Doyle v. Creeger (In re Creeger)
| Decision Date | 20 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-34053,Adv. Pro. No. 15-3023 |
| Parties | In Re: Olga Creeger, Debtor. Justin Doyle, Plaintiff, v. Olga Creeger, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Justin Doyle ("Plaintiff") made payments to the University of Toledo for tuition in the amount of $26,139.37 on behalf of Defendant Olga Creeger. Defendant Olga Creeger ("Defendant" or "Debtor") is the debtor in the underlying Chapter 7 case. [Case No. 14-34053, Doc. # 1]. Plaintiff commenced this adversary proceeding, requesting that the court find that the debts of the Debtor, specifically the $26,139.37 paid by Plaintiff to the University of Toledo, "be held non-dischargeable as a qualified educational loan under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B)." [Doc. # 1, p. 3].
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the payments made to the University of Toledo were on Defendant's behalf and at no time were to be considered a gift. [Id. at ¶ 6]. Plaintiff argues that the amount paid to the University of Toledo on Defendant's behalf is a qualified educational loan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)(B). Accordingly, it is Plaintiff's position that the amount of $26,139.37 should be held non-dischargeable in Defendant's underlying Chapter 7 case. Plaintiff also seeks legal fees, the costs of this action, and any other remedy the court would find appropriate. [Id. at p. 3].
This proceeding is now before the court for decision on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Motion") [Doc. # 17], Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion") [Doc. # 18], Plaintiff's Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Response") [Doc. # 20], and Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Response") [Doc. # 21].
The district court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1334(b) as a civil proceeding arising in or related to a case under Title 11. This proceeding has been referred to this court by the district court under its general order of reference. 28 U.S.C. §157(a); General Order 2012-7 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Proceedings to determine the dischargeability of debts are core proceedings that the court may hear and decide. 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(I).
This Memorandum of Decision constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Regardless of whether specifically referred to in this Memorandum of Decision, the court has examined the submitted materials, considered all of the evidence, and reviewed the entire record of the case. Based upon that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not Defendant's debt owed to Plaintiff is an "educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986" under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)(B).
Therefore, Defendant's Motion will be denied, and Plaintiff's Motion will be denied
The following facts were stipulated to by both parties and submitted to the court as follows:
In her Motion, Defendant states that she and Plaintiff were "in a dating relationship" at the time Plaintiff caused the University of Toledo to be paid on Defendant's behalf. [Doc. # 18, p. 4]. At the time she attended the University of Toledo, Defendant was "doing so on a student visa and was not eligible for qualified student loans and as a noncitizen . . . had insufficient credit to obtain personal loans to pay for her education . . . ." [Id.]. These assertions were not supported by an affidavit.
Defendant Debtor filed her Chapter 7 petition on November 5, 2014. Her bankruptcy Schedule F shows a claim owed to Justin Anthony Doyle in the amount of $26,500.00. [Case No. 14-34053, Doc. # 1, p. 16].
In addition to the stipulated facts, Plaintiff attached a photocopy of a Note as an exhibit. [Doc. # 1, Pl. Ex. A, p. 5]. The Note was executed "in the County of Wood, State of Ohio, City of Bowling Green" and was notarized by a State of Ohio Notary Public. The Note provided for Defendant to repay Plaintiff in a series of installment payments, until the balance due was paid in full. The Note was void of any language referring to the balance due as being derived from an educational loan, qualified or otherwise. Defendant admitted the authenticity of the Note on herAnswer. [Doc. #8, ¶ 7].
No affidavits were filed by either Plaintiff or Defendant.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to this proceeding by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, summary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, however, all inferences "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-88 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, "and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party has met its initial burden, the adverse party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. "The non-moving party, however, must provide more than mere allegations or denials . . . without giving any significant probative evidence to support" its position. Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998).
Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must consider each motion separately on its merits, since each party, as a movant for summary judgment, bears the burden to establish both the nonexistence of genuine issues of material fact and that party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Lansing Dairy v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994); Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 463 n.6 (6th Cir. 1999).
The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not mean, of course, that summary judgment for one side or the other is necessarily appropriate. "When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, 'the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losingparty waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.'" Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 444-445 (6th Cir. 2003)(quoting, B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 593 (6th Cir. 2001)); 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d §2720 (1998).
Plaintiff seeks to have the debt owed to him be found nondischargeable based upon the "undue hardship" exception to nondischargeability of such debt in 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8).
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8), the following claims are excepted from discharge:
Section 523(a)(8) excepts four categories of educational claims from a debtor's discharge: (1) loans made, insured, and/or guaranteed by governmental units; (2) loans made under any program partially or fully funded by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution; (3) claims for funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; and (4) any "qualified educational loan" as that term is defined in the Internal Revenue Code. In re Rumer, 469 B.R. 553, 561 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012); see also, In re Corbin, 506 B.R. 287, 291 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2014), but see, In re Oliver, 499 B.R. 617, 622-623 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2013)...
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