Doyle v. Manhattan Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 October 1891
• Citation: 28 N.E. 495,128 N.Y. 488
• Parties: DOYLE v. MANHATTAN RY. CO. et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

128 N.Y. 488

28 N.E. 495

DOYLE

v.MANHATTAN RY. CO. et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 20, 1891.

Appeal from common pleas of New York city and county, general term.

Action by Anna Maria Doyle against the Manhattan Railway Company and the Metropolitan Railway Company. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

Samuel Blythe Rogers, for appellants.

G. Willett Van Nest, for respondent.

EARL, J.

This action was commenced by the plaintiff, an abutting owner upon defendants' railway, to recover damages to her abutting premises by the maintenance and operation of the railway, and to restrain the defendants from maintaining and operating the same. Upon the trial she gave evidence tending to show the damage to both the rental and fee value of her premises, and the court found the rental damage to be $12,000, and the fee damage to be $16,000, and ordered judgment in her favor for the $12,000, and an injunction restraining the defendants from operating their railroad in front of her premises; the injunction, however, not to be issued for a period of 60 days after the entry of judgment, to enable the defendants to acquire her easements in the street by condemnation proceedings, or by the payment of the sum of $16,000. The judgment thus rendered having been affirmed at the general term, the defendants have appealed to this court. According to our decision in the case of Galway v. Same Defendants, 128 N. Y.--, 28 N. E. Rep. 479, the plaintiff's cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations or by laches, and we need say nothing more in reference to these objections to her right to recover.

There was a serious controversy upon the trial as to the amount of plaintiff's damages, and the defendants claim that improper evidence was received upon that subject. A real-estate expert was produced as a witness on her behalf, and asked this question: ‘What, in your judgment, would the property be worth without the elevated railroad?’ This was objected to by the defendants, and each of them, as hypothetical, speculative, and incompetent; and the court overruled the objection, and the witness answered: ‘Think they would be worth $200,000 to $225,000.’ He had previously testified that the present value of the premises was $150,000 to $175,000. We have just decided in the case of Roberts v. Railway Co., 28 N. E. Rep. 486, that a similar question was incompetent, and that it was erroneous to allow it to be answered, and we need say no more about it now. For this error the judgment must be reversed.

But there were other erroneous rulings upon questions of evidence. The plaintiff was permitted, against the objection of the defedants, to prove the effect of the operation of the road upon the premises upon the corner opposite to that upon which her premises were situated. It is probably true that the exposure of those premises to damage from the road was greater than that to the plaintiff's premises. But we think it was competent to prove the effect upon those premises, so that the trial judge could be informed generally of the effects produced by the operation of the road. But the defendants were prohibited, upon her objections, from giving similar evidence. Her premises, it must be borne in mind, were at the south-east corner of Fifty-Third street and Sixth avenue. Jackson, a witness for the defendants, who had been conducting a grocery business for six years at the corner of Fifty-First street and the avenue, and still earlier at the corner of Twenty-Fourth street, was asked this question: ‘Will you state whether the elevated railroad has caused any material or substantial interference with light, air, and access in any of the buildings which you have occupied on Sixth avenue?’ Plaintiff's counsel objected to this as ‘incompetent and immaterial, and because the witness had never occupied the Doyle buildings.’ Archer, another witness for the defendants, who for seven years had occupied a store on the south-east corner of Fifty-Seventh street and Sixth avenue, was asked this question: ‘State whether the railroad causes any interference with the light, air, and access of the buildings which you occupy on Sixth avenue.’ This was objected to as incompetent and immaterial. He was also asked this question: ‘State whether the elevated railroad, according to your observation, affects in any way the light, air, or access of any of those buildings on the east side of Sixth avenue.’ This was objected to as too broad. The counsel for the defendants then said that he would qualify the question ‘by putting it between Fifty-First street and Fifty-Seventh street,’ and plaintiff's counsel again objected to the question, on the ‘ground that the question should refer to the Doyle property.’ Saltzseider, who owned and resided in a building on the south west corner of Fifty-Fourth street and Sixth avenue, was asked this question: ‘State whether the passage of the your rooms.’ This was objected to as immaterial and incompetent. He was also asked this question: ‘Did the existence of the elevated railroad cause any interference with the access to your premises?’ This was objected to on the same grounds. Prigge, also a witness for the defendants, who had for many years occupied a building on the north-west corner of Fifty-Ninth street and Sixth avenue for the grocery business, and as a residence, was asked this question: ‘Has the elevated railroad affected the light, air, or access of the premises which you occupied in any material or...