Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart Inc., 99-5040

• Decision Date: 17 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-5040,99-5040
• Citation: 213 F.3d 492
• Parties: (10th Cir. 2000) CAROL DOYAL, Plaintiff - Appellant v. OKLAHOMA HEART, INC., Defendant - Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

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213 F.3d 492 (10th Cir. 2000) CAROL DOYAL, Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
OKLAHOMA HEART, INC., Defendant - Appellee. No. 99-5040 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 17, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 97-CV-805-C)

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Copyrighted Material Omitted

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Steven A. Novick, Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

J. Patrick Cremin, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, Tulsa, Oklahoma (J. Daniel Morgan, Gable & Gotwals, Tulsa, Oklahoma, on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee.

Before BALDOCK, MCKAY, and ALARCN,^* Circuit Judges.

ALARCN, Circuit Judge.

Carol Doyal ("Doyal") appeals from the order granting summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Oklahoma Heart, Inc. ("Oklahoma Heart"). Doyal alleged that Oklahoma Heart terminated her employment as an administrator at Oklahoma Heart in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Because Doyal failed to introduce evidence sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that she was substantially limited in a major life activity or was regarded as such by Oklahoma Heart, we affirm.

I

Oklahoma Heart is a cardiology practice group. Doyal began working as an administrator at Oklahoma Heart in April 1992. The company grew and, over time, Doyal's responsibilities grew as well. In January 1995, Oklahoma Heart began moving its billing and accounting functions in house. At that time, Doyal was serving as the business office manager for Oklahoma Heart. The conversion to the new billing and accounting computer system was to be completed by April 1995. The conversion was stressful for the affected Oklahoma Heart employees, including Doyal.

In early 1995, Doyal began to experience "significant feelings of helplessness, anxiety, excessive stress and lack of motivation" as well as "difficulty thinking clearly, concentrating, learning, remembering, and interacting with others." She felt disinterested in work, life, eating, and caring for herself. She experienced insomnia, often

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sleeping only one to three hours a night. She also began to experience panic attacks. In March 1995, she experienced a "mental breakdown" at work, during which she cried and told her supervisor, Steven Struttman, how stressed and overworked she felt. Struttman told her to take a week off.

During Doyal's week off, she saw Dr. Katherine Klassen, a psychiatrist, who diagnosed her with "Major Depression, moderate, with anxiety attacks." Dr. Klassen prescribed an anti-depressant medication. Doyal testified during her deposition that the medication "helped tremendously." Dr. Klassen also recommended that she work with her employer to arrange for a "reduced stress/work load." Upon her return to work after her week off, Doyal asked Oklahoma Heart to give her a new position. She transferred to the position of human resources director. The change in her responsibilities was accompanied by a reduction in her pay.

In her new position, Doyal continued to have problems with her memory and concentration, forgetting the names and qualifications of candidates for jobs. She also threw away medical records on one occasion, believing that she had been given permission to do so by one of the doctors at Oklahoma Heart. In late April 1995, Doyal was briefly hospitalized for what her psychiatrist concluded was a stress-related illness. On May 16, 1995, Oklahoma Heart terminated her employment. Struttman provided Doyal with a letter listing the reasons for her discharge. The letter cited her inability to make decisions and her lapses of memory, judgment, and confidentiality.

II

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. See 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). To prevail on her ADA discrimination claim, Doyal had to establish that: (1) she is a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) she is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired; and (3) the employer discriminated against her because of her disability. See Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1999). Doyal bore the burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact on each element of her prima facie case. See id. We review de novo an order granting a motion for summary judgment. See Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health, 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 53 (1999).

Disability is a term of art under the ADA. The statute defines disability as: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. 12102(2). Doyal alleges she comes within subsections (A) and (C).

"[C]onsideration of subsection A of the definition proceeds in three steps." Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202 (1998). First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has an impairment. See id. Second, the court must identify the life activity upon which the plaintiff relies and determine whether it constitutes a major life activity under the ADA. See id. Third, the court asks whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity. See id.

Here, it appears to be undisputed that depression is an impairment. We therefore proceed to Step Two.

The ADA does not define the term "major life activity." That term has been construed to mean a "basic activity that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty." See Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999). Major life activities include such functions as caring for

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oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working. See Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1999). "The Supreme Court in Bragdon made clear that the court, in making determinations of law and formulating jury instructions, is to analyze only the major life activity asserted by the plaintiff." Id. (discussing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637-39, 118 S. Ct. at 2205).

In Doyal's brief to this court, she asserts that her depression limited her ability to perform the following life activities: learning, sleeping, thinking, and interacting with others. Learning and sleeping are recognized major life activities. See Poindexter, 168 F.3d at 1231. Doyal cites the EEOC Guidance on Psychiatric Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act as authority for her position that thinking and interacting with others are also major life activities. The EEOC Guidance is not, however, controlling authority. See Pack, 166 F.3d at 1305 n.5. We will nevertheless assume for the sake of argument that, along with learning and sleeping, thinking and interacting with others constitute major life activities. We now proceed to Step Three.

In order for an impairment to be substantially limiting, the individual must be

(1) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or

(2) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.

29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1). Doyal does not contend that she was unable to perform the life activities of sleeping, learning, thinking, and interacting with others. In determining whether she was significantly restricted in any of these four activities, we consider the following factors: (1) "[t]he nature and severity of the impairment;" (2) "[t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment;" and (3) "[t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(2). We also consider the effects of corrective or mitigating measures, both positive and negative, on the impairment. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999); Pack, 166 F.3d at...