Dow v. Des Moines City Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 16 June 1910 |
Citation | 148 Iowa 429,126 N.W. 918 |
Parties | DOW v. DES MOINES CITY RY. CO. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Polk County; James A. Howe, Judge.
Action at law to recover damages for injuries received by plaintiff due to being struck by a car upon defendant's line of road. Defendant denied any negligence on its part and pleaded that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Trial to a jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Guernsey, Parker & Miller, for appellant.
W. C. Strock and Thomas A. Cheshire, for appellee.
Defendant is a corporation operating a street railway system in the city of Des Moines. Its Ingersoll Avenue Line running east and west through a residential district is double tracked; west-bound cars taking the north, and east-bound the south, tracks. These tracks are standard gauge, to wit, 4 feet 8 1/2 inches, and the distance between the two tracks is five feet six inches. The cars which ran over these lines were from 8 feet to 8 feet and 2 inches in width. All the cars on defendant's line carried United States mail boxes, and the public was invited to stop them at street crossings for the purpose of depositing mail in these boxes. Defendant's Ingersoll Avenue Line crosses streets running north and south and numbered from Seventeenth to Thirty-Ninth inclusive. At the intersection of Twenty-Ninth and Ingersoll avenue, there was at the time of the accident in question a small frame structure at the southwest corner of the street intersection used by persons contemplating passage upon defendant's cars as a waiting station. From Thirty-Fourth street east to Twenty-Eighth there is a downgrade varying from 1 1/3 to 4 1/9 per cent. Nine hundred and seventy feet and a fraction west of the west side of Twenty-Ninth street at its intersection with Ingersoll avenue is the beginning of a curve in defendant's line of road. This is a 3 per cent. curve. The grade of the tracks from the east end of this curve to Thirtieth street is 4 1/9 per cent., from Thirtieth street to Twenty-Ninth it is 1 75/100 per cent., and from Twenty-Ninth to Twenty-Eighth 2 9/10 per cent. The grade of the curve is 3 2/3 per cent. This curve, as we have said, begins 970 feet west of Twenty-Ninth street and 216 feet west of Thirtieth street. From any point north of the waiting room and south of the north track on Twenty-Ninth street there is a plain view of cars approaching from the west of from 100 to 105 rods. There were many houses on both the north and south sides of Ingersoll avenue; but these did not obstruct a view of cars approaching from the west for the distance indicated.
At the time of the accident plaintiff, who is a married woman, was living two blocks south of Ingersoll avenue and one block east of Twenty-Ninth street. She left her home at 4:30 or 4:45 p. m. February 24, 1908, to post a letter on one of defendant's cars, and went to the intersection of Twenty-Ninth street with Ingersoll avenue. A drizzling rain was falling, and she carried an umbrella to shield herself therefrom. As she approached the avenue, she could see a car passing thereon for a block and one-half south of said avenue, and she saw no cars pass the crossing which she was approaching on the day in question. The schedule time for cars at that time was every seven or eight minutes. As we have said, the day was cloudy, and it was raining, and plaintiff went to a point north of the waiting station, where she had a clear view of defendant's track both east and west--westward for the distance already indicated. Here she stopped and looked westward for an approaching car, standing there for two or three minutes. Discovering no car approaching, she looked toward the east and discovered one approaching from that direction, which was then somewhere between Twenty-Eighth and Twenty-Ninth streets. She immediately crossed all the tracks and waited for the west-bound car to pass her and to stop, either to receive her letter, discharge passengers, or both. This west-bound car stopped on the west side of Twenty-Ninth street in such position that the door, which was in the center of the car, was on the west side of Twenty-Ninth street and just opposite the place where she was standing. As the mail box was on the rear of the car, plaintiff immediately proceeded to the east end of the car and there deposited her letter in the box. The west-bound car then started, and plaintiff, at the same time, proceeded in a southern or southwesterly direction to recross the tracks, when she was struck by an east-bound car and received the injuries of which she complains. There is testimony that this east-bound car was running at least 25 miles per hour, and also to the effect that it threw plaintiff something like 86 feet. She might have gone farther but for the fact that she was thrown against and struck a boy who was walking westward on Ingersoll avenue. This car also ran from 300 to 400 feet after it struck plaintiff before it could be stopped.
The negligence charged against the defendant is as follows:
In her petition plaintiff also made the following, among other, allegations:
Plaintiff introduced an ordinance of the city of Des Moines prohibiting the running of cars at the point in question at a greater speed than 12 miles per hour, and also produced testimony to prove the customs pleaded by her.
Under the facts disclosed, there can be little if any, doubt of defendant's negligence. Indeed, if there were nothing more in the case than excessive rate of speed, that would be enough, under the circumstances shown, to take the case to the jury on the question of defendant's negligence.
2. Reversal is sought on the ground of claimed errors of the trial court in the admission and rejection of testimony, and in the giving and the refusal to give certain instructions, and it is strenuously insisted that under the undisputed testimony plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and should not be allowed to recover for the consequences of the collision. We shall first take up the rulings on the admission and rejection of testimony. It is claimed that the court erred in permitting plaintiff's counsel to propound certain leading questions to his witnesses. A question somewhat leading in form was propounded by counsel to plaintiff herself which was objected to by defendant's counsel. Without ruling upon the objection, the trial court propounded this question to the witness, which was answered as shown: There was no error here of which defendant may justly complain. The interrogatory propounded by the court was not objected to, and, had it been, the objection would have been without merit. Moreover, it is a rare case indeed which will be reversed because a leading question is propounded but not answered.
Although defendant was not charged with having a defective gong on its east-bound car, plaintiff was permitted to prove, over objections, that the gong upon this car was defective. We think this testimony was admissible as...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Barlow v. Utah Light & Traction Co.
... ... REVERSED AND REMANDED, with directions ... Willard ... Hanson and A. H. Hougaard, both of Salt Lake City, for ... appellant ... Bagley, ... Judd & Ray, of Salt Lake City, for respondent ... STRAUP, ... J. ELIAS HANSEN and EPHRAIM ... from other jurisdictions, among them, Barboe v ... Sioux City Service Co. , 205 Iowa 1074, 215 N.W. 740; ... Dow v. Des Moines City R. Co. , 148 Iowa ... 429, 126 N.W. 918; Molby v. Detroit United ... Ry. , 221 Mich. 419, 191 N.W. 29; Colborne v ... Detroit United ... ...
-
Hutchinson v. Sioux City Serv. Co.
...163 Iowa, 58, 144 N. W. 13, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 443;Watson v. Electric Co., 163 Iowa, 316, 144 N. W. 350;Dow v. Des Moines City Railway Co., 148 Iowa, 429, 126 N. W. 918;Willfong v. Omaha & St. Louis Railroad Co., 116 Iowa, 548, 90 N. W. 358. Also see Oppenheim v. Barkin, 262 Mass. 281, 159......
- Dow v. Des Moines City Ry. Co.
-
Barboe v. Sioux City Serv. Co.
...117 Iowa, 447, 90 N. W. 815;Mangan v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 200 Iowa, 597, 203 N. W. 705, 41 A. L. R. 368. In Dow v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 148 Iowa, 429, 126 N. W. 918, we said: “We have never held that one may go heedlessly and blindly upon a street car or other track and still be fr......