Doyle v. Schroeder, 2741
Decision Date | 18 September 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 2741,2741 |
Parties | R. E. DOYLE, Burton Kerns and Franklin O. Baker, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Chris SCHROEDER, Walter Peters, James Fowler, Hazel Conley, Ruth E. Fleischer, Lloyd Watson, Merle Haworth, William F. Welch, Cooley Butler, Melvin White and George Buszkiewic, Defendants and Respondents. |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
John F. Raper and R. G. Diefenderfer, Sheridan, for appellants.
Henry A. Burgess and Edward J. Redle, Sheridan, for respondents.
On July 5, 1955, the Sheridan County Boundary Board, purporting to act under the provisions of §§ 67-701-67-706, W.C.S.1945, consolidated School Districts No. 10 12, and 24 into a single district designated as School District No. 24.
Plaintiffs, Doyle, Kerns, and Baker, residents and taxpayers of School Districts No. 10, 12, and 24, respectively, brought this action, seeking by a declaratory judgment to have the purported consolidation declared void, and requesting an injunction to prevent further functioning of officials acting in behalf of, or in relation to, the consolidated district.
Plaintiffs, setting forth in their petition the facts regarding the situation, contended that § 67-701 was impliedly repealed by ch. 163, S. L. of Wyoming 1947, and that there existed no valid statutory basis for the purported consolidation. Defendants (the members of the boundary board and the elected trustees of the newly consolidated District No. 24) demurred to plaintiffs' petition, insisting, inter alia, that § 67-701 was valid and unrepealed by said ch. 163. The court sustained defendants' demurrer and entered judgment against plaintiffs, who have now appealed.
The basic question to be determined is whether § 67-701 ( ) was repealed by ch. 163 ( ).
Several statements in plaintiffs' brief are noteworthy:
'If the Court should determine that we are wrong in our contention of such repeal, then no further enquiry into the case is necessary * * *';
again,
'Each case must stand upon the particular statutes considered therein and we have not found any situation exactly like that presented here';
and, further,
'It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that a law, whether civil or criminal in nature, may be repealed by a later enactment covering the same subject, although such repeals are not favored.'
As a basis for the rule last stated, plaintiffs quoted 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 292:
* * *'
Taking these statements at face value, our first analysis must relate to the status of § 67-701, the implied repeal of which is not favored in law. Unfortunately, plaintiffs cite for our assistance no cases regarding this statute or one similar; and apparently none exist.
For a discussion of the repeal of a statute by reason of a later statute which gives additional powers or privileges, we turn to our own case of Sheridan County Power Dist. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 61 Wyo. 365, 157 P.2d 997, 1000:
* * *'
This case was cited in 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 292, where it is stated:
'* * * One of two affirmative statutes on the same subject matter does not repeal the other if both can stand, as where they are cumulative. * * *'
When we consider the above-quoted language of our court and the admissions which plaintiffs have made, it is clear that any person who claims that a statute has been repealed by implication assumes thereby the burden of demonstrating beyond question that the legislative body by its later action evinced an unequivocal purpose of effecting a repeal.
Turning then to plaintiffs' arguments on the subject, we find the following language which is plaintiffs' sole foundation for contending that § 67-701 has been repealed.
'We submit that, under every test required by the rule, Section 67-701, W.C.S.1945, was repealed by Chapter 163, Session Laws of 1947. The old law provided for a school district boundary board in each county of the state and placed in it full, complete and arbitrary power to organize and reorganize school districts as it wished. The 1947 statute set up a new, complete and comprehensive method for reorganizing the districts, provided for county committees and a state committee, specifically prescribed the method by which districts could be reorganized or combined and, in particular, required an election to be held so that the electors of the area affected by any proposed action of the sort could accept or reject it. Thus the arbitrary power vested in the district boundary board, under 67-701, was abolished and the right to determine whether any change should be made was vested in the people, where it should be.
'In determining the legislative intent, the title of the 1947 act, as well as its first two sections declaring the purpose of the enactment, all quoted above, should be examined, also Section 6, which defines anew the district boundary board and relegates its...
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