Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore

• Decision Date: 01 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1803,1803
• Citation: 111 Md.App. 616,683 A.2d 808
• Parties: Stephen Michael DOWNS v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF BALTIMORE, et al. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 616

111 Md.App. 616

683 A.2d 808

Stephen Michael DOWNS v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF BALTIMORE, et al.

No. 1803, Sept. Term, 1995.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 25, 1996.

Reconsideration Denied Oct. 29, 1996.

John E. Harris, Sr. (Cheryl M. Brower, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellant

E. Scott Conover (Robert H. Bouse, Jr., on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellees.

Before WILNER, C.J., and HARRELL and JAMES S. GETTY (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

WILNER, Chief Judge.

Appellant, a former candidate for priesthood in the Roman Catholic Church, filed a two-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against Archbishop William H. Keeler, four priests (Francis Murphy, John Wielebski, Paul Cook, and Michael Murphy), and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore (the corporate body of the Church) Appellant has appealed, framing five issues. We see the case as involving only two: (1) whether the court erred in concluding that appellant's claim raised ecclesiastical issues not within its subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) whether the court erred in denying leave to amend the complaint. We shall affirm.

claiming that he had been defamed by them. The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it raised ecclesiastical issues not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.

BACKGROUND

Because appellant's complaint was dismissed on motion, based on the pleading itself, we must accept all well-pleaded allegations of fact as true. Ambiguities and uncertainties in the pleading, however, are construed against appellant. Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 444, 620 A.2d 327 (1993).

Appellant entered the seminary in 1989. In the summer of 1990, the Archdiocese approved a continuation of his training in preparation for ordination to the priesthood. After serving at parishes in the Baltimore area, he was transferred, in October, 1992, to St. Patrick's parish in Cumberland. In 1993, he made a formal petition to be ordained and was assured by Archbishop Keeler that he would be ordained to the transitional diaconate in November, 1993, and to the priesthood in June, 1994. On August 20, 1993, however, he was informed by the Reverend James Barker that "he was released from the Archdiocese and, accordingly, would never be considered for diocesan priesthood." That decision, he alleged, was made after a meeting with Archbishop Keeler and Msgr. Francis Malooly.

Although no explanation for the Church's decision was given to appellant, he later learned from an individual who wishes to remain anonymous that the defendant Reverend John T. Wielebski, "made and published false and defamatory statements respecting the Plaintiff's honesty, reliability, integrity and morality, specifically, asserting sexually motivated conduct "14. As a result of these and other false and defamatory statements published by all Defendants named herein, the character and reputation of the Plaintiff were harmed, his standing and reputation within the Catholic Church and within the community were impaired, and he suffered mental anguish and personal humiliation.

                toward certain staff members of St. Patrick's Parish in Cumberland, Maryland."   Appellant further alleges that the other defendants repeated and republished "said defamatory allegations" with knowledge of their falsity and "with the intent to harm the Plaintiff's chances for ordination to the priesthood."   Two elements of injury were alleged
                

15. As a direct and proximate result of the false and defamatory statements and memorandum published by the Defendants herein, the Plaintiff was not ordained to the position of priest within the Archdiocese of Baltimore, and, thereby, suffered a loss of prospective income which he would have earned from the salary associated with ordination to and the carrying out of priesthood responsibilities, and he was otherwise damaged and injured."

Although in Count I, appellant averred that the defendants repeated and published these statements with knowledge of their falsity, he did not allege that they had acted maliciously, and he sought only compensatory damages, in the amount of $500,000. In Count II, he alleged that they acted "maliciously, negligently and with a reckless disregard for the truth of the matters being asserted," and, presumably on that basis, he sought $1,750,000 in punitive damages.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it sought to challenge the process of training and selecting priests, which was an ecclesiastical matter immune from civil jurisdiction under the First Amendment. Appellant responded that the case was simply one of defamation and did not involve the internal ecclesiastical policies of the Church. He argued that he was not seeking review of any decision made by the Church, that he was not seeking reinstatement, and that his dismissal was but one element of damage. The

court accepted the defendants' argument. In a brief memorandum explaining its decision to grant the motion, it concluded that the statements attributed to the defendants were "certainly within the context of the 'formation process' of the priesthood," that the removal of unacceptable candidates for priesthood is purely [683 A.2d 811] an ecclesiastical function, and that the civil courts have "no business whatsoever in such affairs."

DISCUSSION

First Amendment Issue

Commencing in 1871 with Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 80 U.S. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871), and continuing through 1979 with Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979), the Supreme Court has made clear that, under the First Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, civil courts have no authority to second-guess ecclesiastical decisions made by hierarchical church bodies. The most succinct expression of this doctrine appears in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2387-88, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976):

"In short, the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them."

The Supreme Court cases have not, themselves, involved situations like that now before us--a suit for money damages based on a tort such as defamation--but rather have concerned, more directly, issues of church structure, governance, or property, including the selection of clergy. See Watson v. Jones, supra, Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Maryland & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 90 S.Ct. 499, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151; Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of ecclesiastical controversies from civil jurisdiction has been a broad one. In Watson, the Court, in effect, declared immune from civil jurisdiction "a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them." 80 U.S. at 733, quoted favorably in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, supra, 426 U.S. at 714, 96 S.Ct. at 2382-83.

The goal of this exclusion is "to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice." Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at 603, 99 S.Ct. at 3025. Even where the dispute actually presented to the court is one that, if presented by any other set of litigants, would clearly be justiciable, if the resolution of that dispute between the litigants at hand would require the court to adjudicate matters of church doctrine or governance, or to second-guess ecclesiastical decisions made by a church body created to make those decisions, the matter falls outside the court's authority. Only in the area of property disputes has the Court focused particularly on methods of allowing the civil courts to proceed, approving in Jones v. Wolf, supra, the "neutral principles of law" approach, i.e., resolving the dispute in accordance with "neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property is awarded." Id. at 599, 99 S.Ct. at 3023, quoting from Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. at 606.

Although the Supreme Court has not dealt specifically with actions for defamation directed at churches or church officials, the lower Federal courts have. In most instances, as in this one, the alleged defamatory or other tortious conduct has been intertwined with decisions regarding the plaintiff's fitness or suitability to act as a clergyman. In Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 277, 93 L.Ed.2d 253 (1986), for example, an ordained minister sued his bishop and several other clergymen, contending that they had wrongfully brought about his early retirement. The complaint included actions for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on the allegation that the defendants had "misrepresented his relationships at various churches, and through this misrepresentation brought about his enforced retirement."

Affirming an order dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted tersely, at 393:

"Appellant is really seeking...