Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1929
• Citation: 147 A. 289,110 Conn. 145
• Parties: DOUGLAS v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

147 A. 289

110 Conn. 145

DOUGLAS v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

October 8, 1929

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Newell Jennings Judge.

Action by George F. Douglas against New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, to recover damages alleged to have been caused plaintiff by the alleged negligence of defendant. Verdict for plaintiff, and, from the granting of defendant's motion setting aside the verdict, plaintiff appeals. No error.

John F. McDonough, of Waterbury, for appellant.

J. H Gardner, Jr., of New Haven, and E. R. Brumley, of New York City, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The jury were entitled to have found these facts: The plaintiff drove a motor truck of the Byrolly Company from the yards of the Kalbfleisch corporation along a private road, which converges with the double tracks of defendant's railroad until they were within about 30 feet of one another, when the road turns and crosses the tracks at practically a right angle to Railroad Hill avenue. When he reached a point on the north-bound track, a train of defendant traveling from the south collided with this truck, causing injuries to the plaintiff, Douglas. It was a clear day. At the crossing the train could have been seen over a sixth of a mile to the south and from points in the road from a point 150 feet from the crossing to it, upwards of 400 feet. Douglas stopped and looked to the south for an approaching train at a point 150 feet from the crossing and saw none. It was his duty to look before driving upon the crossing and at a point sufficiently distant from the crossing to enable him to have stopped the truck before driving upon the crossing. He says he did look shortly before driving over the crossing and saw no train. The speed of the train was from 20 to 30 miles an hour. The physical facts make it clear that, had he looked with reasonable care, he must have seen the train. To have driven on the crossing, without so looking, was an act of negligence on his part, which materially contributed to the collision and the resulting injury.

The appellant invokes the last clear chance doctrine. It has no application under the facts in evidence. The defendant could not, by the exercise of reasonable care, have realized that the driver of the truck would drive upon the crossing at any time prior to...