Douglas v. People, 97SC694
| Decision Date | 30 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97SC694,97SC694 |
| Citation | 969 P.2d 1201 |
| Parties | 98 CJ C.A.R. 5922 Donald D. DOUGLAS, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Joan E. Mounteer, Deputy State Public Defender Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Robert Mark Russel, First Assistant Attorney General, Lauren A. Edelstein, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Enforcement Section, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.
In this case, we must decide whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of two prior incidents in which the defendant used a gun, when not threatened by the use of force by another, in order to rebut defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of premises. 1 We hold that it did not.
Evidence of other acts, while not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to establish conduct in conformity therewith, may be admitted for other purposes. See CRE 404(b). Here, after a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled that evidence of extrinsic acts may be used to rebut self-defense and defense of premises claims, a purpose that is independent of the potential likelihood of showing defendant's bad character, prohibited by CRE 404(b). In People v. Douglas, No. 95CA1458 (Colo.App. July 3, 1997) (), a divided court of appeals held that the trial court did not err when it admitted evidence of prior acts in which the defendant brandished a gun when not threatened by others as evidence of mens rea when using a gun in a subsequent incident. We agree and therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
On October 19, 1994, the petitioner, Donald D. Douglas ("Douglas" or "defendant") pointed a loaded gun at William Fritz and his thirteen-year-old son, Anthony Fritz. Douglas claimed he acted in self-defense. The People, respondents before us, used evidence of extrinsic and prior acts to rebut Douglas' self-defense and defense of premises claims 2 and to prove Douglas' intent.
This encounter began when William Fritz drove his son, Anthony, to South Pennsylvania Street in Denver to visit Douglas, a family friend. When they arrived at the block where Douglas' home is located, William parked across the street and a couple of houses down from Douglas' house. William told his son to go up to Douglas' house and ask Douglas if they, Douglas and William, could "work something out" regarding a $400 loan William Fritz had made to Douglas.
As Anthony approached the house, he saw Douglas standing on the front porch with his hands in his coat pockets. Anthony asked Douglas if William Fritz could come over to discuss the loan. Douglas replied that there was nothing to say.
As Douglas spoke, he brought a gun out of his coat pocket, pointed the gun at Anthony, and told him that if he did not leave, he would not live to see his next birthday. Out of fear, Anthony slowly backed away from Douglas. In response, William Fritz, who had been watching the incident from his parked car, quickly drove up and parked in front of Douglas' house. William immediately got out of his car and placed himself between Douglas and his son.
Frightened and crying, Anthony ran across the street to a neighbor's house to call the police. When Anthony returned, he saw Douglas pointing the gun at his father's head. After directing verbal threats at William, Douglas pulled the trigger several times and attempted to fire the gun at William. However, despite his efforts, the gun did not discharge or fire any bullets. Both Anthony and William Fritz testified that they could see bullets in the chamber of the revolver and knew that the gun Douglas was attempting to fire at William was loaded.
The Fritzes were eventually able to back away from Douglas, reenter their vehicle, and drive to a public telephone where they called the police. When the police arrived, they arrested Douglas and took him into custody.
On October 24, 1994, Douglas was charged with two counts of felony menacing 3 in the Denver District Court (trial court). On February 17, 1995, the prosecution filed a motion for an extension of time to investigate evidence of prior similar acts by Douglas, which it intended to introduce at trial. The motion was granted, and on March 1, 1995, the prosecution filed a notice of intent to present evidence of three prior incidents in which Douglas allegedly brandished a gun and threatened others. The prosecution sought to introduce the prior acts evidence "to show ... intent ... and to rebut any claim of self-defense."
On April 13, 1995, Douglas disclosed that he would assert the statutory defenses of self-defense: (1) use of physical force in defense of premises; 4 and (2) use of physical force in defense of a person. 5
Douglas also filed an objection to the prosecution's proffer of evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to CRE 404(b). The trial court set a hearing on the prosecution's motion for May 3, 1995.
