Doyle v. Scutt

• Decision Date: 01 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-CV-40213-FL.,03-CV-40213-FL.
• Parties: Robert DOYLE, # 201447, Petitioner, v. Debra SCUTT, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

347 F.Supp.2d 474

Robert DOYLE, # 201447, Petitioner, v. Debra SCUTT, Respondent.

No. 03-CV-40213-FL.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

December 1, 2004.

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Robert Doyle, Jackson, MI, pro se.

Raina I. Korbakis, Brenda E. Turner, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

GADOLA, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Petitioner Robert Doyle has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he is incarcerated in violation of his constitutional rights. Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea of no contest in Livingston County Circuit Court of one count of armed robbery, M.C.L. § 750.529, and one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, M.C.L. § 750.157a. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty to forty years imprisonment for each conviction.

In his pleadings, Petitioner claims 1) that he was denied due process of law by the absence of an attorney and an interpreter for the hearing impaired at his arraignment; 2) that his no contest plea was involuntary and unintelligent; 3) that the prosecution breached the plea agreement; 4) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel; 5) that his sentence is based on false information; 6) that his sentence is grossly disproportionate; and 7) that the prosecution withheld key evidence. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

II. Facts

Petitioner's convictions and sentence arise from his participation in the armed robbery of one restaurant and an attempted armed robbery of another restaurant. At the completed robbery, the victim was assaulted at gunpoint, robbed of money, and "stuffed into a freezer" to allow Petitioner and his co-defendants to make their getaway. Sent. Trans, at 29. During both crimes, the perpetrators were armed with a twelve gauge shotgun.

At Petitioner's plea hearing, the trial judge informed him of the maximum sentence he faced on each count, which was life imprisonment. Plea Trans. at 13, 16. Petitioner was informed that a plea of no contest would have the same legal effect as a conviction after trial. Id. at 15-16. It was stated on the record that, in exchange for Petitioner's no contest plea to one count of armed robbery and one count of attempted armed robbery, the prosecution would dismiss the fourth felony habitual offender charges and felony firearm charges in each of the cases to which Petitioner pled no contest. The prosecution would also dismiss two additional charges of breaking and entering and one additional charge of larceny over one hundred dollars, all of which were supplemented by fourth felony habitual offender charges. Id. at 10-12. The prosecution would also recommend that Petitioner be sentenced within the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 11. The prosecution noted that there was a mandatory minimum sentence of one year for armed robbery. Id. at 16.

Petitioner stated that he understood that his minimum sentence would be between five and twenty-five years under the guidelines. Id. at 16. The prosecutor stated that, if for any reason the judge wanted to exceed the guideline minimum sentence, Petitioner would have the right to withdraw his plea and go to trial and that, if he did so, he could be convicted as a habitual offender and the guidelines would not apply. Id. at 13-14.

At the plea hearing, Petitioner initially accused his counsel of lying to him. Id. at 4-6. Petitioner alleged that his counsel told him that his sentence would be four to twenty years or four to twenty-five years if he were not the leader of the group, and ten to twenty-five years if he were the leader of the group; Petitioner also accused his counsel of generally failing to communicate with him, and alleged that he did not know what sentence he was facing. Id. Trial counsel denied Petitioner's allegations, pointed out the advantages of the plea agreement he had negotiated, and made a motion to withdraw as counsel. Id. at 6. The trial judge asked Petitioner if he wished to continue to be represented by his current lawyer or if he wanted the judge to appoint him a new lawyer. Id. at 9. Petitioner replied that he wanted to keep his attorney. Id. at 9.

The trial judge informed petitioner of the constitutional rights he would be giving up by pleading guilty, including 1) the right to a jury trial, or a bench trial if he waived his right to a jury trial, Id. at 17; 2) the right to the presumption of innocence; 3) the right to require the prosecution to prove every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt; 3) the right to compel the appearance of witnesses he wished to call on his behalf; and 4) the right to remain silent, or to testify on his own behalf, as he saw fit. Id. at 19.

Petitioner stated that no threats or promises had been made to induce his plea, other than the promises set down on the record in open court, and that it was his free and voluntary choice to plead no contest to the two charges as set forth above in exchange for dismissal of the additional charges and the prosecution's recommendation that his sentence be within the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 17-23. It was also stated on the record that Petitioner's co-defendants had already negotiated plea agreements and had agreed to testify against Petitioner, if necessary. Id. at 12. Petitioner affirmed that his attorney had explained the nature of the charges against him to his complete satisfaction. Id. at 16. After this careful and thorough procedure, the trial judge stated that he was "satisfied that the waiver in this case is freely and voluntarily made," and Petitioner's plea of no contest was accepted by the court. Id. at 18, 26.

At petitioner's sentencing hearing, petitioner moved to withdraw his no contest plea. Sent. Trans. at 4-6. Petitioner alleged that he misunderstood the plea agreement and believed that he had obtained a better sentencing agreement than he actually had. Id. at 4-6, 11. Petitioner then asserted his innocence and contended that trial counsel had never asked him if he was innocent. Id. at 5, 11. Petitioner contended that he only agreed to plead no contest because he knew that he had a bad record and believed that the plea agreement meant that he would plead to certain things, all charges would be dropped, and he would have the opportunity to explain what happened. Id. at 27. Petitioner denied involvement in the armed robbery; he asserted that he knew about the crimes, but was not present. Id. at 29. Petitioner admitted that he let his co-defendants use his van, which they drove to the crime scenes, but denied involvement in, or knowledge of, the armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery crimes. Id. at 28-29.

The trial judge declined to allow petitioner to withdraw his no contest pleas, noting Petitioner's lengthy criminal history¹ and that the armed robbery victim had been "stuffed into a freezer," Id. at 14, 29. The prosecution contended that "[w]hile his history certainly doesn't indicate a lot of violence, he graduated to eliciting other people[, p]rimarily younger people, to assist him. He used firearms and became involved in assaultive crimes." Id. at 25. The prosecution further argued that, although Petitioner had not actually held the shotgun during the incidents, he had aided and abetted the perpetrator who did hold the gun, that society needed to be protected from him, and that a lengthy sentence should be imposed. Id. at 24-25. The trial judge agreed and sentenced Petitioner accordingly. Id. at 25, 29.

III. Procedural History

Following sentencing, petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals. Leave to appeal was granted and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentences after considering his claims on the merits. People v. Doyle, Nos. 226691, 226692, 2002 WL 87491 (Mich.App. Jan. 22, 2002)(per curiam). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Doyle, 467 Mich. 891, 653 N.W.2d 409 (2002).

Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus August 26, 2003, raising the following claims as grounds for relief:

I. Since petitioner is hearing impaired, did the denial of an interpreter, and lawyer at his video arraignment effectively deny him of [sic] his constitutional due process right to a proper arraignment?

II. Was petitioner denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, and therefore is entitled to a new trial and/or an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922 (1976)?

III. Was petitioner's nolo contendere plea not voluntary or intelligent as he claimed his innocence and did the trial court clearly err and deny petitioner due process of law in denying his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea? U.S. Const. Am. VI, XIV; Mich. Const.1963, Art. I, Sec. 17-20.

IV. Was petitioner denied his right to a fair proceeding where the prosecutor failed to uphold his promise in the plea bargain and withheld crucial evidence in violation of United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546 (6th Cir.1999)?

V. Were petitioner's sentences based on false information, and grossly disproportionate to the agreed upon plea bargain, which violates the Constitution of the United States, U.S. Const. Am. VIII?

IV. Standard of Review

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Petitioner is entitled to relief only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claims on the merits either

a. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

b. resulted in a...