Woodruff v. Villalobos
| Decision Date | 15 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:16-CV-1170 AWI EPG |
| Parties | KETA PAULET WOODRUFF and DAVID BELLAMY, Plaintiffs v. RUBEN A. VILLALOBOS, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISS MATTER AS FRIVOLOUS
On August 9, 2016, Plaintiffs Keta Woodruff ("Woodruff") and David Bellamy ("Bellamy") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed this civil rights lawsuit and two motions to proceed in forma pauperis. See Doc. Nos. 1, 2, 3. Plaintiffs allege claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, 22 C.F.R. § 92.18, and 27 C.F.R. § 72.11 against Judge Ruben A. Villalobos ("Judge Villalobos"), Judge Dawna Reeves ("Judge Reeves") (both of the Stanislaus County Superior Court)1 and Stanislaus County Assistant District Attorney Jeff Mangar ("Mangar").2 These defendants are sued in both their individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs seek monetary and injunctive relief, and now move for in forma pauperis status.
The Complaint is not a model of clarity. Plaintiffs refer to themselves as "living beneficiaries," "Creditor One," or "Creditor Two," and to Defendants as "Debtor One," "DebtorTwo," "Debtor Three," "Fiduciaries," or "Trustees." However, what can be gleaned from the Complaint is that, on June 23, 2016, Mangar obtained an arrest warrant for Plaintiffs. Complaint at p.2. This caused the arrest of Plaintiffs "as surety for the Juristic Persons . . . without written contract or a verify complaint an injury party," and resulted in a 13 hour imprisonment. Id.
On July 22, 2016, Bellamy appeared before Judge Villalobos. See Complaint at p. 3. Bellamy told Judge Villalobos that he (Bellamy) was a living beneficiary, he was there to settle this matter for his property (apparently meaning himself/his body), and demanded a verified complaint of injury. See id. Bellamy stated that Judge Villalobos had no jurisdiction over the living beneficiary and that the Judge was trafficking and trespassing Bellamy's "body as the surety for this matter." Id. Judge Villalobos "eroded his Oath of Office."
On July 25, 2016,3 Woodruff appeared before Judge Villalobos. See id. Woodruff essentially made the statements to Judge Villalobos that Bellamy had said on July 22. See id. Woodruff also informed Judge Villalobos that he was "participating in illegal securitization and eroding his oath of office." Id.
On July 29, 2016, Plaintiffs appeared before Judge Reeves. The Plaintiffs told Judge Reeves that they were there to settle this matter as the living beneficiaries and demanded that Judge Reeves compel Mangar to "disclose the verify complaint of the injury party." Id. Judge Reeves stated that if the Plaintiffs "do not plea or contract she will enter a plea for [them]." Id. Woodruff told Judge Reeves that Judge Reeves could not practice law from the bench because Woodruff had not appointed the judge as her "power of attorney." Judge Reeves stated that if the Plaintiffs did not take an attorney or plea, then she would place Plaintiffs in custody and deny them the ability to speak on the record, and then gave Plaintiffs the option of either going to jail or returning on August 5, 2016. Id.
On August 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed their Complaint, which contains two "Counts." Count 1 is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs allege under Count 1 that the Defendants deprived Plaintiffsof their constitutional rights "by failing and refusing to provide verify complaint of the injury party and false arrest and false imprisonment." Complaint at p. 4. Count 1 also alleges that Defendants acted under color of state law by "encroachment of property interests and otherwise committing illegal Securitization, and preventing and have hinder the [Plaintiffs] from receiving full, fair, impartial justice to settle the account." Id. Under Count 2, Plaintiffs cite RICO, two federal regulations, and two criminal statutes. See id. at pp. 4-5. Count 2 alleges that Defendants failed "to provide Plaintiff-Creditors with the verify complaint of the injury party (Corpus Delicti) and IRC 23C Assessment of the account." Id. at p.4.
District courts "may authorize the commencement . . . of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possess that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). A district court "shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An action is "frivolous" if it has no arguable basis in fact or law; the term embraces both inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); DeRock v. Sprint-Nextel, 584 Fed. Appx. 737 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Tripati v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987). "A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit." Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998); Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370. However, the "denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis is an abuse of discretion unless the district court first provides a plaintiff leave to amend the complaint or finds that amendment would be futile." Rodriguez v. Steck, 795 F.3d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2015); see Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370. If a court denies a motion to proceed in forma pauperis because the complaint is frivolous and cannot be cured by amendment, then the denial of the motion acts as a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Rodriguez, 795 F.3d at 1188.
A review of the Complaint shows that it is frivolous and that amendment would be futile.
First, 27 C.F.R. § 72.11 and 22 C.F.R. § 92.18 are merely definitional sections related to various federal regulations, they are not causes of action. Similarly, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are criminal statutes. It is well established that these statutes do not provide for private causes of action. See Battle v. Travel Lodge Motel, 474 Fed. Appx. 654 (9th Cir. 2012); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Because these regulations and statutes do not provide a basis for relief, no claims can be stated and amendment would be futile.
Second, with respect to Judges Villalobos and Reeves, the Complaint shows that the Plaintiffs are complaining about the judges' conduct when the Plaintiffs appeared before the judges in connection with an arrest warrant. That is, the Complaint shows that Plaintiffs are complaining about judicial conduct by the judges. Under these circumstances, Judges Villalobos and Reeves enjoy absolute judicial immunity against each of Plaintiffs' claims. See Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Van Beek v. AG-Credit Bonus Ptnrs, 316 Fed. Appx. 554, 555-56 (9th Cir. 2008) (). Because of the nature of judicial immunity, amendment with respect to Judges Villalobos and Reeves would be futile. Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1997).
Third, with respect to Mangar, the only allegation against him is that he obtained an arrest warrant, which caused Plaintiffs to be arrested. Obtaining an arrest warrant, which leads to the arrest of an individual, is part of the initiation of criminal proceedings and is a prosecutorial function. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997); Howell v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 344, 351-352 (6th Cir. 2012); Millstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, Mangar enjoys prosecutorial immunity against each of Plaintiffs' claims. See id. Because of the nature of prosecutorial immunity, amendment with respect to Mangar would be futile. See Smith v. Delaware, 624 Fed. Appx. 788, 790-91 (3d Cir. 2015); Lopez v. County of L.A., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339, *21 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016); Douglas v. Miller, 864 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1221 (W.D. Ok. 2012).
Fourth, with respect to claims against the Defendants in their official capacity, a claim against a person in their "official capacity" is a claim against that individual's employing entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Suits against California state judges are suits against California. See Langston v. Orr, 569 Fed. Appx. 487 (9th Cir. 2015); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, suits against California district attorneys who are acting in a prosecutorial capacity are suits against California. Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by citizens against their own state. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). None of Plaintiffs' claims abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky, 491 U.S. at 169 n.17 (); Chappell v. Robbins, 73 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 1996) (). Because the Eleventh Amendment bars all Plaintiffs' claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacity, amendment of those claims would futile. See Langston, 569 Fed. Appx. at 487.
Fifth, with respect to injunctive relief, Plaintiffs request that the Court issue an injunction that dismisses the on-going state criminal case and enjoins further prosecution. However, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are prohibited from interfering by injunction with on-going state court criminal proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1970); Logan v. U.S. Bank N.A., 722 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013); California v. Tolefree, 458 F.2d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1972). The Complaint does not reflect any extraordinary circumstances...
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