Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 13 September 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2018-342,2018-342
• Citation: 2019 VT 66
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: Reed Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Department

2019 VT 66

Reed Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Department

No. 2018-342

Supreme Court of Vermont

April Term, 2019

September 13, 2019

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

On Appeal from Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division

Mary Miles Teachout, J.

Anthony N.L. Iarrapino of Wilschek Iarrapino Law Office PLLC, and James Diaz and Lia Ernst of ACLU Foundation of Vermont, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Eileen M. Blackwood and Justin St. James, Office of City Attorney, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.

Jennifer Duggan and Elena Mihaly, Conservation Law Foundation, and Jamey Fidel and Jon Groveman, Vermont Natural Resources Council, Montpelier, for Amici Curiae Conservation Law Foundation and Vermont Natural Resources Council.

David Putter and Christopher D. Winters, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae Jim Condos, Secretary of State of the State of Vermont.

Daniel P. Richardson and Stephen F. Coteus of Tarrant, Gillies & Richardson, Montpelier, and Timothy Cornell and Cornell Dolan, Boston, Massachusetts, for Amici Curiae Vermont Journalism Trust, New England First Amendment Coalition, and Vermont Press Association.

Carl Andeer, Vermont League of Cities and Towns, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae Vermont League of Cities and Towns.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Skoglund, Eaton and Carroll, JJ., and Burgess, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

¶ 1. REIBER, C.J. Reed Doyle appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for partial judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). In his motion, plaintiff argued that the Burlington Police Department (BPD) unlawfully withheld public records in violation of the Public Records Act (PRA) when it charged a fee for costs that would be incurred by complying with his request. Based on the plain language of the PRA, we hold that the BPD cannot charge for staff time spent in complying with requests to inspect public records. Accordingly, we reverse.

¶ 2. Plaintiff stated the following facts in his complaint. Plaintiff witnessed an incident involving BPD officers in a public park. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff submitted a citizen's complaint form to the BPD to voice concerns about alleged officer misconduct and unreasonable use of force during the incident. Plaintiff subsequently requested to inspect body camera footage, among other records, related to the incident. The BPD denied his request. Plaintiff appealed the denial to BPD Chief Brandon del Pozo. In his response to the appeal, Chief del Pozo characterized plaintiff's request as "seeking to inspect" records. He stated that, pursuant to statute, the BPD could only produce a heavily redacted form of the requested records, and the staff time to review and redact the records would cost plaintiff several hundred dollars.¹ Chief del Pozo also informed plaintiff that he must pay a deposit before the BPD would begin reviewing and redacting the requested records.

¶ 3. After filing a complaint in the civil division against the BPD, plaintiff moved for a partial judgment on the pleadings. He argued that the BPD violated the PRA when it failed to provide the requested records for inspection free of charge. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff timely appealed.

¶ 4. "When reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the issue before the Court is whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the pleadings." Fercenia v. Guiduli, 2003 VT 50, ¶ 6, 175 Vt. 541, 830 A.2d 55 (mem.). "[W]e accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations. . . . We . . . focus our analysis on the court's conclusions of law, which we review de novo." Flint v. Dep't of Labor, 2017 VT 89, ¶ 3, 205 Vt. 558, 177 A.3d 1080 (quotation omitted).

¶ 5. The parties dispute whether the PRA authorizes state agencies to charge and collect fees for staff time spent complying with requests to inspect public records. This Court applies "a nondeferential and plenary standard of review to issues of statutory interpretation." Vt. Human Rights Comm'n v. Agency of Transp., 2012 VT 88, ¶ 7, 192 Vt. 552, 60 A.3d 702; see also 1 V.S.A. § 319(a) (directing trial court to review denials of PRA requests de novo). "[O]ur primary goal" when interpreting statutes is "to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Lydy v. Trustaff, Inc., 2013 VT 44, ¶ 6, 194 Vt. 165, 76 A.3d 150. We begin our review with the statute's plain meaning. People's United Bank, NA v. Alana Provencale, Inc., 2018 VT 46, ¶ 8, 207 Vt. 362, 189 A.3d 71. "If the statute is unambiguous and its words have plain meaning, we accept the statute's plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature and our inquiry proceeds no further." Wesco, Inc. v. Sorrell, 2004 VT 102, ¶ 14, 177 Vt. 287, 865 A.2d 350.

