Dovers v. Stephenson Oil Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 03-281.,03-281.
• Citation: 128 S.W.3d 805,354 Ark. 695
• Parties: Virginia DOVERS v. STEPHENSON OIL COMPANY, INC., and William Guffey.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

128 S.W.3d 805

354 Ark. 695

Virginia DOVERS v. STEPHENSON OIL COMPANY, INC., and William Guffey.

No. 03-281.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

November 13, 2003.

Gary Eubanks and Associates, by: Russell D. Marlin and William Gary Holt, Little Rock, for appellant.

Quattlebaum, Grooms, Tull and Burrow PLLC, by: Thomas G. Williams, Little Rock; and Preston & Cowan L.L.P., by: Michele Quattlebaum, Houston, TX, for appellees.

JIM HANNAH, Justice.

Appellant Virginia Dovers brought an action for negligence against appellees Stephenson Oil Company and William Guffey. She alleged that she suffered damages as a result of an accident in which her car was struck from behind by a tractor-trailer rig driven by Guffey. At the time of the accident, Guffey was employed by Stephenson Oil Company. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellees. Dovers filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. Dovers appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. See Dovers v. Stephenson Oil Co., 81 Ark.App. 92, 98 S.W.3d 462 (2003). Subsequent to the court of appeals' decision, the Appellees filed a petition for review, which we granted. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(e).

On appeal, Dovers argues that: (1) the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial; (3) the trial court erred in not allowing her to introduce evidence of insurance; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the appellees to introduce evidence that Guffey did not receive a traffic citation after the accident; (5) the trial court erred in allowing the appellees to elicit hearsay testimony; and (6) the trial court erred in allowing the appellees to introduce testimony regarding secondary gain. We affirm the trial court on all points.

Facts

On June 26, 1999, Dovers was driving northbound on U.S. Highway 67/167. Guffey who was driving a tractor-trailer rig owned by Stephenson Oil Company, was traveling immediately behind Dovers. When Dovers and Guffey reached exit ten, a black Jeep Cherokee operated by an unknown person merged onto the highway in front of Dovers's vehicle.

The three vehicles then continued along the highway towards exit eleven. At or near exit eleven, the black Jeep slowed and came to a stop and, in turn, Dovers slowed her vehicle and came to a stop. Guffey applied his brakes, but he was unable to stop his tractor-trailer rig, and he struck the rear of Dovers's vehicle. Dovers suffered permanent personal injuries as a result of the accident.

Standard of Review

When this court grants a petition to review a decision by the court of appeals, this court reviews the appeal as if it had been originally filed in this court. Lewellyn v. Lewellyn, 351 Ark. 346, 93 S.W.3d 681 (2002). On appeal from a denial of a motion for a new trial, the appellate court affirms the verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. When a motion for a new trial is made on the ground that the verdict is clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence, Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6), we affirm if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, giving the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences in accordance with the proof. Bearden v. J.R. Grobmeyer Lumber Co., 331 Ark. 378, 961 S.W.2d 760 (1998). Substantial evidence is that which goes beyond suspicion or conjecture and is sufficient to compel a conclusion one way or the other. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 (2002). It is only where there is no reasonable probability that the incident occurred according to the version of the prevailing party or where fair-minded persons can only draw a contrary conclusion that a jury verdict should be disturbed. Pineview Farms, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore, Inc., 298 Ark. 78, 765 S.W.2d 924 (1989).

Substantial Evidence

Dovers argues that the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. She also argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial because the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. As the trial court's denial of Dovers's new-trial motion is the basis for both her first and second arguments on appeal, we will address this as one argument.

Arkansas State Trooper Goshen¹ investigated the accident, and he stated that a vehicle in front of Dovers's car came to a stop on the highway, causing Dovers to stop her vehicle. Then, the truck being driven by Guffey collided with Dovers's car. Trooper Goshen stated that Guffey should have stayed at least 120 feet behind Dovers's car, and he stated that, in his opinion, the accident was caused by "being inattentive and following too close."

