Dowling v. Szymczak

• Decision Date: 23 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18922.,18922.
• Citation: 72 A.3d 1,309 Conn. 390
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Lauren DOWLING v. Luke SZYMCZAK.

309 Conn. 390

72 A.3d 1

Lauren DOWLING

v.Luke SZYMCZAK.

No. 18922.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 11, 2013.

Decided July 23, 2013.

Robert M. Shields, Jr., with whom were Wesley W. Horton and, on the brief, Kenneth J. Bartschi, Hartford, and Carla Barone, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).

Campbell D. Barrett, with whom was Jon T. Kukucka, Hartford, for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH and McDONALD, Js.

McDONALD, J.

Connecticut's child support guidelines (guidelines); see Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–1 et seq.; generally reflect the principle that “the proportion of household income spent on children declines as household income increases.” Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2005), preamble, § (e)(4)(A), p. iv. This principle is reflected in the guidelines' schedule of basic child support obligations (schedule), which supplies presumptive levels of support on the basis of the parents' combined net weekly income, but only up to $4000 of such income. In Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 95, 995 A.2d 1 (2010), and Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 368, 999 A.2d 721 (2010), this court recognized that, even when the combined net weekly income of the parents exceeds that amount, child support awards should follow the principle reflected in the guidelines.¹ The present case requires us to address whether that principle is contravened as a matter of law by an order of child support that is calculated on the same percentage basis as that assigned to a combined net weekly income of $4000, even when the parents' combined net weekly income is several times that amount.

The defendant, Luke Szymczak, appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming in part and modifying in part the family support magistrate's decision, claiming that: the magistrate's child support order, insofar as it was affirmed by the trial court, (1) violates the guidelines' principle that high income parents will dedicate a smaller proportion of their income to child related spending, (2) fails to make specific findings justifying an upward deviation from the presumptive child support obligation and (3) is not based on the needs of the child; and the trial court's modification of the magistrate's decision ordering payment of retroactive child support was improper because the actual cost of supporting the child for the relevant period of time was significantly less than even the modified award. The plaintiff, Lauren Dowling, cross appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for appellate attorney's fees. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The issues in this appeal arise in the context of the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff and the defendant, unmarried domestic partners, became parents to a son on September 26, 2007. Shortly thereafter, the parties terminated their relationship, and the plaintiff, who had been living in the defendant's Greenwich home, moved with their son into a cottage located on her parents' property in Old Lyme. The defendant thereafter made irregular voluntary support payments to the plaintiff that amounted to approximately $1000 a month. In February, 2009, the Commissioner of Social Services, on behalf of the state and the plaintiff, filed a Title IV–D support petition against the defendant, claiming that his child was receiving child support services from the state and seeking orders for the support and maintenance of the child. On March 6, 2009, the family support magistrate, Christopher F. Oliveira, issued a temporary child support order requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff $435 per week and to reimburse her for 82 percent of unreimbursed or uninsured medical expenses and work related child care.

Following a five day trial, the family support magistrate, Richard G. Adams (magistrate), issued a decision ordering the defendant to pay $1440 in weekly child support as well as the child's health care costs, and holding the plaintiff responsible for any child care costs necessary for her to maintain employment. In his memorandum of decision, the magistrate determined the parties' combined gross income to be in excess of $1 million and their combined net weekly income to be $14,154, approximately $750,000 annually—86 percent of which was attributable to the defendant's income from salary and other forms of compensation and 14 percent of which was attributable to the plaintiff's earning capacity.² The parties agreed that it was appropriate to rely on the plaintiff's earning capacity rather than her actual income because she had chosen to work in her family's business at an annual salary of $25,000, well below what her experience and education reasonably would have allowed her to earn.³

In determining the appropriate method for assessing child support, the magistrate rejected the defendant's argument that the mathematical formula for the decreasing percentage of income principle reflected in the schedule should simply be extended to combined net weekly incomes of more than $4000. In doing so, the magistrate reasoned that the commission for child support guidelines (commission) had declined to provide presumptive support obligations in such cases and that the defendant's approach was unsupported by data regarding actual spending practices of parents with high discretionary incomes. The magistrate determined that “[t]wo explicit rules fall from the Maturo analysis: the court's award of a child support order, in the absence of a deviation, cannot fall below the dollar amount of the order indicated at the top of the table for the noncustodial parent in the schedule of basic obligations, nor exceed the percentage of combined net income at that level.” (Emphasis omitted.) The magistrate noted that, beyond those rules, the trial court retained discretion—albeit not unfettered—to set the award in light of both the particular circumstances of each case and the general fact that children in high income families are accustomed to an affluent lifestyle that should be maintained to the extent reasonably possible.

In applying these principles to determine the proper amount of support, the magistrate noted: “The guidelines schedule stops at $4000 of combined [weekly] net income. Under Maturo and Misthopoulos, the minimum weekly combined child support obligation [for one child] at that income is $473 per week and the maximum proportion of total net income is 11.83 percent. [That percentage] of the parties' $14,154 combined total net income yields a total child support obligation of $1674 per week or $87,059 per year....” The magistrate concluded that, under the circumstances, this obligation was “not self-evidently excessive or unreasonable,” even though it was approximately three and one-half times the $473 minimum. In so concluding, the magistrate noted the circumstances making this award appropriate in the present case and the need to set an award that would accommodate the child's future needs. The magistrate additionally noted that his order would require the plaintiff to bear the cost of work related child care, which he valued at “several hundred dollars” a week, thereby effectively decreasing the percentage of the defendant's net income devoted to child support to approximately 9 percent, “well below the 11.83 percent maximum.” Thus, the magistrate concluded, he had observed this court's “admonition in Maturo that, ‘in most cases' in which combined net incomes exceed the maximum amount on the schedule, the presumptive current support amount should reflect a percentage below the rate for the highest amount on the schedule.” Accordingly, the magistrate ordered the defendant to pay $1440 a week to the plaintiff in child support, based on the defendant's 86 percent proportionate share of the parties' combined net weekly income. The magistrate made his order retroactive to the date of the parties' separation, with credit for any amount of support previously paid, and required the defendant to pay an additional $285 weekly in arrearage for an unspecified period.

The defendant thereafter appealed from the magistrate's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–231 (n), claiming, inter alia, that: the order contravened the principle that as income level rises, the proportion of income dedicated to child related spending decreases; the allocation of work related child care expenses to the plaintiff was not a proper application of the criteria for deviating from the support guidelines; and the order failed to conform to the actual needs of the child. Additionally, the defendant challenged the arrearage from the magistrate's retroactive application of the order. In response, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking an award of attorney's fees for her defense against the defendant's appeal.

The trial court, Boland, J., affirmed the magistrate's decision, with one modification to the amount of the arrearage. Specifically, the court held that “[u]nless deviation findings are made, [the magistrate or trial court's] discretion is normally confined to a range between a presumed minimum ($473, if one child) and a presumed maximum (11.83 percent of the net income available to the parents), which are the dollar and percentage expressions of presumed support for families netting $4000 per week.” Within that range, the magistrate or trial court “possesses the discretion to locate that exact number by a case-by-case examination of the [factors] listed in General Statutes § 46b–84 (d).” ⁴ The trial court concluded that the magistrate's support order did not deviate from the guidelines, and, therefore, was proper.⁵ With respect to the arrearage, however, the court concluded that modification of the order was appropriate because the magistrate had ordered payment of support to include a period of time during which the plaintiff conceded either that sh...