Douglass v. Outsourcing
Citation | 765 F.3d 299 |
Decision Date | 28 August 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 13–3588.,13–3588. |
Parties | Courtney DOUGLASS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Appellant v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, formerly known as ER Solutions, Inc. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Cary L. Flitter, Esq., [Argued], Andrew M. Milz, Esq., Flitter Lorenz, Narberth, PA, SaraEllen M. Hutchison, Esq., Seattle, WA, Counsel for Appellant.
Richard J. Perr, Esq., [Argued], Fineman, Krekstein & Harris, Philadelphia, PA, Ed W. Walton, Esq., Bush & Ramirez, Terrell, TX, Counsel for Appellee.
Before: FISHER and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges, and *MARIANI, District Judge.
In this case we are asked to decide whether the disclosure of a consumer's account number on the face of a debt collector's envelope violates § 1692f(8) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.Section 1692f(8) limits the language and symbols that a debt collector may place on envelopes it sends to consumers. The District Court held the account number met a “benign language” exception to § 1692f(8) and granted summary judgment to the debt collector. We will vacate and remand. 1
On May 16, 2011, Plaintiff Courtney Douglass received a debt collection letter from Convergent Outsourcing (“Convergent”) regarding the collection of a debt that Douglass allegedly owed T–Mobile USA. Visible on the face of the letter, above Douglass's name and address, was the following sequence of numbers representing Douglass's account number with Convergent: “R–xxxx–5459–R241.” This number does not refer or relate to her account with T–Mobile USA. Convergent mailed the letter in an envelope with a glassine window. When mailed, the top portion of the letter, including Douglass's account number, was visible through the window. Also visible through the window was Douglass's name and address, a UnitedStates Postal Service bar code, and a quick response (“QR”) code, which, when scanned by a device such as a smart phone, revealed the same information as that displayed through the glassine window, as well as a monetary amount corresponding to Douglass's alleged debt.
This action was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.2 The complaint was amended to add Douglass as the sole named plaintiff, as well as to initiate a putative class action on behalf of residents of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, who received similar letters from Convergent exposing their account numbers. The operative Second Amended Complaint alleges when Convergent disclosed Douglass's account number, both on the face of the envelope and embedded in the QR code, it violated § 1692f(8) of the FDCPA, which prohibits “using any language or symbol” other than a debt collector's name and address on an envelope. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). Convergent moved for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, contending the account number qualified as “benign language” that § 1692f(8) was not meant to prohibit.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Convergent. The court reasoned that a strict interpretation of § 1692f(8) would contradict Congress's true intent, aimed at barring markings on an envelope that would reveal the letter to pertain to debt collection or harass or humiliate a consumer. Accordingly, the court adopted a benign language exception to the statute, limiting § 1692f(8)'s reach to language or symbols that either (1) signal the letter's purpose of debt collection or (2) tend to humiliate, threaten, or manipulate the recipient of the letter. The court concluded the account number qualified as benign language because it neither indicated the purpose of the letter nor threatened, harmed, or manipulated Douglass. This timely appeal followed. 3
On appeal, Douglass contends the language of § 1692f(8) is unambiguous and plainly applies to Convergent's disclosure of her account number on the face of the envelope.4 Convergent maintains that to enforce the plain meaning of § 1692f(8) would lead to absurd results and the statute must be read to allow for certain benign language, including account numbers, on the face of the envelope. In reply, Douglass insists that even if § 1692f(8) included an exception for benign language, her account number with Convergent is not benign. We agree with Douglass that § 1692f(8) applies to this set of facts and her account number is not benign.
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). These abusive debt collection practices, Congress found, lead to personal bankruptcies, marital instability, the loss of jobs, and, relevant to our analysis, “invasions of individual privacy.” Id. § 1692(a). “As remedial legislation, the FDCPA must be broadly construed in order to give full effect to these purposes.” Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir.2013).
To further the FDCPA's purposes, § 1692f prohibits a debt collector from using “unfair or unconscionable means” to collect a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. The statute sets out a nonexclusive list of conduct that qualifies as unfair or unconscionable. Id. Subparagraph 8, the focus of this appeal, prohibits the following conduct:
[u]sing any language or symbol, other than the debt collector's address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.
Id. § 1692f(8).
This case requires us to determine whether § 1692f(8) prohibits Convergent's disclosure of Douglass's account number. In statutory interpretation, we begin with the text. Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir.2011). “If the statute's plain language is unambiguous and expresses [Congress's] intent with sufficient precision, we need not look further.” Id. (citing In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir.2009)). But if the “literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,” then we are obligated to “construe statutes sensibly and avoid constructions which yield absurd or unjust results.” United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir.2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Where the plain meaning of a statute would lead to an absurd result, we presume “the legislature intended exceptions to its language [that] would avoid results of this character.” Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir.1979) ).
As a threshold matter, we conclude that § 1692f(8)'s prohibition on language and symbols applies to markings that are visible through a transparent window of an envelope. Section 1692f(8) regulates language “ on any envelope.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) (emphasis added). In this case, the alleged violation involves language printed on the letter itself that appeared through the glassine window of the envelope. Interpreting § 1692f(8) in accordance with its plain meaning, we construe language “on any envelope” to mean language appearing on the face of an envelope. The statute's context further confirms this construction. Section 1692f evinces Congress's intent to screen from public view information pertinent to the debt collection. See15 U.S.C. § 1692f(7) ( ); id. § 1692f(8) ( ). Like language printed on the envelope itself, language appearing through a windowed envelope can be seen by anyone handling the mail. And Convergent makes no argument to the contrary. Accordingly, we hold § 1692f(8) applies to language visible through a transparent window of an envelope.
Having concluded that § 1692f(8) applies in general to the facts before us, we addresswhether Convergent's disclosure of Douglass's account number violates the FDCPA. We find it does.
To prevail on an FD CPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a “debt” as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt. See, e.g., Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir.2005). The only element at issue in this case is the fourth—whether Convergent has violated § 1692f(8) of the FDCPA.
The text of § 1692f(8) is unequivocal. “[A]ny language or symbol,” except the debt collector's address and, in some cases, business name, may not be included “on any envelope.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). The plain language of § 1692f(8) does not permit Convergent's envelope to display an account number. Because the statute's language is plain, our sole function is “to enforce it according to its terms,” so long as “the disposition required by that [text] is not absurd.” Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 759 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004)).
Convergent does not dispute that the plain language of § 1692f(8) prohibits including Douglass's account number on the face of the envelope. Rather, Convergent contends that a literal application of the statute creates an absurdity. If the statute is interpreted to bar any language other than a debt collector's name and address, the argument follows, then no debt collector could ever send a letter through the mail—the...
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