¶ 6. Section 316(c) authorizes an agency to "charge and collect the cost of staff time associated with complying with a request for a copy of a public record." 1 V.S.A. § 316(c) (emphasis added). By its plain language, this provision authorizes charges only for requests for copies of public records, not for requests for inspection. "We will not read an implied condition into a statute unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective." Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999) (quotation and emphasis omitted). If we interpret § 316(c) as also applying to requests to inspect, it would render "a copy of" mere surplusage. See In re Miller, 2009 VT 36, ¶ 14, 185 Vt. 550, 975 A.2d 1226 ("[W]e must not allow a significant part of a statute to be rendered surplusage or irrelevant." (quotation omitted)).

¶ 7. Moreover, the plain language throughout § 316 indicates the Legislature's intent to distinguish requests to inspect public records from requests to copy them. Section 316 begins by providing that "[a]ny person may inspect or copy any public record." 1 V.S.A. § 316(a) (emphasis added). This disjunctive "or" creates a distinction between requests to "inspect" and to "copy" that continues throughout the section. The statute specifies the times when a person may inspect public records in § 316(a)(1)-(2); authorizes charges associated with requests for copies in § 316(b) and § 316(c); and further addresses charges, equipment, monies, and formats for copies in § 316(d)-(i).

¶ 8. Notably, where § 316 authorizes charges for copies, it contemplates that agencies will transfer the copies to requesters—indicating the word "copy" is not interchangeable with "inspect" for the purposes of the statute. Section 316(b) states an agency may "charge and collect from the person requesting the copy the actual cost of providing the copy. . . . The agency may also charge and collect from the person making the request, the costs associated with mailing or transmitting the record . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Section 316(c) states, after authorizing charges for "staff time associated with complying with a request for a copy," that the "agency may require that . . . all charges be paid . . . prior to delivery of the copies." (Emphasis added.) This language indicates that in authorizing charges for a "copy," the Legislature meant a record that the requester could keep and review wherever and whenever the requester chooses. The plain language of § 316 thus separates requests to copy from requests to inspect, and the section only authorizes charges for staff time associated with requests for copies—not requests to inspect.

¶ 9. We acknowledge that here, where no one disputes that the BPD must redact exempted material before producing the record for inspection, the BPD cannot comply with the inspection request without first creating a second, redacted version of the requested material.² See 1 V.S.A. § 318(e) (providing that agency must produce requested record with exempted material redacted rather than simply withholding record). In that situation, the BPD argues, the request to inspect is really a request for a copy. More generally, the BPD contends that the work involved in complying with a request determines whether a state agency may charge fees for staff time, not a semantic distinction between inspection and copying. In support of its rationale, the BPD points to Herald Association v. Dean, in which we held that the PRA "does not allow an agency to withhold public records simply because complying with the request is difficult or time consuming." 174 Vt. 350, 359, 816 A.2d 469, 477 (2002). We held that the PRA "provides a different remedy in those circumstances": the "agency may 'charge and collect the cost of staff time associated with complying with a request for a copy of a public record.' " Id. (quoting 1 V.S.A. § 316(c)).

¶ 10. Herald Association is inapposite because it does not address a request for inspection. More importantly, as stated above, the statute's plain language indicates that the Legislature did not intend to authorize charges associated with staff time in complying with a request to inspect. Where "the meaning is clear" according to "the plain language of the statute," "we will enforce it according to its terms." State v. Richland, 2015 VT 126, ¶ 6, 200 Vt. 401, 132 A.3d 702; see also State v. LeBlanc, 171 Vt. 88, 91, 759 A.2d 991, 993 (2000) ("[W]e presume that all language in a statute was drafted advisedly, and that the plain ordinary meaning of the language used was intended." (quotation omitted)).

¶ 11. Furthermore, the PRA explicitly directs courts to "liberally construe[]" the Act to "provide for free and open examination of records." 1 V.S.A. § 315(a). "...