond his capabilities. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff was assigned to an upper bunk in E-B Block, cell 243-2. (Id. at ¶ 22.)
After his assignment, Plaintiff informed Korszniak and Lewis that he could not ascend or descend from an upper bunk without assistance. (Id. at ¶ 23.) No means of assistance wereprovided. (Id. at ¶ 24.) On December 8, 2008, Plaintiff again advised Korszniak and Lewis that he was unable to use an upper bunk without there being a serious threat that he would fall. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff asked for a safety guard or other device that would allow him to get in and out of his assigned bunk without a risk of falling. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.) None was provided. (Id.) On December 9, 2008, Plaintiff was struggling to descend from his assigned bunk when he lost his balance and fell to the floor of his cell. (Id. at ¶ 26.)
As a result of his fall, Plaintiff suffered severe strain to his back, left leg, foot, and ankle, and a herniation of a disc in his lower spine. (Id. at ¶ 27.) When Plaintiff complained of these injuries, he was accused of malingering and he did not receive further medical care. (Id. at ¶ 28.) These injuries have severely impacted his mobility and continue to cause him severe pain. (Id.) The pain has permanently affected the use of his back and left leg and made performance of everyday functions difficult and painful. (Id.)
On December 29, 2008, when Plaintiff was returned to his cell in a wheelchair, he was accused of malingering, assaulted by prison staff, and threatened to be placed in the Special Housing Unit. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges that he sought to file administrative complaints but was advised by Defendants that a complaint had already been filed or that administrative remedies were not available to him as a temporary detainee. (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 37.) Plaintiff claims to have suffered emotional trauma from these events. (Id. at ¶¶ 68, 71.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), "a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is basis for dismissal of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must containsufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This "'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "A complaint may not be dismissed because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits." McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).
In determining whether dismissal is appropriate, courts use a two-part analysis. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, courts separate the factual and legal elements of the claim and accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true. Id. at 210-11. Next, courts determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 211. Given the nature of the two-part analysis, "'[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" See McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 530 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 663-64).
Plaintiff brings claims against the DOC, Wetzel, Lewis, and "various unknown agents and employees." (Am. Compl.)3 The Eleventh Amendment bars "suits against unconsenting [s]tates" unless a state has waived its immunity. Sossamon v. Texas, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1657-58 (2011). "Where a state agency or department is named as defendant, that too is considered a suit against a state which is barred by the eleventh amendment." Geis v. Bd. of Ed., 774 F.2d 575, 580 (3d Cir. 1985). The claims brought here against the DOC and the DOC employees in their official capacity are suits against the state of Pennsylvania. See Randolph v. Wetzel, 987 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (E.D. Pa. 2013). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff is bringing suit against them in their official capacity for monetary damages, those claims are barred. We must nevertheless analyze whether Plaintiff states valid claims against Wetzel and Lewis in their individual capacities because the Eleventh Amendment does not bar damages suits against state officials in their individual capacities. West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1978).
Count I states claims against Wetzel, Korszniak, and Lewis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff claims that Wetzel, Korszniak, and Lewis violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants make a number of arguments as to why Plaintiff's claim fails.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim must fail because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform Act mandates that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To properly exhaust administrative remedies means that a prisoner must comply with prison grievance procedures. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Defendants raise this affirmative defense in their Motions.
Plaintiff does not claim that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies by complying with the DOC's inmate grievance system. Rather, Plaintiff claims that administrative remedies were not available to him. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he sought to pursue administrative remedies but that Defendants advised him that grievances had either already been filed or were unavailable to him. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 37.) Third Circuit case law provides that "dismissal or summary judgment for failure to exhaust under § 1997e(a) is inappropriate when prison officials have misled or otherwise precluded the inmate from filing or exhausting prison grievance...
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