Drahaus v. State, 96-2027

• Decision Date: 23 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-2027,96-2027
• Citation: 584 N.W.2d 270
• Parties: Stephen J. DRAHAUS and Margaret A. Drahaus, as Administrators of the Estate of Jonathan Eugene Drahaus f/k/a Jonathan Eugene Waller, Deceased, Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Gwen Seward Lewis, Judy Vannahme, C. Mark Chappelle, and Other Unknown Individual Defendants, Acting in Their Capacities as Employees of the State of Iowa and the Department of Human Services, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 270

584 N.W.2d 270

Stephen J. DRAHAUS and Margaret A. Drahaus, as Administrators of the Estate of Jonathan Eugene Drahaus f/k/a Jonathan Eugene Waller, Deceased, Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Gwen Seward Lewis, Judy Vannahme, C. Mark Chappelle, and Other Unknown Individual Defendants, Acting in Their Capacities as Employees of the State of Iowa and the Department of Human Services, Appellees.

No. 96-2027.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 23, 1998.

Robert M. Holliday, Jill Mataya Corry, and Jason D. Walke of Sullivan & Ward, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Shirley A. Steffe, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and TERNUS, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the administrators of the estate of Jonathan Drahaus, from a judgment of the district court dismissing an action against the State and certain state employees under the Iowa Tort Claims Act which was brought on behalf of Jonathan Drahaus, a minor child. The district court dismissed the action because no claim was filed on Jonathan's behalf with the state appeal board within two years from the date the claim accrued as required by Iowa Code section 669.13 (1993). ¹ We will regard Jonathan as the plaintiff.

We affirm.

I. Background facts and proceedings.

Jonathan Eugene Waller was born February 7, 1988. His natural parents are Joanne Taggart and Chad Meyer. Some time in December 1991, Taggart and Jonathan began living with Taggart's boyfriend.

On February 18, 1992, and again on February 27, Jonathan's maternal grandmother, Wilma Waller, contacted the Iowa Department of Human Services (hereinafter DHS or Department) voicing her suspicions that Jonathan was being physically abused. In response to her call, Waller received a written response dated February 27, 1992, from DHS employee C. Mark Chappelle, indicating that her comments concerning Jonathan's abuse had been forwarded to a district DHS worker as "additional or duplicate information to a previously initiated investigation."

On February 28, Linda Bullock, Jonathan's aunt, contacted state juvenile court officer, Gwen Lewis, and a DHS employee, Judy Vannahme, concerning Jonathan's safety and well-being. In response to her call, Bullock received a written response from DHS employee Chappelle dated February 28, indicating that the information she had provided was insufficient to suspect child abuse. No further action was taken by the DHS regarding the reports that Jonathan was the victim of child abuse.

Approximately one week later on March 5, Jonathan was admitted to Blank Children's Hospital in Des Moines. Upon examining Jonathan, medical personnel discovered multiple life-threatening injuries including massive bruising over most of Jonathan's body. The injuries were suspected to have been inflicted by the live-in boyfriend of Jonathan's mother.

The next day, March 6, the juvenile court ordered the emergency removal of Jonathan from the custody of his mother and granted temporary legal custody of Jonathan to the DHS.

On June 26, 1992, Jonathan was placed in the temporary legal custody of Margaret and Stephen Drahaus under the supervision of the DHS. ² Jonathan's placement with the Drahauses remained under the supervision of the DHS until March 5, 1993.

On August 31, 1993, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the parental rights of Jonathan's natural parents, Joanne Taggart and Chad Meyer. The order also continued the custody of Jonathan with the Drahauses and further ordered that temporary guardianship of Jonathan be placed with the DHS for adoption placement. As of that date, the State became Jonathan's guardian.

On May 31, 1994, the district court entered an adoption decree approving the Drahauses's adoption of Jonathan. That order impliedly ended the guardianship of Jonathan by the DHS.

On August 11, 1994, the state appeal board (hereinafter appeal board) received a claim filed by Margaret Drahaus, asserting a personal injury claim on Jonathan's behalf against the State based on the Department's alleged failure to properly investigate the reports of child abuse inflicted upon Jonathan prior to March 5, 1992. The appeal board took no action with respect to the claim before Margaret Drahaus withdrew the claim on March 30, 1995.

