Doyle v. Town of Falmouth

• Decision Date: 23 October 2019
• Docket Number: Docket No. 2:19-cv-00229-NT
• Parties: MICHAEL DOYLE, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF FALMOUTH, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

MICHAEL DOYLE, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF FALMOUTH, Defendant.

Docket No. 2:19-cv-00229-NT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

October 23, 2019

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Before me is the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ("Def.'s Mot.") (ECF No. 5). For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael Doyle claims that Defendant Town of Falmouth ("Town" or "Defendant"), through its Town Council ("Council"), violated its own rules of conduct, denied him equal protection under the law, and suppressed lawful speech. His Complaint, which was filed in Maine Superior Court on April 10, 2019, is produced in its entirety below:

FACTS:

1. Defendant Town of Falmouth's Town Council led by Chairmen Caleb Hemphill, violated their Council rules and denied Plaintiff equal protection under the law as laid out in the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America. The Council Rules were violated in Section 17¹ (Exhibit 1) when Councilor Hope Cahan blurted out after Plaintive [sic] finished a comment at the podium, "No applausing, (Cahan's word choice) we want to create a safe space for people who want to comment so would you please withhold from clapping or booing that would be greatly appreciated so everyone can speak and not held in judgment." without permission to speak from the Chairman Hemphill. Cahan, according to Council rules, Section 19² must make satisfaction before being allowed to speak or vote after the breach. Hemphill allowed Cahan to vote on an item at the April 9th Council meeting. Plaintiff is required to abide by Council Rules while they violate and refuse to enforce their own rules of conduct. For example Democrats are allowed to drone on well after the five-minute limit at the podium has expired, while Plaintiff, a Republican, is constantly and strictly held to the five-minute limit.

2. Plaintiff moves the Court to invalidate all Council votes made that counted Cahan's vote from April 9th up to and including all other votes until Cahan makes satisfaction as defined by "a fulfillment of an obligation or claim" and mandate that all Council Rules be enforced equally on members as well as speakers at the podium both Democrats and Republicans.

3. Respectfully submitted this 10th day of April 2019[.]

Compl. (ECF No. 4-2).

The Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (ECF No. 1). On May 28, 2019, the Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the "legal sufficiency" of a complaint. Maine Educ. Ass'n Benefits Trust v. Cioppa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Me. 2012). The general rules of pleading require a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That "short and plain statement" need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

However, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "Merely reciting elements of a claim will not do. . . . Nor will alleging facts that are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of conjecture." Lydon v. Local 103, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 770 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Furthermore, although a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case of his claim at the pleading stage, "the elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim." Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013).

Faced with a motion to dismiss, I examine the factual content of the Complaint and determine whether those facts support a reasonable inference "that thedefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First, I "isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). Second, I take the complaint's well-pleaded, non-speculative facts as true, "drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Id. However, I need not accept "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Distinguishing sufficient from insufficient pleadings is a "context-specific task." Id. at 679.

"A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, . . . and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citation omitted). If a pro se plaintiff provides sufficient facts, a court can "intuit the correct cause of action." Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). However, dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate where a plaintiff merely states the formal elements of a claim "without the requisite supporting facts." Id. ("[P]ro se status does not insulate a party from complying with procedural and substantive law."). Pro se plaintiffs must still "plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim." Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980).

A plaintiff can challenge the violation of a constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.³ Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). With respect to a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff "must plausibly plead two essential elements, (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and (ii) that this conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). To satisfy this latter requirement, the plaintiff must identify a substantive right, which he has been denied, and a "causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the alleged deprivation." García-González v. Puig-Morales, 761 F.3d 81, 87 (1st Cir. 2014). A plaintiff suing a municipality "must show that the violation occurred as a result of the municipality's 'policy or custom.' " Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2013). A complaint that "alleges misconduct from many separate actors, but gives no guidance about which acts are properly attributable to the municipal authority," fails to state a claim against the municipality. Id.

DISCUSSION

Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges that the Falmouth Town Council has violated its own rules and the Defendant's Equal Protection and First Amendment rights. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff fails to allege any factsshowing intentional discrimination by the Council, that he advances sweeping and conclusory statements, and that he asks for relief that would violate separation of powers.

I. Violation of the Council's Own Rules

The Plaintiff claims that the Council has violated its own rules by permitting Councilor Cahan to vote because she had not made satisfaction after she allegedly violated the rule requiring her to address the Chair before speaking. However, the Plaintiff's own facts do not suggest that any rules were violated. Section 19 of the rules does not automatically require a member to make satisfaction before voting. Rather, it states that "he/she may on motion be required to make satisfaction." Compl. Ex. 1 (ECF No. 4-2). Thus, the prerequisite for any satisfaction requirement is a motion. The Complaint nowhere states that such a motion was made. Further, as the Defendant points out, the rules do not create an independent cause of action. See Def.'s Mot. 6-7. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for any violation of the Council's own rules, much less a violation that would create any right of action for the Plaintiff.

II. Equal Protection Claims

"An equal protection claim requires proof that (1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intentto injure a person."⁴ Freeman, 714 F.3d at 38 (internal quotations omitted). Two groups are considered "similarly situated" when they "have engaged in the same activity vis-à-vis the government entity without such distinguishing or mitigating circumstances as would render the comparison inutile." Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).

The Plaintiff alleges that the Council has "denied [him] equal protection under the law as laid out in the 14th Amendment."⁵ Compl. ¶ 1. He seems to make two claims: (1) that the Council rules are not enforced in the same manner against Council members, who are all Democrats, as against the Plaintiff, who is a Republican, and (2) that the Council treats speakers differently...