Dr. Ilia M. Laborde Perez v. Piñ
| Decision Date | 25 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 14-1276 (CVR) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | DR. ILIA M. LABORDE PEREZ, et als., Plaintiffs, v. DR. ODETTE PIÑEIRO CABALLERO, et als., Defendants. |
On March 31, 2014, Plaintiffs Dr. Ilia M. Laborde Pérez ("Laborde") and Global Education & Instructional Technology Consulting, Inc. ("GEITC") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed the present case against Defendants Odette Piñeiro Caballero ("Piñeiro"), Josefa Caballero ("Caballero"), Global Education Exchange Opportunities, Inc. ("GEEO"), the Puerto Rico Department of Education ("DOE") and the Puerto Rico Department of Justice ("DOJ"), alleging causes of action from infringement under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §101, et. seq., the Puerto Rico Intellectual Property Act, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31 §401, and for breach of contract under P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31 §3373, and damages flowing therefrom. (Docket Nos. 1 ). On August 22, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Verified Complaint. (Docket No. 78).
Before the Court now are a variety of motions by the Defendants, to wit, the DOE's "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" (Docket No. 39); Piñeiro and Caballero's "Motion to Dismiss" (Docket No. 40) and the DOE and DOJ's "Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction" (Docket No. 41). Before the Court are also Plaintiffs' oppositions toall of these motions (Docket Nos. 61, 60, and 62, respectively), and Defendants' replies thereto (Docket Nos. 63 and 69). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS both motions filed by the DOE and DOJ and DENIES co-Defendants' Piñeiro and Caballero's motion.1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A "short and plain" statement needs only enough detail to provide a defendant with " 'fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' " Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ( ). Yet, in order to "show" an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough factual material "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." See, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
When addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, the court must "accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs." Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2009).Under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, however, a plaintiff must "provide the grounds of his entitlement [with] more than labels and conclusions." See also, Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). Thus, a plaintiff is now required to present allegations that "nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" in order to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a). Id. at 570; see, e.g. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court's inquiry occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based "plausibility" standard established by Twombly and Iqbal. First, the Court must "accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint[,]" discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statements and factually threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940. Yet, the court "need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009).
Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether, based upon all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the complaint "states a plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. This second step is "context-specific" and requires that the Court draw from its own "judicial experience and common sense" to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted or whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id.
The heart of this dispute involves an educational model known as "Modelo de Educatión Global" ("MEG"), which Plaintiff Laborde alleges she created. Laborde is the sole owner of GEITC, which she alleges to be the only corporation authorized to use and sell the rights for the use and copy of MEG. (Docket No. 78, ¶ 12). Laborde represents that she wrote about MEG in her dissertation, and that she registered MEG in the University of Michigan Catalog, the ProQuest Catalog, and the United States Copyright Office. (Id. at ¶ 11). Laborde claims to have created and authored MEG. (Id. at ¶ 1).
On February 6, 2012, co-defendant Piñeiro met with Laborde "to negotiate and allow" Piñeiro and her corporation, GEEO to use Laborde's MEG model in presenting a proposal to the DOE's "School Improvement Grant" programs. (Id. at ¶ 13). After that meeting, Laborde, together with GEITC and GEEO personnel, incorporated the MEG model into GEEO's "MAGIC" model, and Laborde claims that in return, she was to be compensated. (Id. at ¶ 18). According to Laborde, after her MEG program was incorporated into the MAGIC model, Co-Defendants Piñeiro, Caballero and GEEO have since procured several professional services contracts for the MAGIC model with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's DOE, and have earned over six million dollars from those contracts. (Id. at ¶¶ 43-50). Plaintiffs allege Defendants Piñeiro, Caballero and/or GEEO have not paid them for the use of MEG, however, and their corporate profile, brochures, and proposals state that GEEO, not Laborde or GEITC, has the exclusive representation rights of MEG. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21). Consequently, Laborde claims that Defendants arecurrently infringing upon and engaging in acts of misappropriation of her copyrighted work.
On March 31, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion for both a TRO and a preliminary injunction against all Defendants, asking the Court to enjoin Co-Defendants GEEO, Piñeiro and Caballero from "further infringing Plaintiff's copyrighted work."(Docket No. 4-1 at ¶ 22). As to the DOE, they sought a cease and desist order preventing them from further illegal use of the MEG model.
On April 15, 2014, the Court denied both the TRO and the injunction at that time on procedural grounds, finding that Plaintiffs had not only failed to give notice to Defendants, but had failed to explain why notice was not required in this specific case. (Docket No. 14).
The Court analyzes both motions together, as the principal ground for dismissal for both petitions is the same. The DOE's motion at Docket No. 39 requests dismissal on two grounds: 1) that the present suit should be dismissed because it is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and 2) that the present case is not a copyright case, but a garden variety breach of contract and damages claim between Plaintiffs and the remaining parties, which the DOE had nothing to do with. The motion at Docket No. 41, filed by the DOE andthe DOJ2 re-alleges the request for dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, and further avers that dismissal against them is appropriate as no allegations of copyright infringement have been brought against either party. The Court agrees with these Co-Defendants that the claims against them are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
It has long been held that ... "[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). This is the case whether the named defendant is the state itself or a state official in her official capacity. Rosie D. ex rel. John D. v. Swift, 310 F.3d 230, 234 (1st Cir.2002) (); see also, Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) ( .
However, in what has become known as part of the Ex parte Young doctrine, a suit for prospective injunctive relief provides a narrow, but well-established exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677, 94 S.Ct. 1347. Ex parte Young held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a federal suit against a state attorney general for enforcing a statutewhich allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The reason for the Ex parte Young exception from Eleventh Amendment immunity is that the court found that an official could not be acting on behalf of the state when he or she acted illegally or unconstitutionally. Therefore, while it is clear that it may be possible to sue a state official in his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief without violating the Eleventh Amendment, monetary claims against the state agency should be dismissed, even if claims against state officials for prospective injunctive relief can be allowed to go forward. See, Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir.2007) (...
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