Douglas v. State

• Decision Date: 07 July 1970
• Docket Number: No. 552,552
• Parties: Ellis Richard DOUGLAS, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 647

9 Md.App. 647

267 A.2d 291

Ellis Richard DOUGLAS, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 552.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

July 7, 1970.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 13, 1970.

Samuel A. Tucker, John D. Hackett, Baltimore City, on brief, for appellant.

Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., and Joseph E. Rosenblatt, State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, respectively, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

By indictment 1089 Ellis Richard Douglas, Jr., was charged with the robbery of Rachel D. DeShields with a deadly weapon (1st count), the attempt to rob her with a deadly weapon (2nd count), the robbery of her (3rd count), assaulting her with intent to steal (4th count), the assault upon and battery of her (5th count), the grand larceny of her monies (6th count), and receiving more than $100 stolen from her (7th count). When the indictment came on for trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, appellant pleaded not guilty and elected to be tried by a jury. Before the jury was empanelled the State entered a nolle prosequi to each of counts one and two. ¹ At the close of all the evidence appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. The court granted the motion as to the 4th and 7th counts. Appellant also moved for a mistrial and that motion was denied. The jury found appellant guilty of the offense charged in the third count.

The evidence adduced by the State tended to show that appellant came into the collection department of the C. & P. Telephone Company at 320 St. Paul Street in Baltimore City, handed Jane Mary Lambden, an employee of the company, a brown paper bag and told her to fill it with money. She thought he was joking and turned to a fellow employee sitting next to her, Rachel D. DeShields, and asked if Mrs. DeShields knew the man. The man said, 'This isn't any joke, just put the money in.' She did so and handed the bag to Mrs. DeShields who turned it over to the robber. He asked if there was anyone in the back and was told the supervisor was there. He went to the back of the office asked an employee, Ethel Wilson Owens, if he could see the manager and when told he could not, said, 'This is a stick-up', pulled a gun and entering the 'cage area' where Timothy Boone, the supervisor, was balancing out the receipts from one of the tellers, said, 'This is a stick-up, everybody just be cool.' Boone gave him two envelopes containing about $2200 and the robbert left. On his way out Mrs. DeShields observed the two envelopes, one of which he dropped and immediately picked up.

The ground for the motion for mistrial was that since the offenses for which appellant was on trial only involved Rachel D. DeShields no evidence relating to the robbery of Boone, particularly since that robbery was with a deadly weapon, should have been received nor should testimony been elicited from Boone or Miss Bell or Mrs. Owens. He urges that only evidence directly relating to the robbery of Mrs. DeShields should have been admitted. The contention could be disposed of on 'simply this and nothing more'-that the motion for mistrial at the close of all the evidence came too late. The evidence now challenged having been elicited and received without objection at the time objection to its admissibility was apparent, objection to it was treated as waived. Maryland Rule 522 d 2. But in any event we think it was properly admissible. We think it obvious the general rule that proof which shows or tends to show that the accused is guilty of the commission of other crimes and offenses at other times is incompetent and inadmissible for the purpose of showing the commission of the particular crime charged, see Cornwell v. State, 6 Md.App. 178, 183, 251 A.2d 5, cannot be applied here to preclude the evidence as appellant desires. Appellant's conduct throughout the course of his activities in the telephone office is admissible, if for no other reason, because they fall squarely within the exceptions to the general rule as set out in Cornwell. They tended to establish a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other; the criminal agency of appellant with respect to the crime charged; the absence of mistake or accident; and, that appellant's intent was to rob Mrs. DeShields. Appellant's conduct which did not involve a direct dealing with Mrs. DeShields was nevertheless so connected with the crime he was charged with committing with regard to her as to have a natural tendency to establish the fact at issue. Thus it met the 'real test' of admissibility and it was not error to admit it. See MacEwen v. State, 194 Md. 492, 500-501, 71 A.2d 46, quoting Challahan v. State, 174 Md. 47, 53, 197 A. 589.

Appellant appears to base his contention that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the same basis as he does his contention as to the denial of the motion for a mistrial. As we have found that the evidence now challenged was properly admissible, the argument provides no more substantial basis for the one than it does for the other. But in any event, we have not the slightest difficulty in determining that the evidence before the court was sufficient in law for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. DeShields was robbed and that it was appellant who robbed her. Therefore, the court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal. Williams v. State, 5 Md.App. 450, 247 A.2d 731.

Sergeant John R. Conroy, assigned to the 'Hold Up Squad of the Criminal Investigation Division' of the Baltimore City Police Department testified on direct examination regarding pretrial procedures for identification of appellant from photographs. On cross-examination defense counsel asked to see the photographs the officer showed the three witnesses. Conroy replied that he did not have them and defense counsel asked, 'Who does?' Conroy answered, 'They should be in Annapolis in the Court of Appeals to my knowledge.' As the bench defense counsel asked for a mistrial. 'I think that this officer has offered testimony over and above the questions that were asked of him by the State. When I asked him where they were, he certainly could have said they were unavailable. I think I have been led down the primrose path by this individual, and I suspect that counsel for the State was well aware of it.' After argument the court denied the motion and appellant claims error in the denial. ² ] 'Appellant contends the trial should have stopped also in that the appellant's prior criminal connection had been presented by the State before the accused himself had put that fact into issue * * *.' We cannot say from the record before us that Conroy's answer to the specific question of defense counsel was not his understanding of the whereabouts of the photographs. Nor can we conclude, as does appellant, that the answer indicated to the jury that appellant had a 'prior criminal connection', whatever he means by that. We do not find that prejudice by the answer was so clearly demonstrated that the exercise of the discretion of the trial court in not granting a mistrial compels a holding that it was an abuse. See Shotkosky v. State, 8 Md.App. 492, 261 A.2d 171; Parker v. State, 7 Md.App. 167, 254 A.2d 381; Baldwin v. State, 5 Md.App. 22, 245 A.2d 98.

In the charge to the jury the court said:

'Now the third count is the count of, as we call it, common law robbery, and the definition of common law robbery is the taking of a person's goods, of any value, from his person or in his presence by threat of violence or by actual violence or by putting him in fear.'

At the conclusion of the charge, after discussion at the bench about the definition of larceny in the charge, defense counsel said:

'Your Honor, I would except to the charge in regard to the definition of robbery, that I respectfully submit that it should start or be embellished to the extent that it is violence actual or being placed in fear, or being placed in fear of great bodily harm, and that such fear is, in fact, reasonable.'

The court said, 'All right' and the transcript reads that 'thereupon, there was an off record discussion, following which the bench conference terminated.' Immediately thereafter the court supplemented its charge with regard to larceny but no further mention was made of robbery. The record does not disclose any objection by appellant to the failure to supplement the instruction on robbery. Appellant now argues that this instruction was erroneous because of the inclusion of the phrase 'by threat of violence.' We do not think the point is properly before us for we can only conclude that after the court's apparent acquiescence to the request to supplement the instructions as to robbery, its failure to do so and the absence of any objection to the failure was because such request was withdrawn at the off the record discussion. But in any event we see no error requiring reversal even if the court refused the request as made. Appellant cites Williams v. State, 7 Md.App. 683, 256 A.2d 776, wherein we said that robbery has been defined as larceny from the person, accompanied by violence or putting in fear. He asserts, 'The cited case does not use the words 'threat of violence' but 'violence.' The defense asked for inclusion of 'violence actual' and 'fear of great bodily harm' and a reasonable fear of actual violence.' We made clear in Giles v. State, 8 Md.App. 721, 723, 261 A.2d 806, 808, that it is...