Douglas v. Miller

• Decision Date: 30 March 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. CIV–10–1295–D.
• Citation: 864 F.Supp.2d 1205
• Parties: Yancey Lyndell DOUGLAS, Plaintiff, v. Robert Bradley MILLER, individually, Robert Bradley Miller, in his official capacity; The State of Oklahoma; and Durbin, Larimore and Bialick, a professional corporation; Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

864 F.Supp.2d 1205

Yancey Lyndell DOUGLAS, Plaintiff,

v.Robert Bradley MILLER, individually, Robert Bradley Miller, in his official capacity; The State of Oklahoma; and Durbin, Larimore and Bialick, a professional corporation; Defendants.

Case No. CIV–10–1295–D.

United States District Court,

W.D. Oklahoma.

March 30, 2012.

Mark H. Barrett, Mark H. Barrett Law Office, Norman, OK, Rand C. Eddy, Eddy Law Firm PC, Stephanie M. Lorance, McLendon & Murphy PC, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff.

Amy R. Steele, Kayce L. Gisinger, Murray E. Abowitz, Abowitz Timberlake & Dahnke PC, John D. Hadden, Victoria D. Tindall, Attorney General's Ofc., Amy J. Pierce, George S. Corbyn, Jr., Corbyn Hampton PLLC, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants.

ORDER

TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI, District Judge.

Before the Court is the motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 33] filed by Defendant Robert Bradley Miller (“Miller”) in his individual capacity. Also before the Court is a motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 34] filed jointly by Miller in his official capacity and the State of Oklahoma (“State”). Plaintiff timely responded to each motion, and Miller filed replies. Miller and the State also jointly move [Doc. No. 47] to strike documents attached to Plaintiff's brief in response to the joint motion to dismiss, and Miller in his individual capacity has separately filed a motion [Doc. No. 48] to strike those documents from Plaintiff's response to his motion. Because the motions are based on the same factual contentions and raise similar issues, all are addressed in this Order.

I. Background:

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with Plaintiff's 1995 Oklahoma County murder conviction and subsequent incarceration. He also asserts pendent state law claims. In summary, Plaintiff contends that Miller, the Oklahoma County assistant district attorney who prosecuted the case against him, wrongfully procured Plaintiff's murder conviction by suborning perjury and by suppressing exculpatory evidence. He alleges that Miller induced a witness, Derrick Smith (“Smith”), to falsely identify Plaintiff as a perpetrator of the crime and that, in return for that testimony, Miller agreed to assist Smith in obtaining favorable treatment in an upcoming parole hearing as well as future criminal matters. Plaintiff alleges that, during the trial, Miller falsely represented to the jury that Smith had no agreement with the prosecution in return for his testimony. He further alleges that, after Plaintiff's conviction, Miller continued to assist Smith by influencing other prosecutors to file reduced criminal charges or otherwise secure leniency for Smith in criminal matters unrelated to Plaintiff's case. According to Plaintiff, Miller did so to ensure that Smith would not reveal the fact that he falsely testified against Plaintiff and Paris LaPriest Powell (“Powell”) ¹ and that he did so in exchange for Miller's agreement to assist Smith. Plaintiff alleges that Miller continued this wrongful conduct after he joined the Law Firm in late 1998, and that the Law Firm assisted Miller in doing so.

Plaintiff was convicted of murder and sentenced to death on July 6, 1995. He was incarcerated for approximately 16 years, but was released after successfully seeking federal habeas relief. See Douglas v. Mullin, CIV–02–101–C. Although relief was initially denied by the District Court, the Tenth Circuit reversed that decision, and remanded with instructions to grant a writ of habeas corpus, subject to the State's right to retry Plaintiff within a reasonable time. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir.2009). ² The Oklahoma County District Attorney did not pursue a new trial, the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed, and Plaintiff was released from confinement in October of 2009. After exhausting the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act notice requirements, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. He asserts claims against Miller in both his individual and official capacities, against the State, and against the Law Firm.³

II. Motion to strike:

Before considering the arguments asserted in the motions to dismiss, the Court must decide whether materials attached to Plaintiff's responses must be stricken. The materials consist of affidavits executed by Miller after Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced in the criminal case. Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff's response is a July 2010 affidavit in which Miller summarizes his view of the facts related to the prosecution of Plaintiff including, inter alia, Smith's testimony as well as Miller's subsequent effort to assist Smith in obtaining parole.⁴ In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff expressly referenced this affidavit. Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 90. He contends it supports his allegation that Miller assisted Smith in exchange for Smith's trial testimony as well as his allegation that Miller's assistance continued well after Plaintiff's trial and conviction, and it reasserts Miller's contention that he did not have any agreement with Smith in exchange for Smith's testimony. The affidavit submitted as Exhibit 2 was executed by Miller on January 16, 2002, and was filed in Plaintiff's federal habeas corpus proceeding. This affidavit is not expressly identified in the Second Amended Complaint.

As Miller and the State argue in the motions to strike [Doc. Nos. 47 and 48], the Court generally considers only the allegations in the complaint when adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and material outside the pleadings cannot be reviewed unless the motion is converted to one seeking summary judgment. However, there are exceptions to that rule. The Court may review material submitted as an exhibit to a pleading or incorporated or referenced in the complaint; documents relied upon by a plaintiff as an integral basis for his claims may also be considered. Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1265 n. 24 (10th Cir.2006)(citing Indus. Constructors Corp. v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 964–65 (10th Cir.1994)). Where documents are central to a plaintiff's claims, they may be properly considered in a motion to dismiss, and conversion to summary judgment is not required. Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir.2002); GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384–85 (10th Cir.1997). Consideration of material outside the pleadings is also permissible in testing the sufficiency of § 1983 allegations. “In analyzing the sufficiency of plaintiff's § 1983 claims, the court is not limited to the four corners of the complaint, but may also consider documents referred to in the complaint.” Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir.2008).

In this case, although the affidavits at issue are not attached to the Second Amended Complaint, the affidavit submitted as Exhibit 1 is expressly identified by Plaintiff in the Second Amended Complaint at paragraph 90. Plaintiff relies in part on the content of that affidavit to support his contention that, for some time after Plaintiff's conviction and sentence, Miller continued to represent to the courts that no evidence was suppressed at Plaintiff's trial and that Miller had no agreement with Smith regarding the testimony offered by Smith at the trial. The Court finds that Exhibit 1 may properly be considered in connection with Plaintiff's response, and the motions to strike are denied to the extent they seek exclusion of that exhibit. The affidavit submitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is not identified in the Second Amended Complaint, nor does Plaintiff refer to that affidavit as supporting any asserted allegation. As a result, the Court concludes the affidavit submitted as Exhibit 2 should not be considered.⁵

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the motions [Doc. Nos. 47 and 48] to strike the affidavits attached to Plaintiff's response briefs are granted in part and denied in part. The motions are granted as to Exhibit 2 and denied as to Exhibit 1. The Court will thus proceed to consider the arguments asserted in the two motions to dismiss.

III. Standards governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss:

To avoid dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain enough factual allegations ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2008); VanZandt v. Oklahoma Dept. of Human Services, 276 Fed.Appx. 843, 846 (10th Cir.2008) (unpublished opinion).

To state a plausible claim, “the Plaintiff has the burden to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” VanZandt, 276 Fed.Appx. at 846 (quoting Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Thus, plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955;Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247. The factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a right to relief “ ‘above the speculative level.’ ” Marshall v. Morton, 421 Fed.Appx. 832, 837 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir.2007)). The “mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2007) (emphasis in original). Although the Court must construe well-pleaded facts as true, not all factual allegations are “entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)...