Dozier v. State
| Decision Date | 20 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 50817.,50817. |
| Citation | 381 P.3d 608 (Table) |
| Parties | Scott Raymond DOZIER a/k/a Chad Wyatt, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Clark County District Attorney
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction in a death penalty case. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jennifer Togliatti, Judge.
Appellant Scott Raymond Dozier killed Jeremiah Miller at the La Concha Inn in Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada. Dozier dismembered Miller's body, put his torso, which was cut into two pieces, into a suitcase, and dumped the suitcase into an apartment complex dumpster. Miller's head, lower arms, and lower legs were never recovered. Dozier took money from Miller that Miller had intended to use to purchase precursor chemicals for the production of methamphetamine. A jury convicted Dozier of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and sentenced him to death. On appeal, Dozier raises several issues related to the guilt and penalty phases of trial.
Guilt-phase issues
Dozier argues that insufficient evidence supports his convictions and the deadly weapon enhancements. He also contends that the district court made numerous erroneous rulings on matters related to (1) whether a senior judge could preside over pretrial matters, (2) the admission of evidence, (3) jury instructions, and (4) prosecutorial misconduct.
Sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation
Dozier argues that the State failed to put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he acted with premeditation or deliberation. In this, he contends that the evidence produced at trial showed that he was a frequent user of methamphetamine and the State failed to demonstrate that he was not under the influence of the drug at the time of the shooting. We disagree.
The evidence adduced at trial shows that Dozier expressed his intention to “jack” a drug dealer prior to Miller's murder. Miller had carried $12,000 to Las Vegas for a drug deal. When Miller was kicked out of the hotel and Dozier could not contact him, Dozier became upset and said that he “lost $13,000.” This evidence implied that Dozier had intended to take Miller's money. In addition, several witnesses testified that Dozier admitted to killing Miller and one witness testified that he saw Miller's partially dismembered body in Dozier's bathtub. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dozier committed the murder with premeditation and deliberation. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992) ; NRS 200.030(1)(a).
Sufficiency of the evidence for robbery and felony murder
Dozier argues that there was insufficient evidence introduced to support his convictions for robbery and felony murder based on robbery because the State failed to show that he was in possession of any sum of money near the $12,000 that the State alleged he stole from Miller. We disagree.
In addition to the evidence described above supporting premeditated murder, Dozier, who had to borrow twenty dollars upon arriving in Las Vegas, began spending significant sums of money on clothes, drugs, and electronics after Miller's death. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dozier robbed Miller or killed him during the course of a robbery. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;McNair, 108 Nev. at 56, 825 P.2d at 573; NRS 200.380(1) ; NRS 200 .030(1)(a).
Sufficiency of the evidence of the weapon enhancement
Dozier argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that a deadly weapon was used to rob and kill Miller. He asserts that there was no physical evidence supporting the verdict, which was based entirely on testimony that Dozier admitted that he shot Miller. While he recognizes that this court held that the corpus delicti rule does not apply to deadly weapon enhancements in Domingues v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 692, 917 P.2d 1364, 1371 (1996), he urges us to overrule that precedent based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). While we decline to revisit our prior precedent, we nevertheless agree that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain the deadly weapon enhancements.
At trial, the district court admitted evidence that when Dozier was arrested, officers seized a firearm, which was not proven to be the murder weapon, from his possession. The medical examiner testified that is was likely that the victim had been shot but could not say with any certainty that the victim had been shot. Further, her testimony was inconsistent with prior testimony at the preliminary hearing where she was not as certain as to the cause of death. Although two witnesses testified that Dozier admitted that he shot the victim, both witnesses abused methamphetamine and admitted that they had ingested drugs before Dozier spoke with them. Although there is some evidence that Dozier used a deadly weapon in the commission of these crimes, we cannot conclude that the seizure of an unrelated firearm, inconsistent testimony from the medical examiner concerning a part of the victim's body that was never recovered, and admissions heard under the influence of illicit drugs rises to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See McNair, 108 Nev. at 56, 825 P.2d at 573. However, this conclusion does not undermine our confidence in the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction for first-degree murder in light of additional witnesses' testimony that Dozier stated that he intended to rob a drug dealer, considered Miller's money to be his own and began to spend considerable sums of money after Miller disappeared, admitted that he killed Miller and had not done enough to prevent the police from identifying his body, and had seen Miller's partially dismembered remains in Dozier's hotel bathtub. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction in part and remand to the district court to strike the deadly weapon enhancements attendant to the robbery and murder convictions.
Senior judge
Dozier argues that his right to a fair trial was violated by the district court permitting a senior judge to preside over the hearing on his pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We disagree. Senior judges are not precluded from presiding over capital trials. Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 529–30, 188 P.3d 60, 69 (2008). As to Dozier's claim that he was prejudiced by the senior judge's ruling on his pretrial challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence produced at the preliminary hearing, the guilty verdict at trial cured any error during the preliminary hearing. See Echavarria v. State, 108 Nev. 734, 745, 839 P.2d 589, 596 (1992).
Evidentiary rulings
Dozier contends that the district court erred by admitting (1) unreliable testimony as to the victim's cause of death, (2) irrelevant evidence that he had a gun when he was arrested, and (3) unreliable testimony about unproduced physical evidence. We conclude that the district court did not err in any of these matters.
First, Dozier contends that the district court abused its discretion in permitting the medical examiner to offer unreliable testimony concerning the cause of Miller's death. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. See Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 12–13, 992 P.2d 845, 852 (2000). The grounds upon which the medical examiner's opinion was based affect the weight that the jury should give the testimony, not the admissibility of it. The proper recourse for Dozier to challenge the medical examiner's credibility was to engage in cross-examination pursuant to NRS 50.115(2), which he did.
Second, Dozier argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence of a firearm that was in Dozier's possession when he was arrested because the State failed to establish a chain of custody for the weapon and the possession of the weapon was unrelated to the charged offense. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gun. See Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). The officer who impounded the weapon testified at trial, identified the weapon as the one that was seized during Dozier's arrest, noted that the weapon had a Phoenix ID tag that contained his and another officer's name, and stated that the weapon and ammunition appeared substantially the same as when he impounded them. See Sorce v. State, 88 Nev. 350, 352–53, 497 P.2d 902, 903 (1972) (). Further, the firearm seized during Dozier's arrest several months after the murder was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, see NRS 48.035(1), as the State introduced evidence that Dozier admitted to several witnesses that he killed the victim and that he was in possession of a weapon with similar coloring immediately after the murder.
Third, Dozier contends that the district court erred in admitting testimony about a note he gave to a police informant and drawings depicting dismembered bodies even though the note and drawings were never produced. He also contends that the State failed to introduce sufficient foundation testimony concerning the drawings. We discern no abuse of discretion. See Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 267, 182 P.3d at 109. The failure to produce the actual note and drawings goes to the credibility of the evidence and not its admissibility. Further, as the witness who discussed the drawings testified concerning what he personally observed and heard, there was a sufficient foundation for the testimony. See NRS...
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