Weir v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 December 1959
• Citation: 340 Mass. 66,162 N.E.2d 793
• Parties: William WEIR, executor, v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY. Elliott BARIBEAULT, administrator, v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY. John Y. DEANE, administrator, v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY. Lillian N. SEARLES, administratrix, v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 793

162 N.E.2d 793

340 Mass. 66

William WEIR, executor, v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.

Elliott BARIBEAULT, administrator, v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.

John Y. DEANE, administrator, v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.

Lillian N. SEARLES, administratrix, v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Sept. 21, 1959.

Decided Dec. 11, 1959.

Thomas S. Carey, Worcester (Henry T. George, Worcester, with him), for plaintiffs.

Noel W. Deering, Boston, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, COUNIHAN, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ. RONAN, Justice.

These are four actions of tort, the first one to recover for the death and conscious suffering of the owner and operator of an automobile and for damage to the automobile, and the remaining three to recover for the deaths and conscious suffering of the other occupants of the automobile, all resulting from a collision with a train of the defendant at a public crossing in North Grosvenordale, Connecticut.

The cases were first heard by an auditor whose findings of fact were not final and were then heard upon the auditor's report and other evidence. The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiff for the death and damage to the automobile as alleged in the first action. The judge ordered a verdict for the defendant on the count for conscious suffering in that action. The counts for conscious suffering were waived in the other three actions and the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs for the deaths of the intestates. The cases are here upon certain exceptions to the admission of evidence and to the denial of the defendant's motions for directed verdicts in the four actions.

The accident occurred in the late afternoon of March 8, 1953, a clear and cold day. The deceased Lillias J. Deane was driving her automobile in a westerly direction toward Buckley Hill Crossing in North Grosvenordale at about fifteen to eighteen miles an hour. A diesel locomotive hauling two passenger cars was proceeding toward the crossing from the north. It was on a scheduled run but was about fifteen minutes late because of difficulty with the brakes on one of the cars at a previous stop. This difficulty had been remedied before the collision, however. The train travelled over two long curves, one seventeen to eighteen hundred feet and the other five or six hundred feet from the crossing so that the engineer, who sat on the right side of the cab of the diesel, was unable to see the crossing until he was almost upon it. The fireman, who sat on the left side and whose duty it was to observe that part of the highway which was not within the vision of the engineer, saw the Deane automobile when it was about 100 feet from the crossing without apparent indication of stopping, at which time the locomotive was approximately 327 feet from the crossing. According to the auditor's report the fireman continued to observe the automobile from the time he first saw it until the impact. When the two 'vehicles were approximately 100 feet apart' the fireman realized that the automobile was not going to stop and shouted a warning to the engineer. The engineer applied the emergency brake, but the train proceeded onto the crossing striking the automobile broadside and dragging it 120 feet and coming to a stop about 1,300 feet south of the crossing.

The auditor found that neither the engineer nor the fireman was negligent. He found that the train was clearly visible to the occupants of the automobile from the time it was seventy-five feet from the east rail to the time of the impact, 'if they were paying some attention to where they were going.' He also found that the railroad signal lights at the crossing were functioning properly before the accident; that the engineer sounded his whistle and bell in a proper manner continuously from the time the train passed the whistle post 1,315 feet north of the crossing to the time of impact; and that there was no evidence that the defendant was negligent.

At the trial one Fatsi, who had not appeared before the auditor, testified that he was travelling toward Buckley Hill Crossing at fifteen or twenty miles an hour and was about 200 to 300 yards from the crossing when he heard 'a rumbling noise which indicated to him there was a train going by.' He heard the noise from '300 yards away until 200 or even closer.' He saw the crossing when he was about 200 feet from it, at which time 'he saw the tail end of the train leaving the crossing.' Fatsi testified, subject to the defendant's exception, that he did not hear either the whistle or the bell of the train from the time he heard the rumbling noise to the time when he first saw the train.

The accident occurred in Connecticut and we are bound by the statutes and decisions of the courts of that State. If a given set of facts has determined the liability or the nonliability of a defendant, then we are bound by those decisions in a similar case tried here; but if the decisions have gone no farther than following a rule of ordinary care, then in applying that standard we have to determine for ourselves 'whether there is sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury on the question whether the defendant conformed to the standard. * * * What inferences are permissible from evidence is matter of procedure and not of substantive law and is determined by the law of the forum.' Peterson v. Boston & Maine R. R., 310 Mass. 45, 47-48, 36 N.E.2d 701, 702.

Connecticut Gen.Sts. (1949 Rev.) c. 261, § 5530 (in force at the time of the accident), provided in part as follows: 'Each person controlling the motions of an engine on a railroad shall commence sounding the bell or whistle when such engine is approaching and is within eighty rods of the place where such railroad crosses any highway at grade and shall keep such bell or whistle occasionally sounding until such engine shall have crossed such highway.' This statute was passed for the protection of travellers over grade crossings, Cote v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321, 331, 16 A.2d 595, and failure to comply with its provisions is evidence of negligence sufficient to support a finding thereof. Cottle v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 82 Conn. 142, 144, 72 A. 727.

The auditor found that the defendant complied with § 5530. His finding, which was not final, is not conclusive when there is testimony which tends to disprove it. Cook v. Farm Service Stores, Inc., 301 Mass. 564, 17 N.E.2d 890. The testimony of Fatsi that he did not hear a whistle or bell during the entire time he was approaching the crossing made it an issue of fact whether they were sounded and the jury could properly infer that none was sounded. His testimony was admissible, and the fact that an attentive witness failed to hear what he was listening for serves as a basis for the inference that the whistle and bell were not sounded. Hubbard v. Boston & Albany R. R., 159 Mass. 320, 323, 34 N.E. 459; Bengle v. Cooney, 243 Mass. 10, 136 N.E. 812. Compare Livermore v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 163 Mass. 132, 39 N.E. 789.

While violation of § 5530 is evidence of negligence according to decisions of the Connecticut courts in common-law actions (or under the Connecticut death statute, see Gen.Sts. [1949 Rev.] c. 413, § 8296), contributory negligence of a plaintiff is a defence. Cottle v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 82 Conn. 142, 72 A. 727; Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 110 Conn. 145, 147 A. 289; Boscarello v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 112 Conn. 279, 152 A. 61; Piscitello v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 116 Conn. 638, 166 A. 61. As was stated in...