On March 30, 1995, the Drahauses, as next friends of Jonathan, filed a petition or action in district court naming as defendants, the State of Iowa, two DHS employees and the juvenile court officer (hereinafter collectively referred to as the State), and asserting that the State was negligent in failing to properly investigate the alleged prior abuse of Jonathan.

The State filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Jonathan's suit was barred because the claim filed with the appeal board had not been filed within two years from the date the claim accrued as required by Iowa Code section 669.13.

The district court agreed and sustained the State's motion. The court concluded that the claim of alleged negligence on the part of the State accrued no later than March 17, 1992, because by that date, the Drahauses "should have known that the suspected child abuse reports regarding Jonathan had not been investigated by the DHS." The court also stated that anyone could have filed a claim with the appeal board on Jonathan's behalf anytime within two years after March 17, 1992. Because the appeal board did not receive the claim within two years from the date the claim accrued, the court concluded that Jonathan failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies under section 669.13, a necessary condition to the district court's jurisdiction over Jonathan's tort claims suit. The court thus determined that Jonathan's suit was time barred under Iowa Code section 669.13.

On appeal, Jonathan argues that the Drahauses were legally precluded from filing the claim with the appeal board on his behalf because under rule 12 of the Iowa rules of civil procedure (1992), only the State, as Jonathan's guardian, had the authority to file the claim. Jonathan thus contends that the district court erred in sustaining the State's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was not filed with the appeal board in a timely manner as required by Iowa Code section 669.13.

II. Standard of review.

Our review of a grant or denial of summary judgment is at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Gabrilson v. Flynn, 554 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996). Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c); Phipps v. IASD Health Servs. Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1997). To determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must examine the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c). The record here consists of the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits. We review the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment; in this sense, we consider a motion for summary judgment as we would a motion for directed verdict. Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Iowa 1996). Under this standard, summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable minds would differ on how the issue should be resolved. Id.

III. Iowa Tort Claims Act.

Iowa Code chapter 669 is Iowa's Tort Claims Act. Iowa Code § 669.1. Through enactment of the Tort Claims Act, the legislature abrogated, in part, the State's immunity from suits sounding in tort. See Swanger v. State, 445 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1989). Private citizens now have the right to sue the State, "but only in the manner and to the extent to which consent has been given by the legislature." Id. Thus, a private citizen's right of suit under the Tort Claims Act is not absolute, but rather is limited by conditions set forth by the legislature in chapter 669.

One such condition is the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Iowa Code section 669.13. Section 669.13 states that any claim brought under the Tort Claims Act is "forever barred, unless within two years after such claim accrued, the claim is made in writing to the state appeal board under this chapter." ³ Thus, before filing a petition in district court asserting an action against the state, a claim must first be presented to the appeal board. See In re Estate of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1996); Swanger, 445 N.W.2d at 346. Upon receipt of such claim, the appeal board has authority to adjust, compromise or settle the claim. Iowa Code § 669.3. Filing a claim with the appeal board is an administrative remedy which must be exhausted before a plaintiff can pursue his or her action in district court. Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 880-81; Swanger, 445 N.W.2d at 346-47.

We have held on several occasions that exhaustion of the administrative remedy provided in section 669.13 is jurisdictional to bringing an action or suit in district court. See Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 880 (claim filed with the appeal board under chapter 669 must be by a person who is entitled to recover for the personal injury that is the subject of the claim); Swanger, 445 N.W.2d at 346; Brumage v. Woodsmall, 444 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Iowa 1989). Thus, failure to file a claim in a timely manner with the appeal board divests a district court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear a subsequent lawsuit asserting an action against the state. Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 882.

We have also held that the tolling provision for minors found in Iowa Code section 614.8 does not apply to the two-year statute of limitations under the Tort Claims Act, Iowa Code chapter 669; such tolling provision only applies to limitations periods of actions mentioned within chapter 614. Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Iowa 1989). ⁴

Section 669.13 also states "[t]his section is the only statute of limitations applicable to claims as...