Bill Mullenax, a retired police officer who teaches driving-safety courses at Mid-South Safety Council, testified that it would not be possible to stop a fully loaded tractor-trailer going sixty miles per hour in fifty feet. Dr. Larry Williams, an expert in accident reconstruction, stated that, in his opinion, the accident at issue occurred either because the tractor-trailer rig was following too closely, the driver was not paying attention, or both.

Guffey's deposition was admitted during Dovers's case. Guffey stated that he was driving behind Dovers's vehicle when a black Jeep failed to yield to oncoming traffic, entered the highway, and pulled in front of Dovers's vehicle, which was proceeding in the lefthand lane. Guffey stated that he thought the Jeep was going to hit Dovers's vehicle, so he backed off. He stated that he saw the black Jeep and Dovers's vehicle come to almost a complete stop; then, he saw both vehicles take off again. Guffey stated that after the vehicles took off again, he began shifting gears and resuming the speed of his truck. Guffey testified that he was consistently checking his mirrors and his trailer because he was concerned that another vehicle might rear-end him.

Guffey stated that after topping a hill, he again saw the black Jeep and Dovers's vehicle; however, he stated that he saw no brake lights. Guffey stated that he was still driving slowly because he was in the process of shifting gears to try and regain speed. Guffey stated that upon seeing the vehicles, he began applying his brakes. He testified that due to traffic, he could not change lanes, and he stated that "within about twenty foot of making contact with her, brake lights came on." He stated that he attempted to stop, but he "was too close to stop," and he rear-ended Dovers's vehicle. Guffey maintained that he was paying attention, and he denied that he had been following too closely. He also stated that he did not believe he could have done anything differently to avoid the accident. Further, Guffey testified that, immediately after the accident, Dovers grabbed him by the arm and said, "[I]t ain't your fault ... it was that son of a bitch in front of me in that black Jeep."

Dovers presented the testimony of several witnesses regarding her damages. Dovers's sister stated that after the accident, Dovers had fusion surgery and has since experienced shoulder, neck, and back pain. Dovers's brother-in-law stated that she has been depressed since the accident. Dovers's employer stated that since the accident, Dovers has not successfully returned to work. Dovers testified on her own behalf and stated that she experiences extreme pain when she turns her neck. Dr. Edwin Barron assigned Dovers a three-percent permanent partial disability rating. Ralph Scott Boax, a forensic economist, calculated Dovers's total damages to be $1,330,334.00.

At trial, the trial court instructed the jury on negligence, stating:

Virginia Dovers claims damages from Stephenson Oil Company, Inc. and William Guffey, and has the burden of proving each of three (3) essential propositions:

First, that she has sustained damages;

Second, that Stephenson Oil Company, Inc. and William Guffey, or one of them, was negligent;

And third, that such negligence was a proximate cause of Virginia Dovers' damages.

Dovers argues:

For a plaintiff to lose a personal injury action based upon negligence, the jury must necessarily find one of the following: (1) That the plaintiff was not injured or that her injuries were not caused by the accident; (2) That the defendant was zero percent negligent in causing the accident; or (3) That the plaintiff was more at fault in causing her own injuries than the defendant.

In the present case there was no serious dispute as to the fact that the Plaintiff was severely injured. Appellees' counsel admitted as much herself in opening statement when she said, "Now damages. Ms. Dovers was hurt." She repeated this admission again in her closing argument when she suggested to the jury that a verdict of $125,000 would be appropriate. There was also extensive testimony from Ms. Dovers' treating physicians, vocational experts and a forensic economist which were presented by the Appellant without rebuttal from the Appellees. The Appellant's injuries and damages are further corroborated by the exhibits Appellant introduced at trial including photos of Ms. Dovers' vehicle, medical bills totaling $55,296.22, extensive medical records and the report of a forensic economist regarding loss of income, future medical expenses and other economic damages as well as testimony from her family as to the extent of her pain and suffering. The Appellees did not seriously contest the fact that Ms. Dovers was injured in this accident and no reasonable juror could have concluded that she suffered no damages.

Likewise, no reasonable juror could have found that Appellee Guffey was zero percent negligent in causing this accident. By his own admission he was following too closely to stop. He even went so far as to testify that his tractor trailer rig was within twenty feet (20') of Ms. Dovers' automobile when he saw her brake lights come on just before impact.

To support this...