Douglas v. Whitledge
Citation | 302 S.W.2d 294 |
Decision Date | 30 April 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 7518,7518 |
Parties | Roy D. DOUGLAS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jimmie WHITLEDGE, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
C. A. Powell, Dexter, for appellant.
Claude Arnold, Dexter, for respondent.
This appeal is from a verdict and judgment of the Circuit Court of Stoddard County, Missouri, in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on plaintiff's petition for $200 damages to his automobile, and in favor of plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim wherein he sought $1,000 damages to his car.
Plaintiff's petition is based upon both primary and humanitarian negligence. The cause was submitted to the jury only on primary negligence. As to primary negligence, the petition alleged that on the 26th day of February, about 7:25 A.M., plaintiff was driving north on Mulberry Street in Dexter, in his 1948 Nash Sedan; that when he arrived at the intersection of Mulberry Street with Stanley Street, (which runs east and west) his car was violently struck in the middle portion by defendant's 1954 Mercury, two-door sedan, coming from the east on Stanley Street.
The acts of primary negligence relied on were: That defendant failed to use the highest degree of care in that he failed to stop at said intersection; that he failed to keep a proper outlook for plaintiff and other persons on said street; that he failed to keep a proper control of his automobile; and, that he drove at a high and excessive rate of speed.
Defendant filed answer and counterclaim. The answer admitted that defendant was driving in a westerly direction on Stanley Street and the collision with plaintiff's car, but, denied all other allegations in the petition. It pleaded that the petition failed to state a claim and that if plaintiff sustained any damages it was due to his own negligence and carelessness directly and proximately contributing thereto.
In the counterclaim defendant asked for $1,000 damages to his car because of the negligence of the plaintiff. The acts of negligence relied on were (1) in failing to keep a lookout for and to see defendant's automobile which was approaching from plaintiff's right; (2) in failing to give the right-of-way to defendant's automobile approaching from plaintiff's right, since both automobiles were approaching and entering such intersection at approximately the same time; (3) in failing to stop, slow down or swerve his automobile to avoid the collision, and, (4) in failing to have his automobile under control.
The reply was a general denial.
In our opinion we will refer to appellant as defendant and respondent as plaintiff, the position they occupied in the lower court.
The evidence shows that Mulberry is a blacktop street, 20 feet wide, running in a north-south direction and Stanley is a blacktop street, 17 feet wide, running east and west, intersecting Mulberry Street.
Plaintiff testified that on the morning of February 26, 1955, about 7:25 o'clock, he was driving his car north on Mulberry Street, approaching the intersection with Stanley Street; that at the time he was driving in the east lane of traffic at a speed of between 28 and 30 miles per hour; that he did not slow down as he entered the intersection. He gave this testimony:
'
Plaintiff testified that the impact between the cars was about two feet south of the north line of Stanley Street and about two feet east of the east line of Mulberry Street; that it happened about the middle of the east line of traffic on Mulberry Street; that the front end of his car, at the time of the collision, was about 8 feet north of the north line of Stanley Street; that he observed skid marks after the collision, made by defendant's car, which were 12 feet long from point of impact; that defendant's car was in the north lane of traffic on Stanley Street. He testified:
Plaintiff stated that after the collision his car came to rest 27 steps north on Mulberry Street, headed west; that there were no other cars traveling on either street at the time of the collision; that it was cloudy but the pavement was dry.
On cross-examination this testimony was given:
The evidence showed there were concrete walks on each side of both streets, about four feet wide. Plaintiff gave this testimony:
'
He testified the seat of the car was about four feet from the front end. He gave this testimony:
'
He stated when he looked he had not got past this tree. He testified he was sitting about four feet or so south of the sidewalk when he looked and he was looking at an angle across the street. He testified:
He stated after he looked to the right he traveled about 15 feet before the collision; that he was still in the middle of his lane of traffic and defendant was in his middle lane of traffic; that he saw defendant's car out of the corner of his eye and that attracted his attention when he looked to the right. He stated the defendant's car hit his car near the front door on the right side; that his car went on north on Mulberry Street and defendant's car headed north on Mulberry Street. Plaintiff testified he did not know the speed of defendant's car at the time of the collision.
We think the testimony is undisputed that at the southeast corner of this intersection there were bushes, without foliage, along the concrete sidewalk from the corner east on Stanley and south on Mulberry.
Defendant testified that as he approached Mulberry Street, driving west he saw plaintiff's car coming north on Mulberry when he was in about 30 or 35 feet from the intersection, and, at the time was driving about 25 to 30 miles an hour; that when he saw plaintiff was not going to slow down or stop, he put on his brakes; that his car made skid marks from point of impact back about three steps.
Three photographs were offered in evidence showing damage to plaintiff's car. The bent portions of the car on the right side started at the edge of the front fender and extended back to and damaging the back fender. Both front and back doors were mashed in.
Defendant testified that the grill, hood, both front fenders, headlights, bumper, radiator, fan, and fan belt on his car were damaged. There were no stop signs on either street.
Defendant assigns as error the trial court's failure to sustain his motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence and for judgment on plaintiff's petition in accordance with defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, because plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Where a litigant's own evidence establishes his contributor negligence, the issue is for the court. Wilson v. Toliver, Mo.Sup., 285 S.W.2d 575, 580.
Section 304.021 RSMo Cum.Supp. (1955). V.A.M.S. reads:
'1. The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway, provided however, there is no form of traffic control at such intersection.
* * *'
In Weis v. Melvin, Mo.Sup., 219 S.W.2d 310, 311, the law is stated:
'It is the duty of motorists to maintain a careful and vigilant lookout ahead and laterally ahead.' (Citing much authority.)
Then the court stated: * * *'Folluo v. Gray, Mo.App.,...
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