At the May hearing, the trial court heard testimony regarding three prior incidents: (1) a February 1980 incident with Harold Ingram; (2) a July 1993 incident with Karen Dhooge, Douglas' girlfriend; and (3) a July 1994 incident with Donna Shore, Douglas' neighbor.
Harold Ingram testified about the 1980 incident in which, during a traffic altercation, Douglas purportedly pointed a gun at Ingram when Ingram approached Douglas after both vehicles came to a stop. Ingram, however, could not identify Douglas as the man who threatened him with a gun.
Karen Dhooge, Douglas' former girlfriend, testified regarding an incident between her and Douglas that occurred in July 1993. Dhooge and Douglas drove by truck to South Dakota to go camping. One night, without provocation from Dhooge, Douglas became enraged. Dhooge testified that Douglas repeatedly threw her against a wall and became verbally abusive. Douglas then exited the cabin and retrieved a gun from the truck. Upon returning to the cabin, Douglas instructed Dhooge to sit beside him on the bed, pointed the gun at Dhooge's head, and asked her if she was afraid to die. Douglas then instructed Dhooge to leave the cabin, which she did. Douglas, however, followed her, again pointed the gun at her through the truck's window as she was attempting to drive away, and instructed her to return to the cabin.
The third prior incident occurred in July 1994, months before the encounter between the defendant and the Fritzes. It involved Donna Shore, a neighbor, and her thirteen-year-old daughter, Solitaire. The Shores lived two houses away from Douglas' house. Donna Shore testified that on the morning of July 28, 1994, she and her daughter heard Douglas pounding on the windows of their home, screaming, "Come out here now." Because Douglas had previously threatened to kill her dogs, Solitaire immediately ran into the backyard to check on them. Donna followed Solitaire, and observed that Douglas had broken through the fence and was standing in their backyard. He was carrying a gun, which he pointed at Donna's "chest area" while shouting, "I'm going to kill all of you." Donna and Solitaire ran back into their house, closing the door behind them. Douglas broke through that door and pursued Donna with the gun in his hand. Donna ran into the kitchen, and jammed the kitchen door shut. Douglas continued pounding on that door while yelling he "was going to kill all of [them]." A neighbor called the police. While the police first gave Douglas a warning and told him to go back to his home, the police returned later that day and arrested Douglas based on his continued harassment of Donna and Solitaire.
No other evidence was presented at the hearing. However, Douglas did argue that the prosecution only intended to use the evidence to show that he had "bad character" and that he "has a propensity to threaten other people with guns." Douglas also argued that "[t]here is no logical relevance for th[e] evidence independent of an inference of bad character...." The prosecution asserted that: (1) the evidence was admissible under People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1990); (2) the evidence was only offered to "rebut a claim of self-defense"; and (3) if the defendant abandoned his self-defense and defense of property claims that intent would no longer serve as a "a proper purpose" for the admission of the prior acts.
The trial court applied the Spoto test, and ruled that "the similarities in this case with the 1980 transaction are not sufficient" and that "no identification of this Defendant was made" by Ingram. Therefore, the trial court prohibited the prosecution from introducing evidence of the extrinsic incident involving Ingram. The propriety of this ruling is not before us.
However, the trial court ruled that the prosecution could present evidence of the two other prior acts. The trial court reasoned that the prosecution could present evidence of the 1993 and 1994 incidents because those prior acts were similar in that they "indicate the Defendant, one, having a gun; two, pointing at someone; three, threatening them." In addition, the trial court ruled that the logical relevance of those two acts of 1993 and 1994 was independent of the inference prohibited by CRE 404 in that the prior acts demonstrated that "absent any threat, this person would pull a weapon." The trial court also reasoned that in light of the defenses disclosed by Douglas, the prior acts evidence was "independent of bad character" and that its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court noted that "when [Douglas] was not in a self-defense situation ... he did exactly the same thing, ... calling...
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