Downey v. Carcieri, C.A. NO. PC 07-2563 (R.I. Super 11/5/2008)
| Decision Date | 05 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | C.A. NO. PC 07-2563. |
| Parties | MICHAEL DOWNEY, Individually and in his Capacity as PRESIDENT of RHODE ISLAND COUNCIL 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL-CIO and RHODE ISLAND COUNCIL 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL-CIO v. GOVERNOR DONALD L. CARCIERI, BEVERLY NAJARIAN, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, A. MICHAEL MARQUES, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, PATRICIA MARTINEZ, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, ASHBEL T. WALL, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, CORRINE CALISE, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF ELDERLY AFFAIRS, PETER MCWALTERS, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, W. MICHAEL SULLIVAN, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DAVID R. GIFFORD, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, GARY ALEXANDER, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, ADELITA S. OREFICE, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, ELLEN R. NELSON, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, RETARDATION AND HOSPITALS, and JEROME F. WILLIAMS, as DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
The late United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once said that "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . ."1 The Plaintiffs, Michael Downey, Individually and in his Capacity as President of Rhode Island Council 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL-CIO and Rhode Island Council 94, A.F.S.C.M.E. (Council 94) (collectively, Plaintiffs), argue that they have been thwarted in their efforts to shed "sunlight" on the use of private contractors to perform public services for the State.2 The Plaintiffs claim that Governor Donald L. Carcieri and the above-named directors and their executive branch agencies (collectively, Defendants) have unjustifiably denied their requests to produce records pertaining to privatization contracts. The Plaintiffs claim that disclosure is required by chapter 2.3 of title 37 of the Rhode Island General Laws, entitled the Governmental Oversight and Fiscal Accountability Review Act (GOFARA, or the Act).
The Plaintiffs petition this Court for a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief. They also seek attorneys' fees and costs. The Plaintiffs contend that the State either failed to compile certain mandatory records, and/or refused to release copies of those documents. The Defendants maintain that they have fully complied with GOFARA and that Plaintiffs' position is erroneous and based upon an overly broad interpretation of the Act. The Defendants argue that they have no legal obligation under GOFARA to provide Plaintiffs with the requested materials.
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Defendants' interpretation of its obligations under the statute is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary language of the Act and inconsistent with the stated purpose of GOFARA. The Court declares that under the subject wording of the statute, information about privatization contracts valued at $100,000, or more, must be disclosed in accordance with GOFARA so long as the contracts provide services that once were performed by public agency employees at some point in the past. The Court finds that the Act does not provide a time limit as to when in the past the services were performed by state employees.
Chapter 30 of title 9 of the Rhode Island General Laws and G.L. 1956 § 8-2-13 confer jurisdiction on this Court.
In 2006, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed GOFARA. In enacting GOFARA, the Legislature found and declared that:
". . . using private contractors to provide public services normally provided by public employees does not always promote the public interest. To ensure that citizens of this state receive high quality public services at low costs, with due regard for the taxpayers of this state, and the service recipients, the legislature finds it necessary to ensure that access to public information guaranteed by the access to public records act is not in any way hindered by the fact that public services are provided by private contractors. Section 37-2.3-2.
Although the Governor vetoed the legislation, on June 23, 2006, the Legislature overrode the Governor's veto and passed the statute.
GOFARA established a procedure to fiscally monitor so-called "privatization contracts." The Act requires each state agency to submit an addendum to its budget request listing all
privatization contracts, as well as a summary of private contractor employees for each applicable contract. See § 37-2.3-4(2).
The pertinent facts in this case are generally undisputed. On February 20, 2007, Council 94, through its Executive Director, Dennis Grilli, requested the Governor to produce copies of each state agency addendum that listed privatization contracts in accordance with GOFARA. The Governor's Office informed Council 94 that it did not possess any such documents, and it suggested that Council 94 contact either the Budget Office or the individual state agencies to request the information.
Thereafter, on March 7, 2007, Council 94 contacted the Department of Administration (DOA) and requested the same records. The DOA also responded that it did not possess any such documents. Plaintiffs then filed the instant lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief. Defendants object and seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim.
Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA), the Superior Court possesses "the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Section 9-30-1; see also P.J.C. Realty v. Barry, 811 A.2d 1202, 1207 (R.I. 2002) (quoting § 9-30-1). Thus, "the Superior Court has jurisdiction to construe the rights and responsibilities of any party arising from a statute pursuant to the powers conferred upon [it] by G.L. chapter 30 of title 9, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act." Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476, 478-79 (R.I. 2000). Specifically, § 9-30-2 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides as follows:
"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or legal relations thereunder." (Emphases added.)
"This statute gives a broad grant of jurisdiction to the Superior Court to determine the rights of any person that may arise under a statute not in its appellate capacity but as a part of its original jurisdiction." Canario, 752 A.2d at 479 (citing Roch v. Harrahy, 419 A.2d 827, 830 (R.I. 1980)).3 Further, this Court acknowledges that the purpose of the UDJA is "to allow the trial justice to `facilitate the termination of controversies.'" Bradford Assocs. v. R.I. Div. of Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 489 (R.I. 2001) (citations omitted). Therefore, the plaintiff must present the Court with an actual controversy when seeking declaratory relief. Millett v. Hoisting Eng'rs Licensing Div. of Dep't of Labor, 119 R.I. 285, 291, 377 A.2d 229, 233 (1977). It is well-established that a trial court's "decision to grant or to deny declaratory relief under the [UDJA] is purely discretionary." Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997).
However, in declaratory judgment actions, Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 2008). Accordingly, "[t]he requisite standing to prosecute a claim for relief exists when the plaintiff has alleged that `the challenged action has caused him [or her] injury in fact, economic or otherwise[.]'" Id. (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22, 317 A.2d 124, 128 (1974)).
Furthermore, "[w]hen called upon to decide the issue of standing, a trial justice must determine whether, if the allegations are proven, the plaintiff has sustained an injury and has
alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation before the party may assert the claims of the public." Id. (citing Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992)). Such a "legally cognizable and protectable interest must be concrete and particularized . . . and . . . actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. (quoting Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I.1997)) (internal quotations omitted).
The Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare that every agency which has any privatization contracts is required to compile and attach an addendum to budget requests submitted since passage of GOFARA, and that where appropriate, such addenda also must include information relating to privatization contracts that existed in the year prior to passage of the Act. They further seek the Court to declare that Defendants have not complied with GOFARA either because they did not compile addenda, or if they did compile them, because they failed to produce such public records upon Council 94's request.
The Defendants disagree. They first contend that the lawsuit is premature because Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies under chapter 2 of title 38 of the Rhode Island General Laws, entitled the Access to Public Records Act (APRA). Additionally, they suggest that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this action due to their failure to allege any harm. The Defendants finally maintain that based upon a reasonable interpretation of GOFARA's statutory definition of privatization contracts, they...
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