O'dowd v. City of Boston

• Citation: 149 Mass. 443,21 N.E. 949
• Parties: O'DOWD v. CITY OF BOSTON.
• Decision Date: 20 June 1889
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

149 Mass. 443

21 N.E. 949

O'DOWD v. CITY OF BOSTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 20, 1889

COUNSEL

Charles A. Prince and James Milton Hall, for plaintiff.

Andrew J. Bailey, for defendant.

OPINION

W ALLEN, J.

It was admitted by the defendant that the plaintiff was a subordinate, legally appointed by the board of directors of East Boston ferries, and that the power of the board to remove its subordinates was fixed by St.1885, c 266,§ 5, which provides that such "board may remove such subordinates for such cause as they may deem sufficient, and shall assign in their order for removal." It insists that the declaration shows that the plaintiff was duly removed from his position as deck-hand on the ferry-boat. The plaintiff claims that no order for his removal was made by the board. The approval by the board of the action of the superintendent reported to it was a sufficient order for removal. The removal dated from the order of the board, and not from the action of the superintendent. The recital that the superintendent had reported that he had discharged the plaintiff for drunkenness was the statement of the cause of the removal which the board made by approving the action of the superintendent. Whether the order was legal, and effected the removal, must depend upon the validity of the other objection presented by the plaintiff, that no opportunity was given him to be heard before the order was passed. The plaintiff contends that the statute requires that a removal shall be for cause; that that imports that there shall be charges stating the cause of removal, and a hearing and adjudication upon them; that the words "for cause" have acquired a technical meaning, in which it will be presumed the legislature used them. But the words as used in the statute are connected with and qualified by other words, and whether in that connection they have the meaning contended for by the plaintiff must be determined by all the language of the statute.

One meaning which may be given the statute is that it authorizes the board to remove for any cause which upon hearing and adjudication it determines to be sufficient, and which it shall assign in an order for removal; and another meaning is that it may remove for any cause which, with or without charges or hearing, it deems sufficient, and which it shall assign in the order for removal. We think the latter is the true meaning. The language of the statute indicates that it did not intend to require charges and a hearing. It is not to be at the discretion of the board for cause shown, which might have implied that there should be a hearing and adjudication, but it is to be for such cause as the board shall deem sufficient, which does not seem to contemplate a formal adjudication. If it was intended that the removal was to be upon charges and an adjudication, there was no occasion to say more than that it was to be for cause,...