Dowrick v. Village of Downers Grove

• Decision Date: 16 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2-05-0054.,2-05-0054.
• Citation: 840 N.E.2d 785
• Parties: John A. DOWRICK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The VILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, Phil Ruscetti, as Fire Chief for the Village of Downers Grove, The Village of Downers Grove Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, Commissioners Keith Killacky, Richard Matthies, and Gary Owens, and The Village of Downers Grove Firefighters Pension Fund, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

840 N.E.2d 785

John A. DOWRICK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The VILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, Phil Ruscetti, as Fire Chief for the Village of Downers Grove, The Village of Downers Grove Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, Commissioners Keith Killacky, Richard Matthies, and Gary Owens, and The Village of Downers Grove Firefighters Pension Fund, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 2-05-0054.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

December 16, 2005.

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John H. Kelly, Ericka J. Thomas, Ottosen, Trevarthen, Britz, Kelly & Cooper, Ltd., Wheaton, for Keith Killacky, Police Commissioner, Richard Matthies, Police Commissioner, Phil Ruscetti, Fire Chief, Village of Downers Grove, Village of Downers Grove Board of Fire, Village of Downers Grove Firefighters Pension Fund.

Thomas W. Duda, Law Offices of Thomas W. Duda, Arlington Heights, for John Dowrick.

Presiding Justice O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, John Dowrick, brought an action in the circuit court of Du Page County against defendants, the Village of Downers Grove (Village), the Village's Board of Police and Fire Commissioners (Board of Commissioners) and its members, the Village's Firefighters Pension Fund, and the Village's fire chief, Phil Ruscetti. Count I of plaintiff's two-count complaint sought administrative review of a decision of the Board of Commissioners to discharge him from his employment as a firefighter and emergency medical technician with the Village's fire department. Count II is not at issue in this appeal. The Board of Commissioners discharged plaintiff after finding that he was unable and unwilling to perform the duties of a firefighter. The trial court reversed the decision and ordered plaintiff reinstated with back pay. The trial court reasoned that a prior administrative decision of the Board of Trustees of the Village's Firefighters Pension Fund (Pension Board) denying disability benefits to plaintiff was res judicata and barred the Board of Commissioners from discharging plaintiff. Defendants appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill.2d R. 304(a)). We reverse.

The record establishes that in August 1998, plaintiff sustained neck and back injuries while assisting with an ambulance call. According to plaintiff, he then began to experience headaches and neck and back pain, as well as numbness and loss of grip strength in one hand. Plaintiff did not work for the rest of 1998. He returned to full time work in 1999, but in April of that year he was assigned to a light-duty position. In December 1999, plaintiff filed a petition with the Pension Board, seeking a disability pension. A hearing on the petition was conducted in April 2000. Plaintiff was examined by three independent physicians selected by the Pension Board. Two of them concluded that plaintiff was unable to perform the duties of a firefighter, but the third concluded that there was "no medical reason why he cannot perform his full time full duty work without restriction." Based upon this evidence, other documentary medical evidence, and testimony at the hearing, the Pension Board found that plaintiff's physical and medical condition did not constitute a physical disability rendering him permanently disabled for service in the Downers Grove fire department. Accordingly, the Pension Board denied plaintiff's petition.

The Village, acting through Fire Chief Ruscetti, subsequently filed charges with the Board of Commissioners, seeking plaintiff's discharge. Testimony at the hearing on the charges establishes that in June 2000, plaintiff was sent to the firefighter's training academy in Elgin. Plaintiff complained of severe pain after performing one of the training exercises, and his training was discontinued. Plaintiff testified that the training "greatly aggravated" his condition. Plaintiff returned to full duty briefly in the summer of 2000. During that time, an incident occurred in which plaintiff experienced pain and loss of grip strength while carrying a stretcher, nearly causing him to drop it. After that incident, plaintiff was sent home sick and did not return to full duty as a firefighter. Instead, he was placed on administrative leave for several weeks and was later assigned to light duty, such as helping to organize fire prevention week and working on an accreditation project.

