Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 94-478-SD.
Decision Date | 21 February 1995 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 94-478-SD. |
Citation | 882 F. Supp. 1197 |
Parties | Susan K. DOUKAS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Lee A. Perselay, Penacook, NH, for Susan K. Doukas.
William D. Pandolph, Sulloway & Hollis, Concord, NH, for Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
In this civil action, plaintiff Susan K. Doukas seeks relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.1994), and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1977 & Supp.1994), as a result of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's (MetLife) denial of her application for mortgage disability insurance.
Presently before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's ADA claims as barred by the statute of limitations and her Fair Housing Act claim for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff objects. Also before the court is defendant's motion for leave to file a reply memorandum, which is herewith granted.
Plaintiff Susan K. Doukas asserts that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder1 in 1983. She has been under a physician's care and has taken medication for her condition since that time. Doukas further asserts that she has not been hospitalized due to bipolar disorder since 1985.
Doukas alleges that in July of 1991 she applied for mortgage disability insurance with defendant MetLife for a condominium she planned to purchase. MetLife denied her application in a letter dated July 29, 1991, which allegedly stated that MetLife's decision was "influenced" by Doukas's medical history.
Doukas reapplied for mortgage disability insurance from MetLife on or about August 25, 1992. MetLife denied Doukas's application in a letter dated September 14, 1992, again indicating that its decision was influenced by her medical history.
When a court is presented with a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ. P., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court accepts "the factual averments contained in the complaint as true, indulging every reasonable inference helpful to the plaintiff's cause." Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1992). Applying this standard, the court will grant a motion to dismiss "`only if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.'" Id. (quoting Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir.1990)).
The Americans with Disabilities Act was enacted in 1990 and was intended "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities...." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
It is plaintiff's contention that MetLife violated section 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) by denying her September 1992 application for mortgage disability insurance.2 Plaintiff further contends that MetLife's "actions in denying plaintiff's application for mortgage disability insurance in September 1992 are inconsistent with N.H. RSA § 417:4(VIII)"3 and "are not based on sound actuarial data and are therefore a mere subterfuge used to evade the purposes of the ADA." Complaint ¶¶ 35-36.
Hickey v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir.1992). See also Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2928-29, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984) ( ); Wilson, supra, 471 U.S. at 267, 105 S.Ct. at 1942 (same).
Federal law does not provide a limitations period in this case.4 Accordingly, this court's analysis begins with the selection of "the most appropriate" or "the most analogous" state statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff's claims. Wilson, supra, 471 U.S. at 268, 105 S.Ct. at 1942-43; Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239, 109 S.Ct. 573, 576, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). To accomplish this task, the court "must characterize the essence of the claim in the pending case, and decide which state statute provides the most appropriate limiting principle." Wilson, supra, 471 U.S. at 268, 105 S.Ct. at 1942-43.
The court finds that a claim for discrimination brought under the ADA is best characterized as a claim for personal injury. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2621, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) ( ); Hickey, supra, 976 F.2d at 983 () (citing cases). Accordingly, the most "appropriate" or "analogous" statute of limitations is one that applies to personal injury actions.
The parties have identified two statutes of limitations that could apply to plaintiff's ADA claims. Defendant contends that the most appropriate statute of limitations is the 180-day period contained in New Hampshire's "Law Against Discrimination," Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 354-A, whereas plaintiff asserts that the three-year statute of limitations set forth in RSA 508:4 is the most appropriate statute. The court examines each option in turn.
New Hampshire's Law Against Discrimination, like the ADA, prohibits discriminatory practices in places of public accommodation because of an individual's physical or mental disability. Compare RSA 354-A:17 with 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
RSA 354-A creates an administrative scheme to handle complaints of discrimination in employment, in places of public accommodation, and in housing accommodations. This scheme is administered by the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights.
The statute requires a "person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice to make, sign and file" a complaint with the Commission "within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination." RSA 354-A:21, I, III. The Commission is thereafter charged with investigating the complaint, a process that is geared toward conciliation, resolution, and settlement of the dispute between the parties. RSA 354-A:21, II.
Under RSA 354-A, a complainant is not entitled to forego the administrative process and proceed directly to state court. Further, although complainant is entitled to seek judicial review of an adverse order by the Commission, that review is limited. See RSA 354-A:22 (describing judicial review and enforcement procedures). The statute further provides that "if the complainant brings an action in federal court arising out of the same claims of discrimination which formed the basis of an order or decision of the commission, such order or decision shall be vacated and any appeal therefrom pending in any state court shall be dismissed." RSA 354-A:22, V.
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