Dows v. Town of Elmwood

• Citation: 34 F. 114
• Parties: DOWS v. TOWN OF ELMWOOD.
• Decision Date: 29 February 1888
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

34 F. 114

DOWS v. TOWN OF ELMWOOD.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Illinois.

February 29, 1888

Thomas S. McClelland and G. A. Sanders, for plaintiff.

Lyman Trumbull and H. B. Hopkins, for defendant.

BUNN J., (orally.)

The two objections in this case which seem to have most substance are-- First, that the bonds of the town of Elmwood, issued to the railroad company in the month of April, 1869, are void for the reason that there was a failure to comply with the Illinois constitutional provision of 1848, that every local or private law shall embrace but one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title; and, second, that the bonds issued by the town exceeded the authority contained in the law of Illinois under which they were issued, in that they run over 20 years, which is the limit provided by the law. The court will consider these objections in their order. There are other objections made and discussed; but I desire only to notice these two objections to the validity of the bonds. The bonds are legal in form, and recite that they are issued in pursuance of certain statutes of the state of Illinois, under and by virtue of which the town bonds were voted by the legal electors of the town of Elmwood; and there are no questions of fact in the case to be submitted to the jury; and it becomes the duty of the court to decide the questions of law, and direct a verdict in the case, either for the plaintiff or defendant.

First in regard to the objection, which has been strenuously urged and ably argued in behalf of the defendant, that the law of April 17 1869, which legalized the town meeting held in the town of Elmwood in the month of March preceding, was not legally or constitutionally passed by the legislature of Illinois because the provision before referred to of the constitution of Illinois was not complied with. The title of the act is 'An act to legalize a certain election therein named,' and it is insisted on the part of the defendant that this is too general and definite to be a substantial compliance with the constitution. Many cases have been cited upon this subject which seem to be not wholly in point; but I am of opinion that the case of Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 2 S.Ct. 391, should rule the case at bar, there being no decision of the supreme court of Illinois holding the act, or any similar act, invalid for such a reason. In that case Justice HARLAN, delivering the opinion of the court, quotes with approval the language of the supreme court of New Jersey in State v. Town of Union, 33 N.J.Law, 350, as follows:

'The purpose of this constitutional provision was to prevent surprise upon legislators by the passage of bills the object of which is not indicated by their titles, and also to prevent the combination of two or more distinct and unconnected matters in the same bill.'

Further said the court:

'It is not intended to prohibit the uniting in one bill of any number of provisions having one general object fairly indicated by its title. The unity of the object must be sought in the end which the legislative act proposes to accomplish. The degree of particularity which must be used in the title of an act rests in legislative discretion, and is not defined by the constitution.'

I think the principle enunciated in that case, which is cited with approval by the supreme court of the United States, is applicable to the case at bar. The title to the act is, 'An act to legalize a certain election named therein. ' There is but one subject embraced in the act, and that subject is expressed in the title. It is true, it is not given with so great particularity as was possible. But it is not misleading; the description of the subject of the act as stated in the title is apt and accurate; and the only possible objection is that it is too general, in that it does not locate the election by designating the time and place, and the question is whether this court, in advance of any decision on the subject by the Illinois courts, ought to say that the act is unconstitutional and void. Now, this court will not undertake to decide that the act of the legislature of a state is unconstitutional and void, unless it is clearly and palpably so. So long as the title of the act states the purpose or subject which is embodied in the act itself, although in very general terms, I think it is a substantial compliance with the provisions of the constitution. Mr. Justice HARLAN, in Montclair v. Ramsdell, supra, in commenting upon this and other cases, says:

'Upon the authority of these decisions, and upon the soundest principles of constitutional construction, we are of opinion that the objection taken to the act of April 15, 1868, as being (when construed as we have indicated) in conflict with the constitution of New Jersey, cannot be sustained. The powers which the township of Montclair is authorized to exert, however varied or extended, constitute, within the meaning of the constitution, one object, which

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