In October 2000, plaintiff and his attorney met with representatives of the Village and a union official to discuss plaintiff's ability to perform his duties. According to one of the Village representatives who attended, plaintiff indicated at the meeting that he did not feel that he could guarantee that he could perform the duties of a firefighter without putting his fellow firefighters, other citizens, or himself at risk.

Testimony and medical records from the Pension Board proceedings were also admitted into evidence in the hearing before the Board of Commissioners. The Board of Commissioners found that plaintiff "was unwilling and unfit to perform the job of a full-time firefighter." The Board of Commissioners concluded that this constituted cause for termination.

Plaintiff thereafter filed his complaint seeking, inter alia, administrative review of the Board of Commissioners' decision. The trial court reversed the decision on the basis that it was barred under principles of res judicata by the Pension Board's finding that plaintiff was not disabled. This appeal followed.

In an appeal from the judgment in an administrative review proceeding, the appellate court reviews the administrative agency's decision, not the trial court's. Grever v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 353 Ill.App.3d 263, 265, 288 Ill.Dec. 713, 818 N.E.2d 401 (2004). The standard of review applicable to an agency's decision depends on the type of question presented. An agency's findings of fact will be upheld unless against the manifest weight of the evidence, i.e., unless the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Du Page County Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue, 358 Ill.App.3d 476, 482, 294 Ill.Dec. 507, 831 N.E.2d 30 (2005). On the other hand, an agency's rulings on questions of law are reviewed de novo. Du Page County Airport Authority, 358 Ill.App.3d at 482, 294 Ill.Dec. 507, 831 N.E.2d 30.

Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under an intermediate standard. Du Page County Airport Authority, 358 Ill.App.3d at 482, 294 Ill.Dec. 507, 831 N.E.2d 30. A mixed question exists where the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the only issue is whether the facts satisfy the settled statutory standard. Du Page County Airport Authority, 358 Ill.App.3d at 482, 294 Ill.Dec. 507, 831 N.E.2d 30. The agency's decision will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous—that is, unless the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Du Page County Airport Authority, 358 Ill.App.3d at 483, 294 Ill.Dec. 507, 831 N.E.2d 30.

The first issue before the court is whether the Board of Commissioners' decision was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The question is one of law subject to de novo review. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill.2d 484, 490, 193 Ill.Dec. 192, 626 N.E.2d 225 (1993). For res judicata to apply, the following elements must exist: (1) an identity of the parties or their privies; (2) an identity of the causes of action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits. Cabrera v. First National Bank of Wheaton, 324 Ill.App.3d 85, 92, 257 Ill.Dec. 512, 753 N.E.2d 1138 (2001).

While res judicata bars subsequent actions involving identical causes of action, the related doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues decided in earlier proceedings. "The requirements for application of collateral estoppel are: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to that presented in the current action; (2) the party against whom the estoppel is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (3) the prior adjudication resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Bagnola v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, 333 Ill.App.3d 711, 723, 267 Ill.Dec. 358, 776 N.E.2d 730 (2002).

Defendants maintain that although the trial court couched its ruling in terms of res judicata, the real question—whether the parties could relitigate an issue decided in the earlier administrative proceeding—implicates collateral estoppel principles. They contend, however, that collateral estoppel does not apply, because the parties to the successive administrative proceedings were neither identical nor in privity. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that collateral estoppel is not the "appropriate theory" applicable to this case and that the trial court correctly held that res judicata applies. He contends that under the "transactional test" adopted in River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 311, 234 Ill.Dec. 783, 703 N.E.2d 883 (1998), the two administrative proceedings involved the same cause of action. He further argues that the Board of Commissioners and the Pension Board are in privity. We note that neither party disputes that Pension Board's decision constitutes a "final judgment" on the merits for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Both doctrines apply to administrative decisions that are adjudicatory, judicial, or quasi-judicial. Bagnola, 333 Ill.App.3d at 717, 267 Ill.Dec. 358, 776 N.E.2d 730.

We conclude that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applies in the present case. First, plaintiff's view that the proceedings...